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Anything which we see to be continually changing, as, for 
example, fire, we must not call “this” or “that”, but rather say 
that it is “of such a nature”; nor let us speak of water as 
“this”, but always as “such”; nor must we imply that there is 
any stability in any of those things which we indicate by the 
use of the words “this” and “that”, supposing ourselves to 
signify something thereby; for they are too volatile to be 
detained in any such expressions as “this”, or “that”, or 
“relative to this”, or any other mode of speaking which 
represents them as permanent. We ought not to apply “this” to 
any of them, but rather the word “such”. 
Plato, Timaeus, 49 d- 50 . 
 
 
Three things are to be considered and differentiated... when 
seeing any object. First, the object we see; for example, a 
stone, a flame or any other body perceptible by the sense of 
vision, an object which can exist even before of beeing seen. 
Second, the seeing, which did not existed before the sense 
perceived the object. Third, the attention of the mind, which 
makes sight rest on the object contemplating it while the 
seeing lasts. 
   St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XI, 2,2. 
 
 
Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit 
of no distinction nor separation. The complex are the contrary 
to these, and may be distinguished into parts. Tho’ a 
particular colour, taste, and smell are qualities all united 
together in this apple, ‘tis easy to perceive they are not the 
same, but are at least distinguishable from each other.  
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, part I, Section I. 
 
 
My experience is what I agree to attend to. 
William James, The Principles of Psychology, Chapter IX. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Sources and aims of the dissertation:  
Demonstratives, perception and consciousness 
 
The central topic of this dissertation is the study of a key aspect in the 
philosophical analysis of perception, to wit, its the “demonstrative” nature. This 
aspect has been regarded even as a necessary condition for visual perception at least. 
The description given for it is not at all clear as it stands. The word ‘demonstrative’ 
applies first to a type of linguistic expression, and hence what it means to say that 
perception has a demonstrative character should be explained. This can only be done 
in a very preliminary way without going fully into the detailed discussion of issues. 
Therefore, all that it seems appropriate to say here is that I will be concerned above 
all with the fact that in perception particular objects are involved in a way that seems 
to have an immediacy which makes it appropriate to use demonstrative expressions 
like ‘this’ or ‘that’ to refer to them. But why this is so, and what is the precise 
relationship of that particular character of perception to the use of demonstrative 
expressions is just part of what we must become clear about, and of what I hope this 
dissertation will shed some light on. 
The relevance of the central topic of this dissertation can only be seen when one 
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appreciates how it lies at the crossroads of epistemology (it might be claimed that the 
perceptual demonstrative relation is the most fundamental relation between our 
cognitive mind and mind-independent objects), the philosophy of mind (it might be 
claimed that it is a key question both in the understanding of the externalistic 
character of the mind, and the relationships of the intentional with the linguistic), and 
the philosophy of cognitive science, since its treatment raises all the main questions 
on the relationships between common sense psychology, philosophical reflection, and 
scientific cognitive science. 
Understandably, I will not be able to deal with all these topics in this 
dissertation. What follows in this introduction is a brief and rather “dry”, quasi-
technical enumeration of those I do tackle, together with a short preliminary 
explanation of my motivation and my approach to them. 
A way of approaching the special manner in which particular objects are 
involved in perception is to say that in perception objects are demonstratively 
identified, and contrast this with the descriptive identification of objects. This 
approach to the subject was initiated, I believe, by Strawson in his book Individuals, 
and was put into a broader perspective by Evans in his posthumous work Varieties of 
Reference. Evans brought the notions and the conceptual ways of analysis of the 
Fregean tradition to the approach, most centrally the notion of sense or mode of 
presentation, and did so in an original, innovative way. In this respect, it seems fair to 
say that Evans’s work was dominated by the attempt to develop a version of that 
notion which is adequate to capture theoretically what is distinctive of demonstrative 
identification in general, and demonstrative identification in perception in particular, 
and he did all this against the background of a recent tradition in the philosophy of 
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language —represented by Kaplan and Perry at the time— which held that this could 
not be done. Given his way of responding to this challenge, I believe it is fair to say 
that Evans’s work uses Strawson’s insights within a tradition of reflection that goes 
all the way back to Frege's disputes with Russell at the beginning of the XXth 
century. 
In this respect there are two general aspects of Evans’s work that Ishould be 
mentioned to put the work of this dissertation in perspective. One is that, from a 
general viewpoint, Evans’s work might seem to go against the tide, both in 
philosophy in general because of its much publicized “linguistic turn(s)” and in the 
analytical tradition in particular, at least if one listens to certain views that are (or 
were) very influential: 
 
What distinguishes analytical philosophy, in its diverse manifestations, from other 
schools is the belief, first, that a philosophical account of thought can be attained 
through a philosophical account of language, and, secondly, that a comprehensive 
account can only be so attained. 
(Michael Dummett, Origins of Analytical Philosophy, p. 4) 
 
Immediately after this passage Dummett himself mentions the consequences of 
this view for the placing of Evans’s work: 
 
Some recent  work in the analytical tradition has reversed this priority, in the order of 
explanation, of language over thought, holding that language can be explained only in 
terms of antecedently given notions of different types of thought, considered 
independently of their linguistic expression. A good example of this new trend is 
Gareth Evans’s posthumous book [Varieties of Reference] (...) On my characterization, 
therefore, Evans was no longer an analytical philosopher. 
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According to Dummett’s criterium, as well as Evans a constantly growing 
amount of recent work in philosophy should be excluded from the province of 
analytical philosophy: the work by Peacocke in Sense and Content, which appeared 
shortly after Evans’s book, or in his more recent A Study of Concepts; by McDowell 
in Mind and the World, by Campbell in Past, Space, and Self, or by Cassam in Self 
and World, to name a few prominent examples. This is only to be expected if one 
recognizes all this work as influenced by Evans’s stance on the way philosophy 
should be undertaken.1 What is more, the immediate antecedents of much of this work 
                                                
1 Cf. Sense and Content, p. viii, where Peacocke, who may be regarded as the other obvious early thinker referred to within the trend alluded to, talks 
about just this kind of influence from Evans. 
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should be excluded as well. In relation to Evans, for example, we would have to take 
into account, at the very least, Strawson’s views on demonstrative vs. descriptive 
identification in Individuals  which has been mentioned above, and also his views on 
objective thought about objects in The Bounds of Sense. Even more generally, 
according to Dummett’s criterion a whole approach to the analysis of linguistic 
meaning —the Gricean approach— would seem also to have to be excluded from the 
province of analytical philosophy, because an attempt is made within the approach to 
understand (linguistic) meaning by taking categories of thought such as intention and 
belief to be more fundamental, or at the very least not less so.  Thus, all this work 
could be characterized as ‘analytic philosophy’ only in the loose sense of “adopting a 
certain philosophical style and as appealing to certain writers rather than to certain 
others” (Dummet, op. cit. pp. 4-5). But, at least when speaking seriously, we should 
exclude it all from the analytical province. 
Whether this verdict should be accepted or whether it amounts to a reductio ad 
absurdum of the criterion from which it stems is a matter which I will not try to 
pursue further, but in any case, the work in this dissertation falls squarely with in the 
trend of “some recent work” alluded to by Dummett with which it alignes itself. 
There is a second relevant general aspect of Evans’s work which I should 
mention to place the dissertation in perspective, and this might also seem to go 
against the tide. It lies precisely in Evans’s attempt to rescue the notion of sense for 
carrying out significant philosophical work. The tide here is the one of post-Kripkean, 
“direct reference” approach to meaning, which has been widely seen as opposing the 
use of a Fregean notion of sense in semantics. The relevance of this for the present 
work is, in principle, somewhat indirect, because this work belongs to the theory of 
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intentionality rather than to the theory of (linguistic) meaning. Nevertheless, it is felt 
when one considers the possible consequences of the “anti-sense” approaches, so to 
speak, for theorizing in the first field. In any case, the distinctive way in which 
theoreticians like Evans and McDowell have sought to oppose these approaches is, as 
is well known, by trying to capture the “supremacy” of reference over sense in a view 
according to which senses are “object dependent”; in other words, an externalistic 
view of senses. 
Again, the treatment of perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation in this 
dissertation may be viewed, I believe, as being within this particular neo-Fregean 
tradition. Thus, the dissertation aims, at least partially, to (modestly) contribute to the 
development of an externalistic view of “senses” or modes of presentation in the 
domain of the intentional content of perceptual experience and the theory of 
perceptual consciousness and perceptual judgements, rather than in the domain of the 
theory of meaning. 
The particular way in which Evans tried to develop this externalist perspective in 
connection with demonstratives and perception brings in another element in 
Strawson's thought —coming this time from the latter's study of Kant in The Bounds 
of Sense. This corresponds to Strawson’s elaboration of a Kantian insight, to wit, that 
the capacity for objective thought, that is, thought that could be characterized —in 
some sense— as concerning objects that are conceived as existing independently of 
our minds, is closely linked to the capacity for spatial representation. 
Evans brought in this Kantian-Strawsonian element by way of endorsing a 
principle of Russellian stock, namely that to understand a demonstrative expression 
one must know to which object that expression refers. In the case of a theory of 
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intentionality, and thus closer to Russell’s original concerns, this principle requires 
that to entertain a demonstrative thought, a thinker must know which object the 
demonstrative element of the thought refers to. That, in turn, is taken to require the 
subject thinking of the object through a “substantive” sense or mode of presentation. 
By talking of a “substantive” mode of presentation here, I mean that Evans 
defended a strong condition for demonstrative understanding: to entertain a 
demonstrative thought the thinker must be able to know what “would make true” the 
identity of the demonstrative mode of presentation of the object thought about with a 
“fundamental” mode of presentation, where a “fundamental” mode of presentation of 
an object is one that discriminates that object from all other objects of the same sort, 
which in the case of (perceptual) demonstrative thoughts or judgements about 
physical objects comes down to the determination of the object’s location, as this 
location is given egocentrically in the perception of the object. (This will be more 
fully explained in Chapter 4.) 
To a large extent, this second element of Evans’ bringing together a theory of 
perceptual demonstrative identification and a theory of sense will be called into 
question in this dissertation. It is quite true that location plays a major role in the 
perceptual demonstrative identification of objects, especially in the cases of sight and 
touch, but there are several considerations that seem to show that Evans’s requirement 
cannot be quite right, or so I will argue. 
At the other end of the spectrum of theories of perceptual demonstrative thought, 
we find John Campbell’s view of demonstrative reference in the paper “Sense, 
Reference and Selective Attention”, according to which no a priori condition for such 
reference can be formulated. For this view, demonstrative reference to objects is a 
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matter of selective attention, in the sense given to this term in some theories of 
cognitive psychology, or rather, in a sense that scientific psychology will lead us to 
discover. An account of demonstrative reference is thus placed within the province of 
empirical investigation. But this, for Campbell, does not mean that we must give up 
talking of senses or modes of presentation in the analysis of the demonstrative 
character of our perceptual awareness of objects. On the contrary, according to 
Campbell the implication is that we must formulate a theory of demonstrative senses 
—that is, senses in a reasonably recognizable classical understanding of the word 
‘sense’, according to which senses discriminate cognitive values as these reveal 
themselves in inference— within an empirical theory of selective attention. 
As a matter of fact, I was first attracted to the group of problems that are dealt 
with in this dissertation by this intriguing Campbellian theory, in that it seemed to 
hold a promise to bring the scientific psychological description and explanation of 
human capacities directly to bear on the understanding of phenomenological traits of 
experience. In being thus attracted, I considered as a challenge the critical stance on 
Campbell’s empirical approach that unfolds in Michael Martin’s “The Shallows of the 
Mind”, and my initial motivation for working on this group of problems was to 
investigate the possibility of providing a principled answer to Martin’s challenge. 
In the course of working on what eventually became this dissertation, I have 
come to substantially modify my initial intuitions and/or inclinations concerning 
Campbell’s theory or Martin’s challenge, although I feel I have at least retained their 
spirit. As will be seen, even if in one sense I retain Campbell's attention-theoretic 
approach to perceptual judgement or thought, the version that I will defend differs 
significantly from his. Thus, my specific approach still leaves an important place for 
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the fairly recent recognition in cognitive science studies of (perceptual) consciousness 
of the central place of attention in perception, but the relation of empirical findings to 
the determination of demonstrative reference is clearly more indirect. On the other 
hand, I came to appreciate more fully the force of Martin’s challenge, but I still think, 
even if not only for the reasons that I started out with, that he was not right after all in 
the views he put forth in the course of his criticism of Campbell’s ideas about the 
limits of our philosophical analysis of the mental and their application to the case in 
hand. 
In this way, by confronting the problem of the characterization of the 
demonstrative nature of our perception of physical objects, I was led to reflect on the 
relevance of empirical research for the philosophical articulation of the intentional 
content of perception. This issue was also present as I reviewed the work on 
analogue, imagistic, non-conceptual and phenomenal content, and pondered the 
relations of all these notions. As will become clear on reading the dissertation, I have 
regarded the work by Peacocke on perceptual content to be of fundamental 
importance especially that from the second half of the eighties as well as his later 
work on implicit conceptions, and I have drawn heavily on this to articulate my own 
position on the demonstrative character of perceptual content and on the place for 
conceptual analysis in this issue. 
To the extent that philosophical reflection articulates the common sense or folk 
psychological notions of attention, and given that these in turn can be regarded as part 
of the “manifest image”, to use the Sellarsean term, the problem this dissertation 
addresses may be taken, from a broader perspective, to be a case study in the relation 
between that image and the “scientific image”. Although I realize that it can be taken 
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thus, and even think that it is not entirely devoid of interest, I have not developed the 
subject from that perspective, and so no attempt has been made here to engage the 
literature on it. 
My work on the demonstrative character of perception took its particular 
direction from a type of methodological decision. Campbell’s commentaries in his 
own paper, vaguely alluding to Kaplan’s well known work on the semantic of 
demonstratives as precedents for his own ideas, again raised the question of the 
relation between a semantic theory of demonstrative expressions and an intentional 
theory of perceptual modes of presentation. My attention was drawn to recent work 
on the semantics of demonstratives, and particularly to Manuel García-Carpintero's 
“Reichenbachian approach” in “Indexicals as Token-Reflexives”. On reading this, I 
gained the general impression that this field was clearly more developed or articulated 
than the theory of perceptual modes of presentation. I then tried to follow my 
supervisor's suggestion of trying to explore the possibility of using work in the first 
field at least as a heuristic tool to find concrete hypotheses in the second field. These 
hypotheses should then be argued for on their own terms of course, but perhaps 
paying attention to work on linguistic demonstratives could also provide some 
“collateral” help in finding or constructing such arguments. As  is explained in 
Chapter 3, it is in this way that I arrived at my central conjecture to account for 
perceptual demonstrative thought. 
In the same way, also that I was led to study what on the face of it seemed rather 
like a “Reichenbachian approach” to the intentional content of perception in Searle’s 
book Intentionality. Eventually, I also found what seemed to me to be striking and 
perhaps not generally noticed similarities running between Searle’s ideas and 
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Peacocke’s ideas in Sense and Content, ideas with which, logically, mine had to be 
compared. Then I pursued this comparison in the wider context of contrasting several 
proposals to account for the perceptual mode of presentation of an object in 
perception which would be opposed by the Campbellian empirical approach. These 
proposals are classified as either “purely perceptual” (as my own proposal and the 
proposal coming from the mentioned ideas of Searle and Peackocke), or “substantial” 
(the ones due to Evans and McDowell). 
Quite apart from this obvious reason for coming to terms with these other views, 
a reason which arose, so to speak, from the “logic” of discussion in a philosophical 
work, there was an independent motivating force for contrasting points of view here. 
It came, again, from what initially seemed to me to be intriguing remarks on 
“imagistic content” in Campbell’s above-mentioned paper and on the relationships of 
this content to “propositional content”, which Campbell somehow seemed to see as 
being “bridged” by attention in a cognitive-science sense. 
In developing my own understanding of all this I was greatly helped by Naomi 
Eilan’s review of Tye’s book Imaginery Debate, with which I thought I could begin 
to see how to bring the “conceptual/non-conceptual” issue to bear on my approach, 
which in turn involved confronting the role of phenomenal properties in perception 
for reasons that I hope will be appreciated on reading Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
The context of my approach required taking into account Peacocke’s work on content 
in what might be called his “intermediate period”, that in which he explicitly analyzed 
a notion of analogue content. I tried then to clarify the relation of this notion to the 
notion of phenomenal property or quale. The next thing to do was then to bring 
together the results obtained from this clarification with the reflections on the notion 
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of attention which were independently required by the fact that my approach to 
perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation is attention-theoretic. 
The development of my thinking about the ideas that gave the first impulse to 
this work (Campbell and Martin's ideas) was accompanied by a fairly parallel 
development in the way of regarding attention itself as a phenomenon, although this 
became obvious only with the benefit of hindsight. At first, under Campbell's 
influence, I considered attention primarily as a scientific phenomenon, and was led to 
study the psychological literature on attention. Later I increasingly began to 
appreciate the ordinary ways of speaking and conceiving of attention, especially 
attention in perception, and eventually I came to see the importance of attention as a 
phenomenon “at the personal level”, to use Dennett’s phrase. In this shift I feel I 
benefitted greatly from writing by Bill Brewer and Johannes Roessler. 
Eventually, I found a bridge between both perspectives when I went closely into 
the question of the status of the notion of feature in Treisman’s empirical theories of 
attention This empirical notion may be conceptually related to the notion of a quale 
and in fact I found reasons to think that both notions referred to the same properties 
even if these were individuated by different sort of criteria. Clarifying this made me 
more confident that perceptual attention may be related to the instantiation of qualia. 
In the search of an explanation of how attention and qualia are related and how 
they can be brought together in a unified account of perceptual demonstration, I 
benefited from recent externalist views of qualia, and I was then ready to take on 
board the view that perception is cognitively mediated by awareness of qualia, but I 
realized that this view is unable by itself to account for the demonstrative nature of 
the perception of objects. At this point I introduced attention as a mediating concept, 
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or rather, the notion of the binding of qualia that I claim attention consists in. 
The resultant account can overcome, I hope, the traditional drawbacks of 
sensation-based accounts of perception, which put all the explanatory notions on the 
causal side, leaving aside the rational aspects of perception, that is, the fact that 
perception is also essentially linked to the space of reasons, in Sellar’s celebrated 
phrase. After addressing this issue, I turn to explain why Campbell’s own explanation 
fails on precisely this count. This attention-theoretic account links attention 
essentially to subpersonal procedures, and I argue that in doing this it cannot supply 
what Campbell claims it can: a rational explanation for the point of using such 
subpersonal procedures. 
Thus, my verdict on Campbell’s account is that he is fundamentally right in 
singling out attention as a key element in perception providing the clue to understand 
its demonstrative nature, but his account does not provide an acceptable combination 
of rational and empirical elements. I hope to have contributed to provide for such a 
combination by situating the link between both elements in a different region as it 
were, that is by linking attention to something like qualia, awareness to instantation of 
which can be attributed to normal perceivers, and indeed in a way that they can be 
also claimed to have in a sense tacit knowledge of them. 
Finally, a fairly general remark about the stance of this dissertation may be in 
order. As I have said above, one of this work's objectives is to make a contribution to 
the establishment of an externalistic view of modes of presentation in connection with 
the intentional content of perception, and with this, a contribution (however modest) 
to the advancement of an externalistic view of the mind and thereby —that is, by 
supporting externalism— also to the articulation of a realist position on the mind. But 
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I do not try to make my contribution by arguing in favour of externalism or 
intentional realism. Rather, I assume an externalist and realist standpoint from the 
very start, and try to clarify at least some of the difficulties facing this viewpoint in 
the specific domain of my chosen subject. 
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writings. 
I thank Carolyn Black for her careful grammatical revision. 
On the personal side, I am very grateful to my parents, without whose help I 
would not have reached this point, and to my sisters, who were able to bear tensions 
and even some off-handedness. They have greatly contributed very much to my 
tranquility and I thank them all. 
Finally, my very special gratitude is directed at Daniel Quesada, who shares both 
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the sphere of ideas, and that of feelings. He has wisely combined his role as 
supervisor with his role as life companion. It was he who illuminated my initial 
grapplings with philosophical issues, and from whom I have learned so many things 
through so many conversations. His ideas, his support, and his confidence have been 
decisive. 
 
 
1.2. An overview 
 
Chapter Two 
I  first describe the growing importance of perceptual demonstratives in recent 
philosophical research in a general way, paying special attention to various works by 
Evans, Peacocke, Campbell, Cassam, Eilan and Brewer. 
I also examine some central aspects of the relation between demonstratives as 
linguistic expressions and demonstratives as perceptual contents. In particular, and 
among other cases, I critically examine Campbell’s hint at the relation between a 
theory of sense in the field of perceptual demonstratives and a theory of sense for 
linguistic demonstratives. 
Finally, I include a summary of the kind of approach to the semantic of linguistic 
demonstratives that I have used as a heuristic tool to arrive at the basic formulation of 
my proposal about perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation, namely, the 
Reichenbachian “token-reflexive” account as developed by John Perry and especially 
Manuel García-Carpintero. 
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Chapter Three 
In this chapter I will put forward a proposal about the intentional  content of a 
perceptual state. Roughly, I hold that in perception things are present in our 
consciousness as attended (by us) and especially, we are aware of particular physical 
objects as attended objects. 
As has been said, I arrive at the formulation of my proposal by using recent 
developments in the theory of linguistic demonstratives as a heuristic tool. I take the 
notion of a referential intention (of a speaker) from these and I suggest that recent 
work on the role of attention in perception leads naturally to a formulation of the 
hypothesis which substitutes acts of  attention for referential intentions in determining 
the reference of a perceptual demonstrative. Particular reference is thus achieved by 
the reflexive role of the act of attention itself. 
In this chapter the focus is first on the perceptual judgements associated with 
perceptual states. With reference to this, I first formulate the proposal by using 
sentences or, rather utterances, as models of intentional contents. This, I believe, 
allows us to develop the proposal far enough to be able to compare it to various other 
proposals about perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation. 
I note the points of contact between my proposal and that of John Searle in 
Intention, in which (in a way that Searle does not make clear) the perceptual 
experiences themselves are part of the content of perceptual judgements, and also 
includes the experiences themselves as determinants of the content of the perceptual 
experiences. Detailed discussion of Searle’s proposal and comparison with some 
aspects of mine follows. It will be shown that, contrary to the internalistic intention of 
Searle’s proposal, the way my proposal for the intentional content of perceptual-
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demonstrative judgements is formulated does not seem to compromise the externalist 
viewpoint. A crucial element that permits this possibility at this point is considering 
(acts of) attention in perception as inscribed in perceptual cycles in the sense of 
Neisser’s Cognition and Reality, where perception, although not of course thoroughly 
intentional, is seen as having an intentional component in looking. The clue I follow 
here (using, in a somewhat modified form an idea of Johaness Roessler) is the 
necessary existence of monitoring for the intention, carrying with it a certain kind of 
primitive awareness of the experience. 
Having presented my proposal and developed it to a certain point in the sense 
just mentioned, I submit it to an initial test, so to speak, while checking how it fares 
with respect to McDowell’s criticisms of Searle’s proposal. I claim that at this point 
my proposal already shows some clear advantages in this respect, although, I think 
that McDowell's criticisms show the need to develop it further. The task of the second 
half of this work is to provide this development. 
 
Chapter Four 
In this chapter the focus shifts from a proposal about the intentional contents of 
perceptual judgements to the perceptual modes of presentation that constitute these 
judgements. Again, the formulation of my proposal is facilitated by the uses of 
linguistic expressions as models for intentional contents. (In the end, of course, those 
models should be, so to speak, “cashed”, but this is left to Chapter 6 and 7). 
My proposal is then compared to other theories about demonstrative modes of 
presentation. I try to show its affinity to Searle and Peacocke's ideas (in Sense and 
Content) by putting together a proposal for those modes of presentation from the 
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standpoint of their ideas. These proposals (including mine) would configure a sort of 
“purely perceptual” approach to the subject, to be contrasted to the more “substantial” 
approach I find in Evans (“more substantial” in that (a priori) considerations about 
the nature of the objects demonstratively perceived enter into their formulation). 
I then proceed to a detailed discussion of Evans's ideas, both in their 
interpretation by McDowell, and also in a weaker version (which, as a matter of fact, 
I believe represents Evans’s own views better). I reconstruct Evans’s a priori 
argument in favour of the essential role of location and argue that there is an 
argumentative gap in it. I also proceed to a partial discussion of Campbell’s proposal. 
At this level of analysis my “purely perceptual” proposal is found to occupy a sort of 
middle ground between Evans and McDowell's more “substantial” approach, on the 
one hand, and Campbell's fully a posteriori or empirical approach, at least in the 
following respect: it is anticipated that what will finally be required for knowledge of 
the reference of perceptual demonstratives, according to my proposal, will have a 
much less rich a priori component than Evans’s proposal even if it will still preserve 
an a priori  element, thus moving away from Campbell’s proposal although sharing 
with it the central emphasis on attention. 
 
Chapter Five 
This is a sort of “foundation chapter” on attention, strongly required because of 
the support from the notion of attention sought by the theory of perceptual 
demonstratives and the contents of perceptual-demonstrative experiences and 
judgements developed in the dissertation. 
The main issue handled in this chapter is that of the relations between 
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“phenomenological” or personal attention, as this appears in common sense or folk-
psychological notions of attention, or their conceptual philosophical development on 
the one hand, and attention as a (set of) subpersonal mechanism(s) postulated in 
cognitive science on the other. An overview of the main empirical approaches and 
theories of (selective) attention in cognitive psychology and neuropsychology is 
presented, while seeking to relax the tension between the “phenomenological” and the 
“mechanistic” notions. I think that this tension may arise in part because of a largely 
unperceived equivocation in the use of the terms ‘attention’ and ‘selective attention’, 
but I also believe that there are some genuine problems to be solved in the 
relationships between folk-psychological and/or philosophical approaches on the one 
hand and empirical approaches on the other, in the specific field of attention; 
problems which to a extent reproduce general situations and puzzles in the relation of 
the cognitive sciences to common understanding. For clarifying purposes I employ 
ideas here that have been used in a general context to understand the relationships 
between the two sorts of notions and approaches, including also among these David 
Marr’s well known distinction between levels of explanation of cognitive tasks, trying 
to adapt them to present purposes. (Marr’s levels are used for these clarifying 
purposes at several places in the dissertation.) 
The conceptual viewpoint presented in a general way in the review of the 
empirical theories of attention is tackled in more detail in relation to the empirical 
approach to the study of attention in perception by Anne Treisman and her 
collaborators. In the analysis of this approach an attempt is made to separate the 
empirical from the a priori threads, which leads eventually to a specific proposal 
about the (close) relationship between the “features” postulated by the empirical 
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theory, and the qualia postulated by some philosophical theories of perception. This 
proposal is used in Chapter 7 to help in the final articulation of the status of my 
proposal about demonstrative modes of presentation. 
 
Chapter Six 
Before being in a position to clarify the issue just mentioned, I must be clear on a 
central dimension of the intentional content of perception which has been almost 
totally absent from the dissertation until this point (thanks to the device of modelling 
intentional contents with linguistic expression). This is the “pictorial” or “imagistic” 
aspect that perception is (rightly) seen to have. I first try to explain why we cannot 
expect much help from empirical approaches to mental imagery in clarifying this 
aspect. This involves me in clarifying the relation of a “common” notion of “pictorial 
character” and the theories of mental images in cognitive science (as in R. Shepard or 
S. Kosslyn's work), and the analysis of Tye’s proposal in the Imagery Debate to bring 
these theories to bear on clarifying the issue of what is to count as a pictorial 
representation. 
I next turn to an exploration of recent proposals on analogue and non-conceptual 
content, following here the lead of some of Peacocke's contributions, namely his ideas 
about ways in which objects and properties are perceived and “second-order” 
isomorphisms. A main concern here is to clarify the relationships that such proposals 
about content have with philosophical theories of perception that postulate awareness 
of sensory qualities or qualia. With some important provisos I find that, the 
imagistic/analogue/non-conceptual contents that those proposals postulate amount to 
the “phenomenal contents” constituted by qualia. 
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Finally, I argue against the way in which Peacocke proposes to make analogue or 
“non-conceptual” contents play a role in the identity of perceptual modes of 
presentation. I think that role comes out too weakly in Peacocke’s theory, due to an 
unduly strong separation of the phenomenological and the epistemic sides of content. 
 
Chapter Seven. 
This final chapter begins by examining a proposal about the role that 
phenomenal properties play in the determination of the representational propositional 
content “linked to” perception. This proposal is made up of diverse ingredients, like 
the role of qualia in perception in views like those of Searle or Jackson, and a 
partially functional, and thus partially representational view of qualia argued for in 
recent work by García-Carpintero. This proposal will turn out to be close to the view I 
myself whish to defend, but I show that it cannot by itself deliver what we need; that 
is, an explanation of the specifically demonstrative content of the perception of 
physical objects. 
After dwelling on some important aspects of the above mentioned proposal, 
mainly having to do with its externalism, I finally turn to developing my own view of 
the role that “imagistic” (non-conceptual, phenomenal) content plays in perceptual 
demonstrative modes of presetation. In my account, such a role is played by qualia 
(externalisticaly conceived), and they play a role as “combined” or binded in an 
object. This binding is involved in the awareness of qualia as belonging to an object 
(a notion reminiscent of sense-data theorists such as Jackson). Using the 
characterization of this notion, further reflection shows that the mentioned sort of 
awarenes involves the awareness of the observable properties of the object as 
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properties of a single object, which in turn leads to equate awareness of qualia as 
belonging to an object to the kind of awareness constituting (perceptual) attention to 
the object, which according to my account characterizes the perceptual demonstrative 
mode of presentation of the object. 
In this way, I present my proposal in a direct and (reasonably) complete form 
(that is, without the auxiliary help of linguistic models) for the first time. I follow 
Campbell in holding that the characteristically demonstrative nature of perceptual 
awareness of objects is centrally a matter of attention, but I part company with him in 
conceiving this attention within the bounds of a common sense and/or folk 
psychology view of it, since, as applied to the case at stake, attention comes out a 
matter of selecting an object from its perceptual background, a process which I link to 
the binding of the qualia caused by such an object in the perceiver. 
According to my proposal, (perceptual) attention to objects is partially 
constituted by the identification of properties mediated by awareness of qualia. It is 
then, in some sense, a “sensation-based” approach. But, in his recent defense of his 
position, Campbell argues in a general way that “sensation-based” accounts cannot 
possibly succeed. In confronting this I explain why my specific proposal is free from 
the basic drawbacks that —as Campbell has correctly seen— plague the general 
approach. 
I then return to my criticism of Campbell's approach, touching on the aspects that 
have opened for discussion with the development of the dissertation. The main issue 
centers around the notion of “cognitive access” or grasp of sense. I argue that, 
contrary to what Campbell claims, his position is, as a matter of principle, unable to 
explain how a subject has, as a person, cognitive access or grasp of sense. This might 
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be thought to be expected anyway because of the “subpersonal character” of 
Campbell's theory of perceptual demonstrative senses, but nevertheless, Campbell has 
presented an argument to the effect that his proposal can, after all, account for grasp 
of sense. My rejoinder to this consists in tracing the unsoundness of this argument to 
an illegitimate use of the notion of procedure on Campbell's part. 
My final efforts are devoted to showing why Martin is not right after all in 
adopting the viewpoint from which he launches his criticism of Campbell’s approach. 
I claim that, on the one hand, there is more room in this case for philosophical 
(“relatively” a priori) reflection than Martin allows, and on the other, that there can 
be a more intimate relationship between a priori and scientific investigations on the 
matters at issue. 
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Chapter 2: The Study of Perceptual Demonstratives 
 
 
 
 
2. 1. Perceptual demonstratives 
in recent philosophical discussion 
 
In contemporary philosophical discussion, Peter Strawson seems to be the first to 
have single out for our attention a kind of identification of ordinary material objects 
for which perception is essential. He called this ‘demonstrative identification’ and we 
have a case of it when a subject “can pick out by sight or hearing or touch, or 
otherwise sensibly discriminate” that object (Individuals, p. 18). 
This demonstrative identification happens, for example, when looking for a person 
among a group of people, or when looking for one’s own car in the car park. A 
sensory mode may then be selected for such a search, and in these examples it will 
usually be sight. It makes no sense at all to try to identify a car that one expects to be 
motionless by engaging hearing in the search. However, depending on the details of 
the case, that may make perfect sense when one expects its engine to be running, as it 
also makes perfect sense to engage hearing when searching for a particular child 
whose voice one knows well in the play-ground. On occasions such as these, the 
sensory mode may be engaged on purpose, and some particular property of the object, 
like colours for cars, or voices for children, may play an outstanding role in the 
identification. But at other times the subject does not deliberately select a sensory 
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modality in order to perceptual-demonstratively identify an object, but rather a 
modality is engaged by salient features of the objects in the environment which may 
automatically attract the attention of the perceiver and result in her demonstrative 
identification of the object. (“That really is a nuisance!” when referring to a particular 
pneumatic drill.) 
In speaking of ‘demonstrative identification’ Strawson was talking about a 
particular capacity. And, as the wide variety of examples cited show, there is no 
reason in what Strawson says to think that this capacity is essentially a linguistic 
capacity or that it is exercised only in using language. We should rather say that the 
capacity at issue is an ability exercised in thinking or an ability of thought, which it 
consists in the ability to be able to entertain a certain kind of judgement or, more 
generally, to entertain a certain kind of thought (“There it is!” “That is my car”) 
which, in consonance with Strawson’s terminology and, as it turns out, with later 
current terminology, may be called, respectively, ‘demonstrative judgements’ or 
‘demonstrative thoughts’. Using this terminology we can therefore say that according 
to Strawson we do not have a demonstrative judgement or thought —a thought 
involving demonstrative identification— unless we are in perceptual contact with the 
object made salient by perception itself. 
Further questions about the “perceptual contact” necessary for entertaining 
demonstrative thoughts may be asked. Proceeding in a certain direction one may ask, 
for example, when one sees or touches an object one metre ahead and then closes 
one's eyes or ceases to touch the object for a tiny fraction of a second, whether one 
still has the same demonstrative thought that was entertained before; that is, whether 
it is the same identification of the object which is being performed. 
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However, there is another type of question about such perceptual contact which 
may be asked; questions about various aspects of the capacity to have the thoughts at 
issue, among which the following one stands out: what is there in the perception of 
the object that enables a subject to entertain these distinctive kinds of thoughts? Now, 
it seems that a good first shot at an answer to this particular question would be that 
perception involves an information link between the perceiver and the object. One 
would then be left with the task of characterising the kind of information link which is 
relevant in singling out the target type of thought, and also of inquiring about other 
information links, perhaps based on capacities or information-providing mechanisms 
other than perception, that are closely related enough to give us a whole family of 
thoughts for which perception-based thoughts would act as a paradigmatic 
representative. 
Thus, the first line of attack on the perceptual contact issue would involve 
questions about the proper contact with the environment  embraced sensorily (such as, 
for example, whether this contact can be briefly interrupted). And the second line 
would rather concern the sort of contact involved, whether only a strictly sensory 
contact that should count, or whether other closely related informational links with an 
object may be included. 
It is the latter line of inquiry that Evans pursues in The Varieties of Reference 
(1982). According to Evans sentences with demonstrative terms require what he calls 
information-based thoughts for their understanding. And this kind of information can 
be available in three different situations. First, when the object referred to by the 
demonstrative expression is in the environment at the time of the proference. The 
hearer and the speaker can then understand the remark because there is shared 
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perceptual information which provides the necessary perceptual contact. Second, 
when the object referred to is not in the environment at that moment but has been 
there before and the speaker has enough reasons to assume the hearer retains 
information about that fact. And finally, when the referred object has never been 
shared in an environment by speaker and hearer but the information available from 
the object can be shared, in the sense that it is information available from the 
testimony of others, and moreover the speaker is entitled to assume that the hearer has 
this information. 
In the above-mentioned work Evans has a name for the demonstratives of the 
second and third kinds: he calls them, respectively, ‘past-tense demonstratives’ and 
‘testimony demonstratives’. Surprisingly though, he does not introduce any 
terminology for naming the first kind of demonstratives, in spite of their providing the 
paradigm for demonstrative identification or demonstrative thoughts. Here is the 
passage where Evans describes the three kinds of demonstrative reference and 
introduces the terminology just mentioned, the passage in which a denomination for 
demonstratives of the first kind is conspicuously absent: 
 
The characteristic is this: in order to understand an utterance containing a referring 
expression used in this way, the hearer must link up the utterance with some 
information in his possession. Thus, if a speaker utters the sentence ‘This man is F’, 
making a demonstrative reference to a man in the environment he shares with the 
hearer, the hearer can understand the remark only if he perceives the man concerned, 
and, bringing his perceptual information to bear upon his interpretation of the remark, 
judges ‘This man is F: that’s what the speaker is saying’. Or a speaker may advert to 
information which he presumes the hearer retains from a previous encounter with an 
object, saying, perhaps, ‘That man we met last night is F’; and here again, I do not 
think that the hearer can have understood the remark unless he actually remembers the 
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man, and thinks ‘That man is F: that’s what the speaker is saying.’ (I call such uses of 
the demonstrative form ‘that ø’, ‘past-tense demonstratives’.) Or again, the speaker 
might advert to information he presumes the hearer has from the testimony of others, 
perhaps from a newspaper article, or a rumour, or a conversation, saying something like 
‘That mountaineer is F’; here I do not think that the hearer can be said to have 
understood what the speaker is saying unless he possesses this information and thinks, 
in a way which is informed by it, ‘That mountaineer is F: that’s what the speaker is 
saying.’ (I call these uses of demonstratives, ‘testimony demonstratives’.) 
Evans, Varieties of Reference, pp. 305-306. 
 
Evans indeed had an excellent opportunity at hand to introduce a special 
denomination for the kind of demonstratives that, according to him, provided the 
basic case. And an obvious one at that: parallel to the denominations ‘past-tense 
demonstratives’ and ‘testimony demonstratives’, the expression ‘perceptual 
demonstratives’ would be the obvious candidate for that paradigm. 
Now, it is obvious from the text quoted that Evans was using the expression 
‘demonstrative’ for a linguistic expression. And indeed, when describing Evans’s line 
of inquiry in the last few paragraphs, I have been talking of the understanding of 
sentences with demonstrative terms and some diverse kinds of reference to objects by 
means of different kinds of demonstrative expressions. On the face of it what we have 
here is a semantic project.1 On the other hand, in talking about what is required for 
such understanding and such references, Evans is indeed laying out features of the 
thinking which is required for such an understanding as witnessed by the text quoted 
above. And this undertaking can take on a life of its own, leading to the delineation of 
                                                
1 One is reminded here of Evans’s very significant contribution to the semantics of demonstrative 
expressions in “Understanding Demonstratives”, in some passages of which it is possible to find the 
seeds for the new project which is described in the present chapter.  
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what Evans calls ‘information-based thoughts’ putting aside, even for a while, worries 
about their role in the understanding of sentences. And, one may be allowed to add, 
coming from the Strawsonian perspective I mentioned at the very beginning of the 
chapter, it is not much of a surprise that it did indeed acquire a life of its own. 
As we will see in the next section, the way of introducing the new undertaking 
that is suggested in Evans's text quoted above gives rise to certain problems, at the 
very least problems of expression, given that the phenomenon of making perceptual 
demonstrative judgements or entertaining perceptual demonstrative thoughts is, at 
least pretheoretically, a different phenomenon from the phenomenon of using 
demonstrative expressions when these are used in contexts which require perception 
for their understanding. Thus, to make this difference clear at a pretheoretical level, 
consider a case in which there are two similar dogs and someone, vaguely nodding in 
their direction, addresses the owner of one of the dogs by saying: “That’s your dog 
Figo”.2 Since the nod has been vague and the dogs are similar, there is a real question 
about whether the hearer’s attention has been directed at any particular dog. The 
hearer has truly no way of knowing which dog  the speaker is referring to and so no 
way of knowing whether what the speaker says is true or false. But even if the 
speaker's utterance has misfired, her thought may perfectly well be directed at one of 
the dogs. Thus, we may hold that while the use of the demonstrative expression in this 
occasion is faulty, the demonstrative thought is well determined. 
The (pretheoretical) distinction between the phenomenon of having what may be 
called ‘perceptual demonstrative thoughts’ and the competent use and understanding 
of demonstrative expressions which need a perceptual episode for such a use and 
                                                
2 The example is from Reimer (“Three Views of Demonstrative Reference”, p. 380). 
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understanding seems to confirm that the phenomenon of demonstrative thought in 
general must be distinguished from the phenomenon of the meaning of sentences or 
utterances with demonstrative expressions. Which does not imply that one cannot 
come to study the first via a study of the second. This, at least in part, is precisely the 
way in which Evans’s approach to the new subject of study is to be seen, especially 
when one bears in mind texts such as the one quoted above. 
With its own peculiarities, this was also the way for Christopher Peacocke, the 
other “founding father” of the study of demonstrative thought.3 His first contribution 
to the subject in “Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation” is to a 
certain extent in the spirit of Kaplan’s insistence on the importance of the semantic 
study of demonstrative expressions and, to a greater extent, of Perry’s studies of the 
indispensability of thoughts or beliefs that should be expressed by demonstrative 
expressions for the purpose of explaining action. 
Peacocke’s contribution takes shape around his defence of the thesis he calls the 
Indispensability Thesis: “No set of attitudes gives a satisfactory psychological 
explanation of a person’s acting on a given object unless the content of those attitudes 
includes a demonstrative mode of presentation of that object” (op. cit. pp. 205-206). 
Peacocke himself says of this thesis that it “generalizes the points made by J. Perry in 
‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’ (...) and further developed in his ‘Perception, 
Action and the Structure of Believing’.” It is in the fore-mentioned paper by Peacocke 
that we find for the first time, as far as I know, an explicit mention of the difference 
                                                
3  But Peacocke seems to recognize a certain priority in Evans when he writes: “[T]hose who know his 
work well will recognize that my conception of how philosophy in this area should be done —as 
opposed to the particular views to be held— has been greatly influenced by vigorous discussions ... 
with Gareth Evans” (Sense and Content, p. viii). 
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between the “goal of a meaning theory for indexical languages” (p. 192) and 
something that is a “task of the philosophy of mind”, to wit, answering to “the need 
for substantive theories of demonstrative modes of presentation” (p. 194). 
On his path to developing such substantive theories, Peacocke introduces a 
systematic notation for these modes of presentation. It is in this context that the 
denomination ‘perceptual demonstratives’ first makes its appearance (“Demonstrative 
Thought and Psychological Explanation”, p. 200). But Peacocke does not use it to 
refer to linguistic expressions, but, very roughly, to the “part” or “element” in 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts which, as it were, corresponds to the subject in the 
verbal expression that might be used to describe or “model” the thought. That is, in 
effect, a subset of what Evans called ‘Ideas’, a terminology that he explained thus: 
 
Using what I hope is a harmless piece of convenient terminolgy, I shall speak of the 
Ideas a subject has, of this or that particular object, on the model of the way we speak 
of the concepts a subject has, of this or that property [in note: ... I capitalize the initial 
letter as a reminder that we are dealing with a technical use of the term.] And I shall 
allow myself to say that this or that particular thought-episode comprises such-and-
such an Idea of an object, as well as such-and-such a concept. This is simply a 
picturesque way of rephrasing the notion that the thought is a joint exercise of two 
distinguishable abilities. 
(Varieties of Reference, p. 104) 
 
The non-linguistic usage of the expression ‘perceptual demonstrative’ holds for 
Peacocke’s use in the paper mentioned as well as for the work which constitutes a 
first culmination of his study of demonstrative thought, Sense and Content; as indeed, 
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it does as far as I know, for any other writings by Peacocke.4 And I will follow 
Peacocke entirely in this usage,5 for which I will be satisfied, for the moment, with 
applying the explanation contained in Evans’s text for singular modes of presentation 
in general to it, leaving the task of further clarification to Chapter 4. 
I maintain this usage in the ensuing brief description of several recent writers 
diverse intellectual interests and projects which concern perceptual demonstratives, at 
least where there is no suggestion to the contrary. 
While Evans’s interest focuses rather on perceptual demonstrative thoughts as a 
whole, Peacocke is also concerned with perceptual demonstratives as such. 
Peacocke’s interest in perceptual demonstratives as in some sense the basic cases for 
the study of the relations between, so to speak, reference and sense “in thought” is 
also evident in John Campbell’s work. As a matter of fact, Campbell uses the term 
‘senses of perceptual demonstratives’, which on the face of it is semantic 
terminology, but which he puts to use to introduce his inquiry on the components of 
                                                
4 Cf. “Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation” pp. 200 and 204, where the expression 
first occurs, to my knowledge. Cf. further, p. 144 of Sense and Content, for the first occurrence in this 
work (for other occurrences, cf. 153 ff.). 
5 A few paragraphs previously, in commenting on Evans’s missed opportunity for introducing the 
expression ‘perceptual demonstrative’, I momentarily suggested a “linguistic usage” for it. Now, this 
usage is actually found in the literature, although perhaps rather as a mere façon de parler, as we will 
see below. One must be careful here not to be confused by genuine linguistic uses of the expression in 
the semantic literature on the behaviour of demonstrative expressions. Since demonstrative expressions 
that require perception for their interpretation are to be distinguished from uses of demonstrative 
expressions whose interpretation is determined by referring back anaphorically to other expressions in 
a linguistic context, we need a different denomination for each use. Thus, Ingar Brinck refers to these 
two uses respectively as the perceptual use and the narrative use (cf. her “Demonstrative Reference 
and Joint Attention”), but occasionally she uses the term ‘perceptual demonstratives’ to refer to 
demonstrative expressions as used in the first of these two ways. 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
thought at issue. His usage is closely related to another peculiarity in his approach, 
that of using the framework of inferences with perceptual demonstratives. As we will 
see in detail in the next chapter, Campbell believes that senses or modes of 
presentation, in particular the senses associated to singular expressions, are what 
allows a reasoner to rely or “trade upon” co-reference, in particular the co-reference 
of singular tokens of those two expressions: 
 
Sense is that, sameness of which makes trading on identity legitimate, difference in 
which means trading on identity is not legitimate. 
“Sense, Reference and Selective Attention”, p. 59 
(cf. also “Is Sense Transparent?”, pp. 276 ff). 
  
According to this characterization of sense it is analytically true that, if two 
perceptual demonstrative tokens have the same sense, then one can trade upon their 
co-reference in an inference. Indeed, inferences with perceptual demonstratives are a 
paradigmatic example of the constitutive relationship that Campbell postulates 
between sense and trading upon co-reference of singular terms. 
For the characterization of the sense of perceptual demonstratives Campbell turns 
to empirical psychology, since he believes that senses or modes of presentation 
depend on how our perceptual systems actually operate for their identity. This is how, 
in following this path, he is led to link them to the cognitive capacity of perceptual 
attention (cf. “Sense, Reference and Selective Attention”). 
Campbell also explores the possibility that perceptual demonstratives could be 
taken as a model for, apparently, the use of the first person pronoun (an issue that, in 
their own ways, is also found in Evans and Peacocke's work). Campbell’s main 
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interest in this issue is in the study of the nature of the self, and he holds that a fruitful 
way to pursue this study is in the context of inferences with the first person pronoun 
(again there is an issue here about whether he means inferences in the sense —
standard in contemporary logic— of involving sentences or other kinds of linguistic 
items, or rather inferences “in thought”; but we shall let this pass for now). 
Specifically, he looks to see whether the conditions in which trading upon co-
reference is legitimate in the case of the first person pronoun are the same as the 
conditions in which one can trade upon co-reference in the case of inferences 
involving perceptual demonstratives. If this were the case, then, assuming the 
constitutive connection between those conditions and senses mentioned above, one 
might think that the sense of the first person pronoun can be thought of according to 
the model of the sense of perceptual demonstratives (cf. Past, Space and Self, pp. 87-
93). Campbell, however arrives at a negative conclusion concerning this possibility, 
arguing that what legitimates trading upon co-reference in the case of perceptual 
demonstratives is “keeping track” of the object, while there is nothing that answers to 
this description in the case of the first person (see op. cit. § 3.2). 
A comparison between perceptual demonstratives and the first person is also 
proposed by Quassim Cassam in “Self-Reference, Self-Knowledge and the Problem 
of Misconception” and in Self and World, at a key point in his argument in favour of 
the thesis that self-consciousness implies awareness of oneself as a physical object, 
itself in turn a key thesis in his inquiry into the nature of self-consciousness. Here, 
perceptual demonstratives are meant to deliver the model for understanding what kind 
of awareness is at issue. According to Cassam understanding a perceptual 
demonstrative (expression) does not require a substantive knowledge of the object 
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referred to by the demonstrative, but only an awareness of it as an articulated physical 
unity, which requires as little awareness of the object as being simply something with 
definite spatial boundaries (cf. “Self-Reference, Self-Knowledge and the Problem of 
Misconception”, p. 286). In a similar way, awareness of oneself as a physical object 
would require only awareness of oneself as “oneself, qua subject, as shaped, located 
and solid” and, in this way, “as a bounded corporeal object” ( loc. cit.). 
Thus, as we can see, both Campbell and Cassam compare the way the first person 
works (so to speak) with the way in which perceptual demonstratives work, but while 
in Campbell this comparison results in a dissimilarity, Cassam emphasizes the 
analogy. We may note that, as we have seen, the particular form in which they frame 
the issues owes much to Evans’s way of formulating issues about thought in a 
semantic key, as it were. 
Perceptual demonstratives play a more central and positive role in Bill Brewer’s 
recent work on the foundations of empirical knowledge. In his book Perception and 
Reason, perceptual demonstratives appear first in the context of his defence of a key 
argument for his project, what he calls the Strawson-Argument. According to this, the 
singular modes of presentation which are part of the contents of perceptually-based 
beliefs cannot be descriptive. The possibility of misperception, but above all the 
possibility of reduplication or multiple satisfaction makes  it impossible to determine 
a unique mind-independent referred (intended) object if the content of a perception is 
characterized descriptively. Hence, the determinate character of reference that 
characterizes our perceptually-based beliefs requires the more fundamental kind of 
reference that is found in perceptual demonstratives. Brewer describes this form of 
reference in the following way: 
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The Ideas6 involved at this level, I believe, are essentially experiential perceptual 
demonstratives. That is to say, the more fundamental mode of reference to spatial 
particulars, which is required to anchor our beliefs to a unique set of such things in the 
world around us, essentially involves a presentation of the particular thing in question 
in conscious experience. 
(Perception and Reason, p. 28, author’s italics). 
 
Brewer’s aim is to show how perceptual experience provides knowledge. He 
argues that this is shown by explaining how it provides reasons for empirical beliefs. 
The claim is that not only is the content of someone's empirical beliefs not 
independent (constitutively) of any relation she may or may not have with the actual 
things around her, but that this is recognized by the subject herself when she 
understands, as a perceiver, how her perceptually-based beliefs are based on 
experiences about particular mind-independent things in the spatial world around her. 
The fundamental mode of reference that is supposed to be distinctive of perceptual 
demonstratives provides the crucial element in the explanation of how this is the case. 
As this brief and somewhat casual survey tries to illustrate, perceptual 
demonstratives play a key role in several important philosophical projects, most of 
them related in intrincate ways. In Individuals, Strawson puts the existence and 
epistemological priority of (perceptual) demonstrative thoughts to work for setting 
out an argument in favour of a long-ranging metaphysical thesis: the ontological 
priority of spatio-temporal individuals in our conceptual system. Evans, essentially 
                                                
6 Brewer is here using Evans’s terminology, in which, as we have seen, an Idea is the singular “part” 
or “element” in a singular thought, and so it is not described semantically, as the the sense of a singular 
term. 
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motivated, it seems, by the project of developing fundamentally anti-Cartesian 
epistemological views, is interested in arguing for the existence of what he calls 
‘Russellian thoughts’ and in investigating their varieties. He believes that the 
demonstrative thoughts associated with perception constitute a paradigmatic kind of 
such “Russellian thoughts”, but that there are other Russellian thoughts of the 
demonstrative variety, so to speak, which are made possible by capacities other than 
perception (such as memory) and other knowledge sources, like testimony. Moreover, 
he inquires whether there are other species of the genus ‘Russellian thought’ besides 
the demonstrative variety. His inquiry may take an apparent meaning-theoretical 
shape, but, as I have hinted above, it is aimed at thought-theoretical targets, in the 
province of the philosophy of intentionality and philosophy of mind. 
Peacocke first linked the study of perceptual demonstratives to issues in the 
philosophy of action, but they soon appear in his work connected with the same 
general issues that concerned Evans, and also with issues in the philosophy of 
perception. 
Perceptual demonstratives also play a significant role in the work of other 
authors ranging from Campbell and Cassam’s efforts at clarifying the “sense of the 
first person” to Brewer’s project of explaining how experiences provide reasons for 
empirical beliefs, or Eilan’s project of theoretical clarification of the “perspective of 
consciousness” (cf. her “Objectivity and the Perspective of Consciousness”). 
 
 
2.2. Perceptual demonstratives and linguistic demonstratives 
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In the previous section I alluded to the difference between having demonstrative 
thoughts and competently using and understanding utterances with demonstrative 
expressions. I also suggested that we can pre-theoretically capture that difference in 
cases like Reimar's example, where the demonstrative thought —precisely a 
perceptual demonstrative thought this time— could be definite because of identifying 
a particular object, while there is no utterance linked to that thought by the rules that 
account for the competent use and understanding of sentences and utterances. This 
seems to suggest, still at the pre-theoretical level, the more general possibility of 
thoughts or judgements that are different due to the peculiarities of perception, but 
which can only find uniform (unique) linguistic expression in utterances with 
demonstrative expressions. 
With regard to perceptual demonstrative judgements and restricted to the “part” 
of the thoughts in which we are interested, the distinction is the one between the sense 
of a demonstrative expression, the understanding of (and use of) which requires 
perception, and the mode of presentation of a particular in perception, which, 
assuming a general Dummetian conception of sense, would be roughly the distinction 
between the condition a particular must meet to be the referent of an indexical or 
demonstrative expression when this expression requires perception for its 
understanding, and the condition it must meet in order to be perceptually identified. 
The difference here is clearly one of intension, so to speak; but one must at least also 
reckon on the possibility that there is a difference in extension as well, that is, that not 
all the perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation are senses of (possible) 
expressions in the language.  
But these distinctions between two kinds of phenomena are not necessarily a 
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barrier to approaching in one way or another the study of the first kind of 
phenomenon on the basis, or with the help, of the study of the second. And indeed, I 
have remarked that, to begin with, it was historically the case that the need for 
“substantial theories of demonstrative modes of presentation” —as Peacocke put it— 
came to be recognized as a subject of its own in the course of the study of the 
semantic peculiarieties of demonstrative and indexical expressions. (I will expand on 
this point in the next section.)7 
It is true, however, that the peculiarities of the new domain of study makes the 
mere application of a theoretical apparatus conceived to handle the semantics of 
demonstrative expressions unlikely to get us very far in the investigation of the new 
domain of the theory of intentionality, because the difference in extension remarked 
on above. Thus, we have Peacocke’s early warning that even without going into 
details “[t]he probable nature of these substantive accounts shows why one cannot 
identify type m.p.’s with Kaplan’s characters or token m.p.’s with ordered pairs of 
character and object.” And this is how he formulates the reason: “Character is 
essentially linguistic, a rule for determining an object as referent on an expression 
from a context of utterances, whereas it is not excluded ... that someone should emply 
token m.p.’s in his thought while having no word in his language (if any) to express 
those m.p.’s” (“Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation”, p. 195). In 
Sense and Content Peacocke was soon to argue that what is here introduced as an 
                                                
7The adjective ‘semantic’ is meant to be used so that it refers to properties that expressions of a natural 
(public) language possess, which directly are related to meaning —and so, they are not phonetic or 
phonological properties— , but which are not pragmatic properties.  
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open possibility is actually the case.8 
Nevertheless, the respective conditions on senses of demonstrative expressions 
and (perceptual) demonstrative modes of presentation can somehow overlap, so that 
in giving details of the condition for understanding uses of demonstrative expressions 
one would come to find out something of importance about such demonstrative 
modes of presentation. This may be the rationale for a sort of methodological stance 
implicit in the literature, a decision that leads to a preference for discussing issues that 
belong rather in a theory of (perceptual) judgement or thought —something in the 
province of the study of intentionality and the philosophy of mind— in a “semantic 
key”, which shows in the use of semantic terminology and also in the use of the 
expression ‘demonstrative’ or ‘perceptual demonstrative’ to literally refer to a kind of 
linguistic expression, when the main issues lurking in the background discussion go 
well beyond purely semantic concerns. This, I feel, is what is going on in passage by 
Evans's quoted extensively in previous sections, and in passages by other authors on 
which I will comment below. 
The crossing over of several projects and perspectives results in some danger of 
confusion. Indeed, what we have here is no less than: (1) two different projects, 
related in complex ways; (2) the possibility of using —as a methodological or 
strategical device— at least part of the language naturally appropiate to be used in 
one of the projects to clarify issues belonging to the other project; (3) the fact that 
there is an effort underway to extend the Fregean view from its home base (the 
                                                
8 Peacocke’s argument is, in fact, a straightforward consequence of the theory of demonstrative modes 
of presentation that he gives in Chapters 5 and 6 of Sense and Content (cf. especially pp. 106-107, 
160-161 and 126). 
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semantic theory of language) to new domains. 
Next, I would like to comment briefly on some examples which illustrate the 
different aspects of the peculiar situation which I have just been describing in a 
general way. 
The first example is provided by attempts to extend the Fregean perspective in 
which we find certain formulations which suggest somewhat oddly, that it is a 
semantic issue which is at stake, when really it is not. A number of passages in 
Campbell’s writings are a case in point.9 Take, for example, the passage in “Sense, 
Reference and Selective Attention” in which he starts with a text by Kaplan taken 
from his work “Demonstratives” (p. 514). I will not reproduce this text here but it will 
suffice to know that the context in which it occurs is one in which Kaplan is 
reconstructing a Fregean theory of demonstrations as part of his immediate aim to 
explain and criticize Frege’s theory of demonstrative expressions. Thus, the context to 
which Campbell appends his comment, and the paper “Demonstratives” as a whole, is 
a context of research (a report) on a semantic theory of certain kinds of linguistic 
expressions (demonstrative expressions). Campbell says: 
 
The problem this raises is how we are to characterise in detail the senses of perceptual 
demonstratives, such as ‘that planet’, or ‘that car’. In the case of a definite description 
the phrase itself makes explicit the condition that something has to meet of an object to 
be its denotation. If two descriptions impose just the same conditions, then trading on 
identity is legitimate. But how are we to say what the sense of a demonstrative is? 
(Op. cit, p. 60) 
 
                                                
9 Points similar to the ones to be made here arise in connection with other works by Campbell. (See 
specially Campbell, Past, Space and Self, § 3.2.) 
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Now, on the strength of the knowledge of the context of Kaplan’s remark to 
which Campbell adjoins his comment, and, indeed, of the general project in 
“Demonstratives”, and on the basis of Campbell’s terminology in this passage, one 
may be fully justified, I feel, in assuming that Campbell is about to discuss a proposal 
about the semantics of demonstrative expressions. There is no immediate indication 
that allows the reader to suspect otherwise. Thus, it clearly seems that Campbell is 
applying the term ‘perceptual demonstrative’ to linguistic entities in that text, and that 
he is indeed talking about the sense of a certain kind of linguistic expression. 
According to all this, this text would make a standard philosophical use of the term 
‘sense’. 
But if the reader approaches Campbell’s text in this frame of mind he is likely 
soon to feel disoriented, because the text continues thus: 
 
This problem of the sense of a perceptual demonstrative is a problem about 
selective attention. To find when two demonstratives have the same sense, we have to 
look at the principles that the perceptual system uses to select a collection of imagistic 
information as all relating to a single object. 
 
This does not look at all like a proposal about the semantics of languages with 
demonstrative expressions. Indeed, as soon as we look into the context of Campbell’s 
passage, we see that he introduces his subject by contrasting certain “imagistic 
contents” with certain “propositional contents”, and his explicit purpose is to 
contribute to an explanation of the relations between the two. It is the key to just these 
relations that he finds in the psychological state of selective attention. Thus, we soon 
see that, far from being concerned with the semantics of certain kinds of linguistic 
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expressions, Campbell is interested in the content of perceptual experiences. This 
raises the question of why he is talking about the sense of a certain class of linguistic 
expression, as we must take him to be if we interpret the form of words he uses 
literally? Is he perhaps of the opinion that perceptual modes of presentation are just 
the senses of certain linguistic expressions? And this, assuming a perceptual 
demonstrative is the kind of linguistic expression which requires perception for its 
understanding. Or perhaps, although he rejects —or, at least does not assume— 
extensional identity of the classes of such senses and such modes of presentation, is 
he still choosing to theorize in a “semantic key”, that is, by apparently talking about 
the members of the first class? 
There is yet another possibility, suggested by texts like the following one: 
 
Among the concepts used in propositional thought, I will focus on the singular 
terms that we use to refer to perceived objects, such as ‘that car’ or ‘that man’ 
(Campbell, op. cit., p.58) 
 
In passages such as these, I submit, it is clear that Campbell is talking of 
demonstratives as a kind of concept, as is manifest in the very first words of the text 
above. The fact that he seems to refer to them as singular terms immediately after —
even using singular demonstrative terms of language to (apparently) exemplify those 
demonstrative concepts— is not to be interpreted as an incongruence on his part, but 
only as reflecting the very widespread practice of using an assumed analogy of 
thought with speech for the purposes of expediency when introducing specific 
examples of thought items. This is the practice we find, for example, in the following 
passages by Peacocke:  
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Suppose a treet lamp in London in the fog looks exactly the same from the north as 
it does from the south. Standing five meters north of it, your see it and think “That 
lamp is Victorian”. Would you have had exactly the same thought —not merely for the 
same type of thought— had you seen the lamp from five meters south and thought 
“That lamp is Victorian”? 
(“Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation”, p. 200) 
 
For instance, two perceivers may have exactly the same type of subjective 
experience in respect of what is perceived and how (...) but one may use the concept 
“that diamond”, another may use “that shape”, another “that pointed figure”. 
(“Nonconceptual Content Defended”, p. 382) 
 
It follows from this interpretation of Campbell’s way of talking that when he uses 
the expression ‘perceptual demonstrative’ he is, after all and against all appearances, 
not alluding to a kind of linguistic entity, but to a kind of singular concept or mode of 
presentation. 
But this leaves us with the problem of interpreting his expression ‘the sense of a 
perceptual demonstrative’. On the present interpretation, this would be the sense of a 
concept or, equivalently here, the sense of a mode of presentation. Is this a congruent 
way of talking? One recalls here that in the Fregean tradition of analysis of mental 
state attributions it is acceptable to talk of the sense of a sense. Even more to the 
point, in Peacocke’s pioneering paper “Demonstrative Thought and Psychological 
Explanation” repeatedly mentioned in these pages, he argues that, in the case of 
demonstrative thoughts, we cannot identify modes of presentation of objects with 
modes of presentation of modes of presentation of objects (cf. op. cit. p. 192). I 
cannot pause here to examine the context of Peacocke’s claim and even less the 
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argument itself. What I would like to pick up from this is only the possibility of 
interpreting Campbell’s form of words ‘the sense of a perceptual demonstrative’ in 
the same spirit as Peacocke’s ‘the mode of presentation of a mode of presentation’. 
I doubt, however, that Campbell’s expression can be interpreted in this way. The 
reason for this is that in a Fregean approach to intentionality, which I assume 
Campbell to be following in his analysis of the intentionality of perception, it seems 
that the “sense” of a mode of presentation should determine this mode of presentation 
in the same way that sense determines reference in Fregean semantics. That is,  the 
idea that there could ever be a case with a unique “sense” of a mode of presentation 
and two, or more, modes of presentation would be incongruent with the basics of such 
a Fregean approach. And, even though it would be premature at this stage to go into 
the details of Campbell’s proposals to substantiate the claim, it seems to me that 
something like that situation would occur according to such proposals if, that is, we 
interpret Campbell’s form of words ‘the sense of a perceptual demonstrative’ along 
the lines suggested. 
I would suggest instead that if we persist in taking the expression ‘perceptual 
demonstrative’ to denote a certain kind of concept, as opposed to a certain kind of 
linguistic expression, we interpret the form of words ‘the sense of a perceptual 
demonstrative’ as trying to refer to a type of mode of presentation. That is, along with 
the different perceptual demonstratives —different modes of presentation tokens— 
there would be a unique mode of presentation type to which those belong. And it 
would be the aim of Campbell’s theory to characterize such a type. 
With these comments on Campbell’s texts I do not claim to have ascertained the 
real intentions behind his terminology or linguistic usages. For one thing, I am not at 
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all clear that there are decisive reasons for choosing just one of the alternatives 
outlined to interpret what Campbell says. I only hope to have said enough to illustrate 
why we cannot regard those usages as at all straightforward. 
As a final example on the topic of possible problems with terminology or 
linguistic usages, I would like to turn to texts from Eilan’s “Objectivity and the 
Perspective of Consciousness” in which the author is at some pains to indicate when 
she is talking about expressions of a language and when she is talking about thought 
contents, as shown, for instance in the following passage: 
 
Prime examples of expressions that cannot be used in an absolute conception are all the 
context-dependent indexical expressions such as ‘I’, ‘now’, ‘here’ or ‘this’. Assessing 
the truth or falsity of such representations requires taking into acount facts about when 
and where they are used, which objects are causing their use, and so forth, that is, 
requires taking into account the perspective from which thoughts they are expressive of 
are entertained. 
(Op. cit. p. 239) 
  
Nevertheless, consider the following text: 
 
A representation is perspectival if the assessment of its truth or falsity requires taking 
into account the context in which it is used. 
(Ibid.) 
 
As the context of her paper makes clear, Eilan’s use of the word ‘representation’ 
here is not to be limited to denoting linguistic expressions in a public language but is 
meant to include mental representations in its denotation as well. Still, in appealing to 
the relativity of the interpretation of one such representation to “the context in which 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
it is used”, she is treating such mental representations as something akin to linguistic 
representations, in that both of them can apparently be used. This is also found in 
other places in Eilan’s paper: 
 
An account of how objective knowledge is possible from within the perspective of 
consciousness will be an account of how context-dependent indexical representations 
of objects and spatial properties, the use of which is at least partially constitutive of 
having a self-conscious perspective in play (...) 
(Op. cit., p. 244; my italics.) 
 
The point is that we understand what ‘use of representations’ means when talking 
about mental indexical representations if we assimilate these cases to the use of terms 
in a language, where we use representation-types —expression-types— by generating 
tokens of them. But it is not obvious how that expression should be applied to the 
kind of representation Eilan mainly has in mind.10 
A rather different sort of example is provided by Searle’s book Intentionality. As 
the title of the book indicates, it is devoted to the analysis of intentionality. It so 
happens that here Searle outlines a semantic analysis of indexical expressions, which 
for him include ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘he’, ‘she’, etc. In a book 
devoted to intentionality, one would expect him relate his analysis of these 
expressions explicitly to the analysis of indexical thoughts or thought components 
which may or may not be expressed by means of such expressions. On the face of his 
                                                
10 In a broad meaning of the expression, we can talk of a person’s use of a mental representation of a 
determinate room, say, when she moves around in it. It does not seem that the use of the phrase in 
Eilan’s text can be assimilated to this one. We would indeed have a clearly legitimate use of the 
expression if we were prepared to assimilate mental representations to linguistic representations by 
endorsing the Language of Thought Hypothesis, but nothing else in the text points in that direction. 
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analysis of indexical expressions, one might perhaps think that the methodology is to 
proceed first to such an analysis, going on to elaborate on how the account provided 
can be made the basis for an account of indexical thought. But Searle does not do this. 
There is no account of indexical or demonstrative intentionality in his book. This is 
the cause for some perplexity, which is reflected, I think, in the following remark by 
John McDowell: 
 
I note that it is a curiosity of Searle’s discussion that he deals with the first person, 
for instance, only in the context of his treatment of indexical expressions, as if the first-
person mode of presentation —to use Fregean terminology— was in play only when 
one speaks and not also in unexpressed thought. There is no reason to suppose that the 
general strategy (...) requires this. 
(“Intentionality De Re”, p. 223, note 9; McDowell's italics) 
 
At the very least, what we should perhaps conclude from the examination of 
these examples is that we find ourselves in an area of inquiry where avoiding 
unwanted interpretations or even perplexities is anything but easy. The examples 
given are among many which could have been chosen, and so, they really can be 
taken to serve the purpose of illustrating a situation in the area of inquiry.  But their 
choice has not been left to chance. As will be seen, all four have a special connection 
with the path which the present investigation will to take: Kaplanian demonstrations 
will provide a source of inspiration, Campbell’s selective attention will be a key 
element in the proposal, and as will something akin to the uses of demonstrative 
mental representations which are alluded to in Eilan’s texts. And all this will be put at 
the service of developing the kind of substantial theory of perceptual demonstrative 
modes of presentation which has been found lacking in Searle’s writings. I hope, 
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however, that in pursuing this path I have taken note of the problems inherent in the 
examples examined so as to avoid their unwanted implications or pitfalls. 
 
 
2.3. The aim of the inquiry 
 
As we have seen in the very brief survey in the first section of this chapter, there 
are several areas of philosophical inquiry and diverse philosophical projects in which 
perceptual demonstratives are called for and a view of perceptual demonstratives 
must either be laid out or presupposed. 
There is an obvious additional area of inquiry where interest in perceptual 
demonstratives naturally arises, indeed the “propietary area” of inquiry for perceptual 
demonstratives, which is none other than the characterization of perception, including 
the characterization of the relationships of perceptual experiences to thoughts or 
judgements “directly related” to (or perhaps involved in) perception: perceptual 
thoughts or judgements. In fact, this is the perspective which will mainly inform the 
present work.11 
More specifically, we will concentrate on one characteristic of perception. Here, 
objects are presented in perception with properties which can be established by 
observation, and this is undoubtly one of the central features or characteristics of 
perception. But what constitutes the focus of interest in this work is an altogether 
                                                
11 This is a major interest in Peacocke’s work on perceptual demonstratives since Sense and Content, 
in many ways the other “founding work” of current philosophy of thought, jointly with Evans’s 
Varieties of Reference and the two earlier papers by Evans and Peacocke mentioned in previous 
sections. 
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different feature of perception, namely the fact that perception provides the basic 
cases in which objects can be identified demonstratively. As we have mentioned, this 
ability is by no means a fundamentally linguistic ability; that is, it is not only an issue 
of using with understanding demonstrative expressions of a language, but that in 
perception a wholly distinctive mode of identification or mode of presentation of 
objects “in thought” is in play. It is this perceptual mode of presentation which I will 
account for. 
As a matter of fact, in the case of visual perception at least, there is some 
plausibility in the claim that demonstrative thought about objects is necessary and 
sufficient to see an object. Peacocke put it like this: 
 
... ‘seeing’ is what I shall call a demonstrative-linked concept: in particular we say that 
someone see those objects of which he is actually in a position to have (perceptual) 
demonstrative thoughts (...) If one fails to include the connection with perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts in an account of perception, one will leave it quite unanswered 
why objects at one rather tan another stage of the incoming causal chain in perception 
are said to be perceived. f this is correct, it can be true that someone sees something only 
if he is in a position to have perceptual demonstrative thoughts about it. 
(“Demonstrative Thought and Psychologycal Explanation”, p. 209) 
 
I do not actually want to go as far as this. Thus, I will not assume that 
demonstrative thought is necessary for visual perception, although neither will I deny 
this claim. It is, then, a matter that I would like to leave open for the purposes of the 
present dissertation. 
Now, it would be tremendously implausible if this distinctive way of identifying 
objects perceptually had little to do with other traits that are distinctive of perception, 
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such as the fact mentioned above of the observational character of the properties 
involved, and, moreover, the “imaginistic” or “pictoric” character that perception 
undoubtedly seems to have. Hence, the analysis of perceptual demonstrative modes of 
presentation will have to integrate the demonstrative character of perception with its 
other traits at some point. 
In developing an account of perceptual demonstratives within this general 
perspective, I will proceed in two stages. In the first (Chapters 3 and 4) proposals to 
account for perceptual demonstrative judgements and perceptual demonstrative 
modes of presentation of individual objects respectively will be discussed in 
abstraction from their relation to phenomenological aspects of perception such as its 
putative “pictorial” character or the sensorial qualities which according to some 
theories are involved in perceptual experiences; or at least, these aspects will be kept 
in the background. I hope to show that we can go a long way towards characterizing 
perceptual demonstratives and perceptual demonstrative judgements without taking 
them into account. These other aspects of perception and especially their relationships 
to perceptual demonstratives will then move in to the foreground in the last two 
chapters, following a chapter devoted to the analysis of the notion of attention, the 
central notion used in the entire account, and which, as will be seen, plays a major 
role in unifying the diverse perspectives to be described. 
What I wish to show in the first stage of the inquiry is that there is indeed 
something significant that unifies all types of perceptual demonstratives; a distinctive 
generic perceptual demonstrative way of identifying things. Moreover, I will also 
show that from the general characterization of this way, we obtain, in a systematic 
manner, the diverse (token) demonstrative singular modes of presentation of things 
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which a (neo-)Fregean view of perception is inclined to seek. What will be left for the 
second stage of the inquiry is the issue of how these various perceptual 
demonstratives might be distributed among the different sensorial modalities. 
One device generally used to talk about specific perceptual demonstratives or 
about examples of perceptual demonstrative thoughts is to mention a linguistic 
expression, respectively, a demonstrative expression or a sentence within quotation 
marks or by equivalent means. There is some danger that unwanted implications  may 
arise when using this procedure, as we have had occasion to see from the illustrations 
in the previous sections, and we cannot adopt this procedure without further ado when 
we do not want to assume that perceptual modes of presentation and perceptual 
demonstrative judgements are exactly the senses of (the appropriate sort of) linguistic 
expressions. 
As I have mentioned in passing in the previous section, the unwanted 
implications can be largely avoided when we see such an apparent mention of a 
linguistic entity as showing by analogy the specimens of modes of presentation or 
judgements one wants to talk about. The use of this practice for the purposes of 
expediency is very widespread indeed. We can even exploit it to good purpose by 
using such analogies in the context of theoretical discussion, then making them play 
the role of models(-by-analogy) of the perceptual demonstratives or perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts for which we aim to provide an account. As models, they may 
have more or less merit, or they might be more or less faithful to what they are 
modeling. So, as well as avoiding some potential pitfalls, this perspective on the use 
of verbal expressions in the context of analyzing perceptual demonstratives and 
judgements may allow us to compare two “verbal expressions of a perceptual 
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judgement” and discuss their relative adequacy for indicating features of the 
judgements at issue with complete logical independence of the communicative 
situations, if any, which would prompt the verbal expression of such a judgement, 
even when mention of a communicative situation may help bring to mind the 
judgement which is the target of discussion at that moment. 
When using verbal demonstrative expressions which I associate with the 
perceptual demonstratives or the perceptual thoughts I will freely adopt the 
widespread practice of the linguistic analogy and even this modelling perspective 
from now on. 
With the help of this expedient, I can now make it clear what kinds of perceptual 
demonstratives and perceptual demonstrative thoughts I will concentrate on for the 
most part in the present dissertation. Concerning the latter, I will be concerned with 
thoughts that can be modelled to a first approximation with specific utterances of 
sentences of the following forms: 
 
(i) That is Pavarotti / That is that. 
(ii) That is a tree / That is torn. 
 
In the first type of case the linguistic expression used to describe —or model— 
the thought combines a demonstrative12, either with a proper noun or with a 
                                                
12 The use of the terms ‘demonstrative’ and ‘indexical’ pose a minor difficulty for us. Evans, for one, 
appears to regard the terms as equivalent (see, e. g. Evans, “Understanding Demonstratives”, p. 291), 
while, for example, Peacocke —discussing demonstrative thoughts this time— says that in his view 
demonstrative thoughts constitute a subclass within the class of indexical thoughts* (see Peacocke, 
“Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation”, p. 187; Peacocke, however, seems to have 
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demonstrative in an identity statement (it is assumed that in the identities with two 
demonstratives there is a different “demonstration” —a “signalling”, as it were— for 
each demonstrative token). Cases of the second type are suggested by sentences 
where a demonstrative expression combines with a predicate. Moreover, as the 
examples suggest, my interest will be mainly restricted to cases where the 
demonstratives identify an spatial thing as opposed to either an abstract thing (like a 
number or a triangle, although physical triangles drawn on a board are not of course 
excluded) or a merely temporal thing (such as a mental state). This leaves us with 
physical objects and the properties thereof, and among these my interest will be 
focussed for the most part on the first. On the other hand, even though these will not 
constitute the prime cases, I will at least occasionally consider a kind of thought in 
which a non-spatial thing is demonstratively identified, namely thoughts about 
sounds. 
A range of further cases of judgements where a demonstrative identification is 
performed could be added without much difficulty. These are suggested by sentences 
of the forms: 
 
(iii) That tree is blooming / That bag was bought by my sister. 
 
In cases like these the demonstrative is accompanied by a sortal, and the 
corresponding resulting expressions combine with a predicate in the utterance 
expressing or modelling the target judgements. It is obvious that an account of these 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
changed his mind about this point in Sense and Content; c.f. e.g. p. 107). I will follow Evans’s use 
without further ado. 
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would involve some account of the sortal concepts at stake. More generally, this 
would also happen if we were to direct our attention to perceptual demonstratives 
suggested by expressions like: 
 
(iv) That shape / That pointed figure / That colour / That green. 
 
However, the interest in the present work is focussed on the fact that entertaining 
or understanding the target thoughts involves actually identifying the thing being 
demonstrated. It does not seem that an exercise of a similar capacity —the capacity of 
determining whether a particular falls under the concept— is required for 
understanding the general concepts involved in the thoughts, whether those general 
concepts appear in the “predicative part” of the thought, or as supplementing the 
demonstrative in the “subject part”.13 This is one reason for neglecting such a 
“predicative part”, at least when it involves only such general concepts (unlike what 
happens in the second kind of the judgements suggested in (i)) but also for 
disregarding such supplemented demonstratives. It is true that these cases make up 
the most natural cases of perceptual demonstratives and there does not seem to be 
much difficulty in including (at least many of the) examples of such “mixed” cases, or 
of perceptual demonstrative thoughts which involve them, but there is not much point 
in using examples of this kind. When I do consider them (as in Section 1 of Chapter 
                                                
13 This does not imply that the use of such concepts is the same in both parts. When the general 
concept occurs in “the subject part” the concept helps in the identification of the object, rather than 
being used to make a predication of something that is already identified, as happens when the concept 
occurs in “the predicative part” (cf. Peacocke, “Demonstrative Thought and Psychological 
Explanation”, p. 201) 
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4) it is only for reasons of naturalness in the example or for the sake of variety, but I 
do not really engage in an analysis of the contribution of the general concepts 
involved.14 
A final limitation of this study is that is not going to discuss —at least not 
directly— any problems connected with what Kaplan called ‘cognitive dynamics’, 
and which we can describe as the study of the constitutive features of the persistence 
of thoughts with demonstrative modes of presentation over time.15 
A key feature of all the kinds of thoughts I aim to deal with —those right in the 
target area as much as those that could also quite easily be included— is that they can 
be entertained only by somebody in a perceptual situation.16 (Thus, they are thoughts 
such that, if it were possible for a speaker to express them in a communicative 
situation, their linguistic expression could only be understood by somebody sharing 
the relevant perception with the speaker.) Some or most of them will not merely be 
entertained thoughts but actually judgements which specify a subject's current beliefs. 
Among these there are some  thoughts for determining the truth value of which the 
                                                
14 Currently influential views of perception —such as those of McDowell or Brewer— hold that it is 
precisely such demonstratives which capture the right “fineness of grain” of perception. Hence, it 
might be thought that in leaving out such demonstratives I am excluding beforehand just the central 
cases of some rival theories. I hope this is not so, since it seems that the fundamental tenets of such 
positions can be reformulated without such supplemented demonstratives, using simply the 
unsupplemented perceptual demonstrative ‘that’ (cf. Peacocke, “Phenomenology and Nonconceptual 
Content”, pp. 610-1). 
15 As we might expect, Kaplan formulated the problem as a problem for the semantics of 
demonstrative expressions. Cf. “Demonstratives”, p. 538, n. 64. 
16 Even if they also present this feature, I will not be concerned with the Quinean cases of “deferred 
ostension”, as when we point to a car that belongs to a certain man and say ‘That man is certainly rich’ 
(to describe the kind of thoughts meant with the help of a situation of communication this time). 
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perceptual situations suffice (perceptual judgements or perceptual beliefs),17 and 
                                                
17 In some theories of perception such judgements are constitutive of the perceptual states themselves. This is a controversial issue on which I will try to
remain neutral for the time. 
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some where this is not the case, like the ones we might exemplify with ‘This tree was 
planted by my father’ (we may call these latter ‘partially perceptual beliefs or 
judgements’). 
To summarise, as characterized pre-theoretically, the thoughts in the target class 
are at least part of the thoughts among whose features are: (i) (external) context 
sensitivity; (ii) an obvious necessary relationship between perceiving the object 
demonstrated and entertaining or understanding the thought; and (iii) a “fluid 
transition” between thought and object, in the sense in which the thought can be 
entertained simply by perceiving in the adequate perceptual modality —say, by 
looking around the room and focussing on any object in it. 
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Chapter 3: Perceptual Demonstrative Judgements 
and Attention to Objects 
 
 
 
 
3.1. A short summary of the semantics of 
demonstrative expressions 
 
I have said that the fact that there are two different projects does not imply that 
one cannot take one of them —the semantic project— as a basis for pursuing the 
other in some way or other. I have referred to an initial way in which this has taken 
place: an historical connection, that is, the fact that the project of characterizing 
demonstrative thoughts and demonstrative modes of presentation seems to have arisen 
as a sort of generalization on the semantic project (cf. Chapter 2, § 1). Furthermore, I 
have mentioned the possibility of in some way using certain forms of expression or 
form of words, or certain formulations that literally belong to the semantic project 
methodologically with the real aim of pursuing issues concerning the second (cf. ibid. 
§ 1 and 2). In this chapter I will attempt a variant on this methodological approach, 
but, quite a different one indeed from what Evans's or Campbell's texts may have 
suggested. This is the possibility of using the semantic theory heuristically to reach 
proposals in the other field that are subsequently to be argued independently. The 
suggestion is that reflecting on the semantic theory can prompt specific questions to 
be answered by a theory about perceptual demonstratives or perceptual demonstrative 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
thoughts, specific paths to explore and even specific hypotheses to be investigated. 
Since I plan to use the semantic study of demonstrative expressions as a basis, it 
is necessary to have before us the kind of semantic theory I have in mind. 
It is customary to distinguish pretheoretically between two types of deictic 
expressions: 1) Pure indexicals, paradigmatic examples of which are ‘I’, ‘today’, 
‘yesterday’ and verb tenses: 2) Demonstratives, paradigmatic examples of which are 
‘this’, ‘that’, ‘there’, but which also include pronouns such as ‘she’, ‘he’. Complex 
expressions, built by appending a general term to ‘this’ and ‘that’ —‘this table’, ‘that 
tree in the alley’— can be assimilated to this second kind. The distinction is based on 
the idea that the use of expressions of the second kind requires “demonstrations” 
(pretheoretically, something like pointing to an object) while the use of expressions of 
the first does not. Moreover, in the case of pure indexicals, the indexical expression 
itself in some way counts among the factors that determine reference, while it is 
thought by many that this is not the case with demonstratives. 
As we will see, in a Reichenbachian approach (abbreviated as RA, from now on) 
to the semantics of demonstratives and indexicals such as that articulated by Perry 
and García-Carpintero following Reichenbach's pioneering work the distinction turns 
out not to be so sharp: the second group of deictic expressions is as a special case of 
the first one. 
Kaplan’s theory has been the semantic theory of (linguistic) demonstratives and 
indexicals for a while (from now on, we will be interested only in demonstratives). 
According to this theory, every demonstrative has a character and a content to use 
Kaplan’s terminology. Intuitively, the character is what all tokens of a particular 
demonstrative share. Thus, it corresponds to what we could consider pretheoretically 
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as the linguistic meaning of the demonstrative. Kaplan theoretically articulates the 
notion of character as a function, the domain of which are contexts of utterance and 
whose values are the objects referred to by the demonstratives in those contexts. 
There is, then, another semantic property possessed by demonstratives: their reference 
relative to a context. In Kaplan’s terminology there is a name for this property: it is 
the content of a demonstrative, that is, the object referred to by an ocurrence of the 
demostrative type (or, according to Kaplan’s construal of this, a demonstrative-type-
in-a-context). In plainer (although less exact) words, the content is the object referred 
to by a demonstrative when it is used successfully. We can define character as a 
function from contexts to contents, now using the word ‘content’ in this special 
technical sense. 
Thus, according to Kaplan’s theory, there are two semantic properties linked to 
demonstratives. On the one hand, we have the character, something that a 
demonstrative-type possesses, and on the other the content, something possessed by a 
demonstrative-type-in-a-context. As we will see, in an RA to demonstratives, their 
semantic properties are not possessed by types or types-in-a-context, but by tokens of 
the types, where tokens must be understood as token-events and not as a token-
objects1.  
                                                
1 The difference between construing tokens as token-events or as token-objects is clear when we 
consider the possibility of using, e. g. the same piece of paper with a sentence written on it (like ‘I will 
come back in ten minutes’) and sticking to a door. The same token-object (the same piece of paper) is 
used for announcing different messages on different occasions (they are different because they refer to 
different moments in time); in contrast, we have different token-events, or tokens considered as events 
(one such event  in this case would be the particular hanging up of that piece of paper on a particular 
occasion), each announcing a different message. These different messages are not transmitted by the 
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In “Indexicals as Token–Reflexives”, García–Carpintero develops the difference 
between a theory of demonstratives and indexicals that treats types as having 
semantic properties, and a theory where it is the tokens which are the bearers of those 
properties. He defends the latter as the better of the two, but I will leave aside the 
arguments for this particular version of the RA in the brief summary of it that follows. 
Let us consider an utterance like (1) in circumstances in which a subject is 
pointing to branches of what we can consider different trees one after the other. 
 
(1) That is an elm and that is a beech. 
 
An adequate demonstrative theory must fufill the following desiderata in relation 
to (1) (cf. “Indexicals as Token Reflexive”, p. 550): 
(i) The theory must give us something that is the same for the two different 
tokens of ‘that’, that is, something that corresponds to the meaning of the type-
expression. 
(ii) The theory must provide for the possibility that the two tokens of ‘that’ have 
different “contents” (different references), since, in agreement with our linguistic 
intuitions, it is not to be pressupposed (except in an anaphoric use of the expressions) 
that the two ocurrences of the demonstrative-type must refer to the same thing.  
For the reason given, if the speaker is confused and he is in fact referring to one 
and the same tree with his two demonstrations, an utterance of ‘No, it cannot be so, 
that is the same as that’ made in reply to (1) (repeating the speaker’s demonstrations 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
token-object, since it remains the same across different messages, but by the token-events. (Cf. García-
Carpintero “Indexicals as Token-Reflexive”, pp. 534-535) 
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accompanying each ocurrence of the demonstrative “that”) would be informative. For 
the same reason, correferentiality of two tokens of ‘that’ expressed in different 
sentences in the same context cannot be taken for granted, as for instance when the 
speaker is forming an argument and he says ‘That is an elm’, in the same 
circumstances described above, and then, as part of the same argument, ‘That is a 
beech’. 
An RA satisfies the two desiderata described above. The first one is satisfied by 
using a linguistic rule roughly as follows: any instance of ‘that’ refers to the 
individual (of the contextually determined sort) demonstrated when that instance is 
uttered. This rule also provides in a certain determinate way the referent of any token 
of ‘that’ (which is uttered in the right circumstances), thus also making it possible to 
satisfy the second desideratum. How is this done? The rule that governs the 
demonstrative is token-reflexive, that is, it provides the referent of any proper use of 
‘that’ by resorting to the (event) token itself. Therefore, since when (1) is uttered there 
are two different tokens of ‘that’, there is nothing in the rule that means that the object 
determined as referent is necessarily  the same in the case of both tokens. 
Whatever the merits of an RA for a semantic theory of linguistic demonstratives, 
from the perspective of using the semantic theory as a heuristic tool for developing a 
theory about perceptual demonstratives and perceptual demonstrative thoughts it 
seems to me that an approach that uses the —to my mind— obscure idea of ‘type-in-
a-context’ is not very promising, and that an RA is much more in consonance with the 
sort of singularity which is present in demonstrative thought. 
One main reason for my being attracted by the particular theory developed by 
García-Carpintero, among other RA approaches to the semantic of demonstratives is 
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precisely the way in which the “Fregean side” of semantics is brought out. According 
to the RA as elaborated by Garcia-Carpintero, for a competent speaker to understand 
a demonstrative he must know its referent is the bearer of a property with the 
following three characteristics: (i) it is reasonable to consider it as individuative; (ii) it 
is associated with the expression on the basis of linguistic rules; (iii) it is 
epistemically transparent to beings who cognitively resemble us (cf. “A 
Presuppositional Account of Reference Fixing”, pp. 118-119). Thus, it can rightly be 
said that there is a mode by which a demonstrative-token presents the referent. To 
understand the demonstrative is to recognise the referent as presented in this way. 
Therefore we can say that the sense of the demonstrative-token is provided, thus 
making standard use of the word ‘sense’. 
Hence, the mode of presentation associated to a token of ‘that’ (the sense of this 
token) would be described roughly thus: object (of the contextually determined sort) 
demonstrated on the occasion of the production of that token. Here we can see that 
when coming to (linguistic) demonstratives, sense or mode of presentation is a 
semantic property of tokens, not types (cf. García-Carpintero, loc. cit.). It is important 
to point out that since the semantic rule for demonstratives is associated with the 
types (even if by way of specifying the reference of each instance of a type), it does 
not give us a sense. We may say, perhaps, that the rule “guides” the determination of 
the mode of presentation of the object referred to by the demonstrative-token, a mode 
partially constituted by the token itself. Or perhaps the right thing to say is that the 
rule supplies only part of the mode of presentation and that the remainder is provided 
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by the demonstrative-token itself.2 
These reflections on senses in connection with demonstratives will be of 
significance in the next section when we turn to an account of perceptual 
demonstratives and perceptual demonstrative thoughts or judgements. 
There is another aspect of the semantic account of demonstratives which is 
relevant for my purposes. As we have mentioned, demonstratives differ from pure 
indexicals in that they have to be contextually supplemented with a demonstration. 
How exactly we are to understand this appeal to “demonstrations” has generated 
much controversy. 
Kaplan's “Demonstratives”, which first appealed to demonstrations, did not make 
clear what should be understood as such, thus giving rise to the controversy. As I 
have said in the previous section, in the paper about demonstratives, by 
‘demonstrations’ he could be taken to mean pointing gestures or visual presentations 
of objects discriminated by them. Eventually he realized that pointing gestures by 
themselves do not determine the reference of a demonstrative, and that an appeal to 
the speakers intentions to refer was necessary (cf. “Afterthoughts”). However, he did 
not succeed in correctly describing the intentions that were required for determining 
reference. In a famous example he maintained that the demonstrative ‘that’, in an 
utterance of ‘That is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of this century’, 
refers to Rudolph Carnap, when the utterance is made by a speaker pointing behind 
him to where he believes a picture of Rudolph Carnap to be, while there is actually a 
                                                
2 Demonstrative-tokens being spatio-temporal entities, modes of presentation or senses constituted 
partially by them lie out side the type of internalistic senses which, according to most commentators, 
Frege had in mind. 
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picture of Spiro Agnew (there has been a change of pictures unnoticed by the 
speaker). Thus, Kaplan made the reference of the demonstrative depend on the 
speaker's intentions, regardless of any other considerations. This led Reimer to defend 
Kaplan’s older approach in “Demonstratives, Demonstrations and Demonstrata”, on 
the grounds that what detemines reference should be a publically accessible element 
in the communicative situation, a view which is supported by our intuitions about the 
Carnap-Agnew case, to the effect that contrary to what Kaplan says, it is Agnew and 
not Carnap who should be regarded as the reference of the demonstrative. Bach 
replied to this in “Paving the Road to Reference” by pointing out that one obtains the 
result that the demonstrative refers to Agnew when one considers the immediate 
referential intentions of the speaker. The contrary result —that an utterance of ‘that’ 
in the described situation refers to Carnap— is only obtained if the ultimate 
referential intentions of the speaker prevail. In this way Bach restores Kaplan’s 
insight about the necessary appeal to intentions for determining the reference of 
demonstratives, while leaving the correctness of Kaplan’s specific proposal to hang 
on whether it is immediate or ultimate referential intentions that should prevail. 
I believe that the intentions with regard to which the reference of (linguistic) 
demonstratives are determined are the intentions that can be manifest to the hearer in 
a communicative situation, or to put it more exactly, the intentions that a competent 
speaker is entitled to assume are manifest to the hearer. This way of putting the matter 
accords well, on the one hand, with both the standard cases where there is an act of 
pointing, and the “Agnew-Carnap cases”, and also, on the other hand, with altogether 
normal cases in which there is demonstrative reference to an object but the speaker 
does not make any indication of her intentions by pointing. An example of this would 
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be when a speaker utters in somebody's presence ‘This table is made of a rare kind of 
wood’ in a room where there is only one table and the speaker is simply looking at it, 
or when a speaker utters ‘That glass was in an unstable position’ in a situation where 
one of several glasses has fallen in the vicinity of the speaker and hearer. In situations 
of this kind an object makes itself salient, so to speak, in a variety of ways, in my 
examples by being the only table in a room and by being the only glass that has fallen, 
respectively. These are situations in which the speaker, as a competent user of 
language, is entitled to assume that her referential intentions are manifest to the 
hearer. 
Taking this explanation of demonstrations into account, we can return to the rule 
associated with a demonstrative like ‘that’, and formulate it thus: any instance of 
‘that’ refers to the individual (of the contextually determined sort) demonstrated when 
that instance is uttered (cf. García-Carpintero’s account in “Indexicals as Token-
Reflexives”, p. 550). 
How can all these ideas about the semantics of demonstrative expressions be 
potentially useful in formulating a theory about perceptual demonstratives and 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts? Perhaps the first thing to notice is that in the 
second case we can neither talk of utterances, nor of speakers or hearers, nor of 
communicative situations, nor a fortiori of intentions that a speaker is entitled to 
assume are manifest to the hearer in a communicative situation, nor, for that matter, 
of demonstrations. But, perhaps something analogous could and should be found for 
some of these items. I will turn to this possibility in the next section. 
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3.2. From a semantic theory towards a theory 
of perceptual demonstrative thoughts 
 
In the second chapter I suggested using a semantic theory of demonstratives as a 
heuristic tool in order to arrive at a formulation of a theory of perceptual 
demonstratives (cf. § 2.3). Roughly, according to the semantic theory, (linguistic) 
demonstratives used in utterances refer to the object which is most salient in the 
context in which the respective token demonstratives are used. I will now begin to use 
this token-reflexive theory to formulate an account of perceptual demonstratives 
which is itself token-reflexive in some way. It will be seen that the token-reflexive 
account of linguistic-indexicality is used at a key moment, exploiting the fact that 
there are certain respects where rather close parallelisms between both types of cases 
are manifest. At first I will only claim to use such parallelisms as heuristic aids to 
arrive at the formulation of a proposal, trying to show that this kind of approach in 
some way allows us to notice certain traits of the subject matter which are either less 
salient or simply unnoticed in other approaches. I believe that such parallelisms turn 
out to be all but superficial, and that the traits arrived at on their basis prove to be key 
pieces in an acceptable account of perceptual demonstrative judgements.  
Until now I have used linguistic formulations; sentences or utterances, 
demonstrative expressions, etc. as auxiliaries to delineate the types of perceptual 
demonstratives and perceptual demonstrative thoughts that will be the target of my 
proposal. Now, however, linguistic items will be made to assume a further function, 
or, more exactly, it is the semantic study of the same linguistic items which is going 
to play the further role of heuristically motivating the proposal to be advanced 
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concerning the intentional contents that constitute our target. 
Certainly there are dissimilarities between the linguistic case and the intentional-
perceptual case. It is useful to begin by briefly considering those, before looking at 
how the similarities on which I will focus appear. Let us take the very simple example 
of the utterance ‘That is a tree’. Let us assume also that the object at issue is being 
pointed at by the speaker by stretching out his arm, and so making it perfectly 
manifest to the hearer. (Of course, whether there are circumstances which make such 
an utterance and/or pointing natural, or what those are is not relevant to us. If we 
wanted we could imagine a situation where there is some doubt about whether the 
object at issue is a bush or a tree, or where we are teaching a child to recognize trees, 
etc.). In a paradigmatic context of communication such as the one in the example, the 
speaker attemps to draw the attention of the hearer to the very object which 
constitutes the current object of attention for him (the speaker). To that purpose the 
speaker can effectively use any sort of “signalling” at the object, after which he 
regards this object as reasonably salient to the hearer. Success or failure in those 
situations is measured according to whether the attention of the hearer is drawn to the 
same object to which the attention of the speaker is directed, and there are a number 
of external circumstances that may endanger this key aspect of the communicative 
situation. 
The attempt of the speaker described should be regarded as part and parcel of his 
communicative intentions, and it is such communicative intentions which are central 
in the case of the paradigmatic uses of demonstrative expressions. 
For obvious reasons, all such specific intentions are absent in the cases which it 
is our purpose to analize, cases where subjects find themselves in a perceptual 
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situation, directing their attention at a particular object. Furthermore, communication 
is an intentional activity, in the sense of being concerned with subjects' intentions to 
act, in a way in which perception definitely is not, and this by itself constitutes a 
major difference between the two sorts of cases, although as we will see, certain 
intentional traits are not altogether absent in the cases we are interested in. 
Nevertheless, behind all those fairly obvious reasons for regarding the use of 
demonstrative expressions in communication as disparate with events of perception of 
particular objects, there are similarities which motivate me to try to exploit the 
theoretical tools used for the analysis of communicative cases for the corresponding 
analysis of the perceptual ones, and I now turn to these. 
When a subject utters the sentence in our example (‘That is a tree’), a particular 
tree is (normally) referred to. This reference is achieved by means of a demonstration. 
Now, in the theoretical study of linguistic indexicals there is in principle a choice 
about what exactly a demonstration should be taken to be. One of the options is to 
take a demonstration to be an act of signalling in the strict sense of the occurrence of 
pointing “gestures” caused by the intention of pointing to an object, area of space, etc. 
In a very wide sense, that includes not only prototypical finger gestures but also a 
number of other devices used for the same purpose, like suddenly raising the voice or 
raising eyebrows, etc. A second option is to identify the demonstration with the 
“intention of pointing” itself, in a general sense of this phrase that is perhaps better 
captured by the expression ‘deictical intention’.3 In the second case, the pointing 
gestures, when they do occur, are only the manifestation of the demonstration; hence, 
                                                
3 Cf. Kaplan, “Demonstratives”, p. 490, Kaplan, “Afterthoughts”, p. 582-4, Bach, “Paving the Road to 
Reference”, and García-Carpintero, “Indexicals as Token-Reflexives”, pp. 536-7. 
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they are not essential to it. 
It is clear that the first option is immediately excluded for the purpose of 
explaining what is fundamental to the perceptual demonstrative identification of 
objects.  It is obvious that there are no demonstrations in that sense in the case that 
interest us. But perhaps there is a chance to consider that something akin to a 
demonstration in the second sense is still taking place in perceptual identification. Or, 
which amounts to the same thing, there is something in perception that seems to serve 
the same function that pointing gestures, when informed by deictical intentions, serve 
in the case of communication. If pointing to an object when informed by the right 
deictical intentions serves the function of making an object salient to an audience for 
the purposes of communication, analogously it would seem that attending to an object 
—visually, auditively or by means of touch— has the similar function of making an 
object salient to the perceiver.4 
With this motivation for using the notion of attention in the case of perception in 
a way rather similar to which the notion of demonstration figures in a theoretical 
account of linguistic demonstrative expressions in place, we can move directly to the 
“translation” of the relevant semantic rule. As already advanced in the previous 
section, the semantic rule for the demonstrative expression ‘that’ can be formulated as 
                                                
4 A local object can make itself salient in diverse ways and this can perhaps be taken to be a 
manifestation of the subject's deictical intention (García-Carpintero, op. cit. p. 537). On the other hand,  
it is very natural to say, in certain circumstances, that a certain object has attracted our (perceptual) 
attention by making itself salient. The comparison of these two cases, however, does not capture the 
sense of the parallelism that I am trying to establish in the text, since if we regard the object's making-
itself-salient as the manifestation of the deictical intention, we take it as the effect of our intention, 
while in the other case, it is the cause of our paying attention instead. 
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follows:5 
 
(4) Any instance of ‘that’ refers to the individual (of the contextually determined 
sort) demonstrated when that instance is uttered. 
 
And this is a preliminary version of the suggested “translation”: 
 
(5) Any instance of ‘that’ refers to the individual (of the contextually determined 
sort) attended when that act of attention takes place. 
 
This “rule”, as it stands, makes no sense, for there are no instances of a linguistic 
type involved in perception, with the obvious exception of cases in which the objects 
perceived are themselves linguistic tokens. At least, there are no such instances unless 
the linguistic types involved and their instances were thought to be elements of a 
language of thought. In any case, there is no proper link in formulation (5) between 
the demonstrative and the act of attention at issue. But there is no point in trying to 
amend this formulation in the last respect, since in any case it does not seem adequate 
to attempt to account for the intentional content of perception, or for perceptual 
judgements or thoughts by resorting to the controversial hypothesis that postulates a 
                                                
5 Whatever the advantages of a Reichenbachian approach for a semantic theory of demonstrative 
expressions, it seems to me that, in any case, the rival approach we mentioned in the previous section, 
which uses the idea of type-in-a-context, is not very promising from the perspective of using the 
semantic theory as a heuristic tool for the purpose of developing a theory about perceptual 
demonstratives and perceptual demonstrative thoughts: the Reichenbachian approach seems to be 
much more in consonance with the kind of singularity which is present in perceptual experience and 
thought.  
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language of thought.6 
Nevertheless, we can use the intuition which is at work in (5) to approximate the 
first formulation of my proposal for the content of a perceptual demonstrative 
judgement or thought. Take as an example the very simple case of a perceptual 
judgement straightforwardly associated with the utterance ‘That is a tree’. With some 
important reservations which will be discussed later (cf. Chapter 4, § 1), we could 
express its content in the following way: 
 
(6) The object attended in this act of attention is a tree. 
 
This is the bud of the theoretical proposal for the account of perceptual 
demonstratives and perceptual demonstrative thoughts to be developed in this 
dissertation.  The claim is that there is a kind of perception which involves a 
distinctive sort of identification of objects, which pre-theoretically we think of as 
demonstrative.7 Perception of this kind is linked, in a way that I prefer not to 
characterize further for the moment, with certain kind of judgements or thoughts: 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts. According to the proposal made with the help of 
the formulation in (6), the kind of perception at issue involves the sort of awareness 
of an object which consists in (perceptually) attending to it, so that a perceived object 
                                                
6 We saw in Chapter 2, § 3 that some formulations concerning perceptual demonstratives seemed to 
make literal sense only in the context of such a hypothesis, most likely against the will of their authors. 
Analogically to what happens in those formulations, accepting a weaker version of the rule in (5) 
would involve us at best in careless ness. 
7 I leave open the question of whether there is perception of objects, or any perception  at all that 
involves perception of objects, which does not require this kind of demonstrative identification. 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
is primarily present to the mind of the perceiving subject as the object currently 
attended to. 
Hence, according to the proposal, the state or episode of attention itself, which is 
necessarily involved in perception of objects, plays an essential role in identifying the 
object being attended to. More concretely, a state, event or act of attention identifies 
an object in a token-reflexive sort of way. In this respect the case resembles the 
determination of the propositional content of an utterance of a demonstrative 
sentence, as this content is understood in the token-reflexive theory of demonstratives 
which I have taken as my (heuristic) point of departure. In the case of interest to us, it 
is even more immediately clear that the token at issue —an episode of attention— is 
not a thing or object, but rather an event. 
Once this proposal is stated, it is easy to see how it can be generalized to other 
thoughts in the target area. For example, an explanation of the perceptual judgement 
that we may naturally express linguistically by uttering ‘That (tree) is blooming’ 
would be suggested by the sentence: 
 
(7) The object (or object of the tree kind) attended to in this act of attention is 
blooming. 
 
Naturally the proposal needs much clarification, refinement, development and 
defence. What is it exactly that is claimed by saying that the object is presented as 
attended to, and indeed, as attended to in the current act of attention? Am I suggesting 
a hypothesis about modes of presentation of objects in perception in the sense that we 
talked about modes of presentation in the previous chapter (cf. § 2)? What kind of 
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awareness of the object is (perceptually) attending to it? Does the proposal imply that 
we have some kind of awareness of attention in turn? Does it imply that the subject 
capable of perceptual demonstrative judgments has to possess the concept of 
attention? What is attention in general, and attention to objects in particular? What 
has attention to do with the phenomenology of perception? Indeed, the rest of the 
dissertation is devoted to trying to answer these questions and others related to them. 
In this chapter I will try to provide some clarification and undertake a 
preliminary defence of my proposal in the context of a discussion of a related 
proposal which is part of Searle’s view of perceptual intentionality. I turn now to an 
explanation of this view, concentrating on what is most relevant for the present 
purposes. 
 
 
3.3. Searle’s theory of perceptual intentionality 
 
The proposal advanced in the previous section aims to account for the 
“demonstrative character” of basic perceptual judgements. It seems that at least part 
of what is involved in this is the simple intuition that a case of perception of an object 
is a case in which, to put it bluntly, that very object and not a similar one or even one 
that is qualitatively indistinguishable is involved. This feature of perceptual 
judgements may be called the particularity or the particular-directedness of the 
intentional content of perception and perpectual judgements.8 
                                                
8 The second denomination is McDowell’s (cf. “Intentionality De Re”, e.g. p. 216). The first is used by 
Searle for alluding to a more restricted case, namely, the case in which the perceiver somehow 
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If it succeeds the proposal advanced will account for this particular-directedness 
and/or the demonstrative character of perception in a way analogous to the way in 
which a token-reflexive account of (linguistic) demonstratives accounts for the 
content of utterances of demonstrative sentences, that is, by making the presence of a 
descriptive element compatible with that particular-directedness. In this way, the 
proposal would turn out to belong to an entire general (neo-)Fregean tradition in the 
philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind which is especially concerned 
with answering the challenge posed by the alleged inability of Fregean views of 
representational content —both linguistic and mental— to cope with the particular-
directedness of certain linguistic devices and mental states. And more particularly, it 
would belong to the sub-tradition that essentially resorts to the token-reflexive 
character of the content of those devices or states to account for particular-
directedness. 
A pioneer in this particular theoretical direction is John Searle, in his book 
Intentionality. In this work Searle proposes a particular version of the token-reflexive 
idea, in which the particular-directedness of the mental states at issue is accounted for 
by resorting to the particularity of perceptual experiences, and the particularity of 
these experiences, in turn, is at least partially accounted for by resorting to the token-
reflexive character of their content. 
According to Searle the intentional content of, for example, a visual perception 
of a tree in front of the perceiver, may be approximated by (cf. op. cit. p. 48): 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
recognizes the particular object as something already somehow known, and takes his experience to be 
one of perceiving precisely such an object (cf. Intentionality, p. 64 ff.). I stick to the more general case. 
Recognition of the object would add complications that can be left out for the purposes of the present 
dissertation. 
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(1) I have a visual experience (that there is a tree in front of me). 
 
In this formulation the sentence in brackets is meant to “express” in a certain 
way the intentional content of the visual perception or the visual experience, a content 
which is, for Searle, always propositional:9 a visual experience is “never simply of an 
object but rather it must always be that such and such is the case” (p. 40).10 
In any case, sentence (1) would only gather part of the content of the visual 
perception or the visual experience. Searle now adds a decisive novelty. As is well 
known, causal theories of perception contend that there is visual perception only 
when the object or state of affairs perceived causes the visual experience11. And, on 
the face of it, Searle’s theory would seem to add something to this claim, that is, to 
the claim that (in perception) the object or state of affairs perceived causes the visual 
experience. It would seem to add the requirement that this very fact  —the causal 
                                                
9 Searle places the sentence which gives the intentional content in brackets, and I will respect this 
convention so long I am discussing his views. He holds that a sentence “expresses” the content of a 
visual experience only in so far it is the “verbal specification of the conditions of satisfaction of the 
visual experience” (p. 40). Moreover, it is not that the content of the experience “is linguistic but rather 
that the content requires the existence of a whole state of affairs if it is to be satisfied” (ibid.). This is 
all very well, but it easily leads one to raise the further issue of just what  then  is the nature of such a 
(non-linguistic) content. This issue will figure prominently in the dissertation. 
10  This includes cases in which the perceiver abstains from actually making the  perceptual judgement, 
as is the case, for example, when a subject who is aware of the particulars of the Müller-Lyer illusion 
refrains from judging or believing that the two segments at issue are of equal length. In this way Searle 
sides with those who think that the basic content of perception is propositional (seeing that, in the case 
of visual perception) against those who, like Jackson (1977) and Dretske (1995), maintain that it is 
perception of things which is fundamental. 
11 The classical reference is Grice, “The Causal Theory of Perception”. 
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fact— belongs to the intentional content of the visual experience itself. Thus, he 
specifies the content of the visual experience in our example as follows (cf. op. cit. 
pp. 48-49): 
  
(2) I have a visual experience (that there is a tree in front of me, and that there is 
a tree in front of me is causing this visual experience). 
 
It can be seen from this formulation that by including “the causal fact” in the 
intentional content of the experience Searle is making the identity of that intentional 
content depend on the very experience at issue, and hence, in effect, in his view the 
conditions of satisfaction of the experience are partly determined by the experience 
itself, since the conditions of satisfaction are determined by the intentional content. 
More specifically, the intentional content and the satisfaction conditions of a token 
perceptual experience are determined relative to a property of such token experience, 
to wit, the property of being caused by the state of affairs which is an essential part of 
the satisfaction condition determined by the intentional content, or, as Searle puts it 
more simply, the property of being “caused by the rest of its condition of satisfaction, 
that is, by the state of affairs perceived” (p. 48). In this way, token perceptual 
experiences can be said to “reflect themselves” in their intentional content.12  
                                                
12 Here Searle talks, not very properly, of self-referentiality, which involves him in issuing the warning 
that “[t]he visual experience itself does not say” that it figures in its own intentional content (p. 49). 
Eventually, he rectified this point: “... perhaps it would have been better to try to state the point 
without using the notion of reference, but e.g. that of token-reflexivity” (in “Response: Reference and 
Intentionality”, p. 238). ‘Token-reflexivity’ is appropriate because the intentional content of the visual 
experience “reflects” the token experience itself in the way that has been explained. Notice also that, 
since what belongs to the intentional content is that the perceptual object or state of affairs is causing 
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I will return to the discussion of the import of the proposal that perceptual 
experiences are involved in their own intentional contents, later. This, in any case, 
requires paying attention to Searle’s general views on perception and perceptual 
experiences, which I will now outline briefly. 
Searle differentiates between experience and perception, that is, between simply 
having a perceptual experience and a case of genuine perception: “... I am 
distinguishing between experience and perception ... Experience has to determine 
what counts as succeeding, but one can have an experience without succeeding, i.e. 
without perceiving” (Intentionality, p. 38). Experiences determine “what counts as 
succeeding” because, as we have seen, they have an intentional content determining 
their conditions of satisfaction. Moreover “visual and other sorts of perceptual 
experiences are conscious mental events” (op. cit. p. 46, Searle’s italics) possessing 
“specific phenomenal properties” (ibid.). That is, there is always a “what it is like” 
side to them, so to speak. 
Searle resorts to experiences to account for what is common to cases of (genuine) 
perception and cases of illusions and hallucinations: Somebody who has a visual 
hallucination can share the visual experience with a perceiver (pp. 57-58). With all 
these ingredients, Searle’s position strongly recalls the position of a defender of the 
representative theory of perception. In particular, the latter would also postulate 
entities that are “conscious” and “mental” for the same purpose of providing a sort of 
“neutral content” to be shared by perceptual and pseudo-perceptual states alike. 
Moreover, Searle shares the internalist stance which is typical of such theories: “It is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
the experience, and particular causal relations hold, properly speaking, between events, the experience 
enters its own intentional content as an event. 
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a consequence of my account of [i]ntentionality that one could have all of the mental 
contents one has, and still the objects that in fact correspond to those contents in the 
world, the objects which ‘fit’ the contents and thus are ‘referred to’ by the 
representations in question, might not even exist” (“Response: Reference and 
Intentionality,” p. 237). 
However, rather surprinsingly, Searle rejects a representative theory of 
perception and classifies his theory as “a version of ‘naive’ (direct, common sense) 
realism” (cf. pp. 57-59). Ultimately, it would seem that he believes himself to be 
justified in locating his view in the “direct realist” camp because he holds that an 
experience is —as he insists for the particular case of visual experiences— “the 
vehicle of the [i]ntentional content of our visual perception”, not “the object of visual 
perception” (loc. cit.) —that is, the state of affairs perceived. But, as he leaves just 
what the description of the visual experience as the vehicle of the intentional content 
amounts to unclear, it is not at all certain that his view on perception can be regarded 
as a variety of a “direct realist” theory.13 
More generally, as we have seen, according to Searle there are two features to 
perceptual experiences: their having an intentional content, and their possessing 
phenomenal properties. As far as I can see, he does not say anything about the 
relationship between these two features that goes beyond the vague claim that, in 
perception, intentionality “is realized in conscious experiences (cf.: “[T]he 
                                                
13 A source of discrepancy between Searle’s position and a (typical) representative theory would lie in 
the fact that, as Searle makes clear in the text quoted above, he regards experiences as events, while in 
traditional versions of representative theories they would be as things rather than as events. This might 
be a potentially important difference (as will be seen in Chapter 7), but Searle’s internalism keeps him 
close to traditional versions of representative theories. 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
intentionality of vision is characteristically realized in visual experiences which are 
conscious mental events”, op. cit. p. 46). This seems poorly-equipped to stand up to 
much close inquiry about the character of Searle’s position in the philosophy of 
perception. In any case, the character of experiences as conscious mental events 
involving phenomenal properties can hardly be unrelated to the “self-referentiality” 
—indeed, token-reflexivity— of their intentional content, as I will stress later on. But 
Searle remains silent on the connection.14 
There is one final peculiarity of Searle’s theory of perception which is related to 
the points already made. When explaining above the decisive novelty introduced by 
Searle in his theory, I took care to say that Searle’s proposal “would seem” to add 
something to the central claim of a causal theory of perception, namely, that what I 
called ‘the causal fact’ itself is part of the intentional content of visual experience (see 
example (2) above). My caution is due to the fact that when Searle uses the verb 
‘cause’ in his formulations, he means it in a special sense: he means it to refer to his 
own notion of intentional causality, and not to a (mere) natural relation between 
                                                
14 Among the perplexing issues I find in Searle’s text is his assertion that the claim that there are visual 
experiences “is a genuine empirical ontological claim” (cf. p. 46). This is,  of course, a point of 
divergence with representative theories, as indeed, with philosophical theories of perception in general, 
but what I find most perplexing about it is that he does not seem to be able to maintain his assertion 
without undertaking risky compromises. Indeed, he accepts that “[t]he verbs ‘see’ and ‘remember’, 
unlike the verbs ‘desire’ and ‘believe’, imply not only the presence of an [i]ntentional content but also 
that the content is satisfied” (Intentionality, p. 52), but then, given that in his view the visual 
experience is part and parcel of the intentional content, it would seem that the explanation of ‘see’ 
analytically implies the existence of visual experiences, unless, that is, the doctrine that experiences 
participate in their own intentional content is also itself a “genuine empirical ontological claim”. I will 
take issue with Searle’s assertion in Chapter 7, in relation to a theory which postulates something akin 
to Searle’s visual experiences. 
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objects or events “in the world”. It seems that in introducing that notion Searle is 
trying to overcome the conflict of traditional versions of theories which appeal to 
experiences in the determination of intentional content with the aim of giving an 
account of the intentionality of perception which is at the same time “first personal”, 
that is, an account from the point of view of the perceiving subject. As the 
formulation in (2) shows, Searle aims to provide that sort of account, and he holds 
that the use of a standard, “natural” notion would be incompatible with this aim (cf. 
op. cit. pp. 117-126). I will not pursue the complication introduced by this notion in 
Searle’s theory, since it does not seem to me that it contributes to clarifying the 
appeal to internal entities in his theory, as will become clear in the next section. 
Before considering this decisive point, I will complement my initial description 
of Searle’s views on the intentional content of perceptual experiences with a brief 
look at his related treatment of the case of perceptual judgements, beliefs or thoughts. 
This will facilitate a more exact comparison with my own proposal, as formulated in 
the previous section, since it concerns such thoughts as well. Thus, I focus on a 
specific (possible) perceptual judgement —or possible thought or belief— involved in 
an episode of perception like the one of the example I used above, at least when the 
perceiver would take his experience at face value, an episode where a possible 
judgement is involved which the perceiver could express by saying “That is a tree” 
(leaving the improbability of this as a communicative situation to one side as 
irrelevant).  According to Searle, this judgement would be represented simply in the 
following way (cf. Intentionality, p. 212 for a little more natural —and complicated— 
example): 
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(3) (There is a tree there causing this visual experience.) 
  
On the face of it, and contrary to the case of the extensional content of an 
experience, we do not have anything here that reflects itself. Thus, we cannot say that 
the present account of perceptual judgements is token-reflexive. Nevertheless, the 
“reference” to the experience in the account —indeed, the fact that according to this 
the experience is somehow essentially involved— would seem to have favourable 
consequences. Because of reasons that are parallel to the well known reasons in the 
linguistic case, trying to account for the way in which the object is “presented” to a 
subject in visual perception in a specificatory manner by something akin to a 
description, is bound to be unfaithful to the afore-mentioned feature of the 
particularity or particular-directedness that seems to characterize the sort of judgment 
which a subject could express by saying “That is ...”. Searle’s proposal contains much 
of such a descriptive character, since the object which the perceptual judgement is 
about is somehow determined through a descriptive property, namely: tree causing 
this visual experience. However, this property is not a purely descriptive property, but 
rather a mixed descriptive-demonstrative property. And this fact seems to change 
things radically: the particularity of the tree the judgement is about seems to be taken 
care of by the particularity of the visual experience concerned, precisely to this 
extent: the identity of the judgement is determined entirely by the relevant object in 
the perceptual situation (assuming there is such a relevant object) and it is entirely 
irrelevant to the identity of the perceptual judgement whether there is another thinker 
enjoying a qualitatively identical experience at some other location in physical (or 
logical) space. Thus, it might seem that Searle’s specific (quasi-)descriptivist account 
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succeeds where traditional descriptivist accounts fail. If his proposal could be made to 
work in detail, it would account for the “particular-directedness” of some mental 
states. 
With regard to its potential to account for the particularity feature of the 
perceptual judgments at issue, there is an obvious similarity between Searle’s 
proposal and mine as the latter has been formulated so far, as emerges when 
comparing the formulation in (3) above and my formulation in the previous section, 
repeated here as (4): 
 
(4) The object attended in this act of attention is a tree. 
 
Just as in Searle’s proposal, the visual experience itself belongs to the 
determination of the judgement or the thought, the act of attention belongs to it in 
mine. Indeed, in my proposal the token-reflexive feature seems to be present. The 
attending or token act of attention has an object as its content, and which object this is 
is determined by which act of attention that was. 
The two proposals seem to hold parallel promises to solve the problem of 
particularity. The particular-directedness of perceptual judgements or thoughts would 
be accounted for by the particularity of the visual experience involved in Searle’s 
proposal, and by the particularity of the episode of attention involved in mine. 
A caveat concerning the potential of Searle’s proposal for solving the problem is 
that if internalism is indeed integral to it, as Searle believes, his theory would not after 
all offer a real perspective for providing a solution to the problem of particularity. In 
my opinion, a theory which purports to offer a solution to this problem but for which 
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it is a possibility that no such objective particulars exists (none of them), has the ring 
of paradox, since the problem of particularity is precisely the problem of how the 
mind, or the intentional contents that are determined by what is “in the mind”, is or 
are specifically directed toward particulars, paradigmatically particular physical 
objects, objects which are fully “mind-independent”. 
As will be seen, I will not follow Searle in his internalism, and although I agree 
with him in adopting a first-personal perspective, my account will do so without 
appealing to intentional causality. But given the undeniable similarity between the 
approaches, there is a real issue about what the concrete features mine has that make 
my own approach diverge on those points. These will gradually emerge throughout 
this work, beginning in the next section,  where, I turn to a more detailed discussion 
of one aspect of Searle’s proposal. I will examine the nature of the appeal to an 
internal entity in his proposal which is signalled by the use of a demonstrative 
expression —‘this experience’— in its formulation. Since there is also an evident 
appeal to an internal entity in my proposal (albeit a different one this time, introduced 
in an identical manner) using a demonstrative expression in the formulation, the 
examination of the meaning of the above-mentioned central feature in Searle’s 
proposal will provide an immediate opportunity to expand on its significance in mine. 
 
 
3.4. McDowell’s criticism of Searle’s account 
 
In his “Intentionality De Re”, a commentary on Searle’s proposal, McDowell 
criticises Searle from the position that his proposal has not been properly developed at 
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a decisive point. As we have seen, Searle’s proposal seems to have the potential to 
solve the problem of particularity where other descriptive-specificatory approaches 
fail. But the decisive element of the account is its appeal to a particular perceptual 
experience. McDowell’s objection is that Searle  does not discuss the “particular-
directedness” that we could reasonably think is involved in the element of the content 
that is alluded to in Searle’s formulation by his use of a demonstrative expression —
‘this visual experience’, and that this is a very significant deficiency in Searle’s 
account: 
 
But what about the particular-directedness signalled here by “this visual 
experience”? How is this to be made out to conform to the general “Fregean” picture? 
This kind of demonstrative expression is enormously important at several points in 
Intentionality (...) and that makes it remarkable that the book contains no discussion at 
all of the questions I have just posed. 
(McDowell, “Intentionality De Re”, p. 217) 
 
We can understand, I believe, the true meaning of McDowell’s concern here if 
we reflect that the use of such a demonstrative expression is a theoretician’s device 
for capturing something, and we ask what it is exactly that the device aims to capture. 
There is a real,general issue about the character of the philosophical proposal and its 
exact relation to subjects' experiences and judgements, but it seems that we can 
discuss the concrete issue at hand now without going into the discussion of the 
general issue. We can ask ourselves: what is it in subjects' experiences or thoughts 
that would justify the use of the demonstrative device, referring in the formulation to 
a perceptual experience? In other words, what do the models aim to model here? 
Searle repeatedly says that what the demonstrative expression in his formulations 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
aims at capturing is something that shows in subjects' experiences and judgements (cf. 
pp. 49 and 213). And what is it that the experiences and judgement show? I do not 
think that Searle gives an explanation that helps us in answering this question. And I 
think that this is precisely McDowell’s concern in the passage quoted. 
 I do not see any alternative to thinking that at least an essential part of what 
Searle’s formulations indicate is that in a perceptual experience  there is  an 
awareness of the experience itself, and that there is also such an awareness in the 
genuine perceptual judgement. Again, in spite of the difference in language, I think 
that this is also essentially McDowell’s diagnostic: 
 
In the absence of help from Searle on this point, then, let me suggest that the best 
account of the sort of particular-directedness that is, perfectly intelligibly, signalled by 
phrases like “this visual experience” in those formulations of his exploits the fact that 
the experience itself —the very object to which those contents are directed— is a 
possible focus of the mind’s attention, simply by virtue of being enjoyed. In the right 
circumstances, namely that one is having a visual experience, the experience itself can 
be a determinant of the mode of attention or directedness that one might indicate, at 
least to oneself, by “this visual experience.” 
(McDowell, loc. cit.) 
 
I understand this passage as simultaneously pointing to the need to recognize 
something like an awareness of, or “access” to the experience15 and making at least a 
sort of gesture or suggestion about the proper kind of awareness in Searle’s account. 
                                                
15 This reading of McDowell is also found in the paper “Searle on Perception” (cf. “... there is a 
correct point in what the critics say”, p. 27), where García-Carpintero explains more clearly the sort of 
concern at issue. He designates the kind of awareness at stake in Searle’s proposal with the expression 
‘cognitive access’ (cf. p. 28). For the time I will use it simply as an alternative denomination, without 
asking what might lie behind the addition of the adjective. I will deal with this in Chapter 7, section 2. 
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But I do not think that it is really an attention to the experience that is involved here. 
This alternative is rejected by Searle in a passage in which he is commenting on 
Merleau-Ponty. As far as I can see it is the only passage in which he touches on the 
issue of awareness, and due to its negative character it is not very helpful. In the 
passage in question, Searle is trying to dispel philosophical resistance to admitting 
visual experiences, in his substantive sense. One such source of reluctance is 
epitomized by Merleau-Ponty, who holds that visual experiences do not exist because 
any attempt to focus our attention on the experiences inevitably alters the 
phenomenology of experience. If the phenomenology of ordinary experience does not 
reveal us as attending to experiences, recognizing them as entities would be like 
adding something that is not there. Searle agrees with the premise about ordinary 
phenomenology, but not with the conclusion: 
 
As one proceeds through the active affaris of life one seldom concentrates one’s 
attention on the flow of one’s visual experiences, but rather on the things they are 
experiences of. (...) One does indeed alter the character (though not, in general, the 
content) of a visual experience by focussing one’s attention on it, but it does not follow 
from this fact that the visual experience was not there all along. 
(Searle, Intentionality, p. 44) 
 
So,  Searle is implying that in normal cases of perceiving, subjects do not have 
access to visual experiences through some sort of attention. 
Thus, I do not think that the positive “gesture” or suggestion in McDowell’s text 
is found in calling the kind of access to the experience that is required an attention to 
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the experience.16 It seems to me that where McDowell really contributes to making 
the kind of access a person must have to his concrete visual experiences a little more 
intelligible is in his minimalist formulation of the nature of such access. It would be 
an access the subject has to the experiences “simply by virtue of their being enjoyed.” 
Certainly, these words do not seem to point to anything like an introspective attention 
by the subject to his visual experiences. 
But this, if anything, would make looking for a clarification of the way in which 
the visual experience is supposed to be accessed in perception only more urgent, in 
connection to an approach like Searle’s. 
Taken in a certain way, the sort of concern that McDowell expresses  about 
Searle’s proposal would seem to require the development of such a proposal. But of 
course, this can also lead to the adoption of a negative stance if one is sceptical about 
the possibility of such a development being forthcoming, or if one believes oneself to 
hold a better alternative. The latter constitutes a second line in McDowell’s 
commentary on Searle’s proposal, according to which in allowing for the experiences 
themselves to constitute (part of) the intentional content of experiences, Searle would 
be acknowledging that experiences are not “object independent”: 
 
It is not a matter of a specification intelligible independently of the object specified: the 
presence to the mind of the object itself enters into any understanding of these 
demonstrative modes of presentation. 
                                                
16 As a matter of fact, I do not believe that the text really means to suggest that it is attention to the 
experience that is at stake here. I think rather that ‘the mind’s attention’ in the text is just a form of 
words incidently chosen to give linguistic form to the deficiency that is found in Searle. This might be 
signalled, I think, by the rather casual phrasing “mode of attention or directedness” that occurs just a 
little later in the text. 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
(McDowell, “Intentionaliy De Re”, p. 217). 
 
Except that in this case the object at issue is an internal object of course. Now, if 
this is seen to be problematic, that is, if with McDowell the particular move Searle 
makes here signals “a kind of indirection” which is somehow to be taken as wrong, 
why not directly embrace the “object-dependent” option in an account of “external 
demonstratives” once that it has been shown that one is prepared to take the step 
towards allowing “object-dependence”? This is how McDowell expresses his 
suggestion: 
 
The suggestion is, then that “this visual experience” can signal a way in which a 
visual experience can be presented in a thought, made possible by the fact that the 
experience itself is present to the mind by virtue of being enjoyed. And now I want to 
raise the question why it cannot be fully Fregean to parallel this idea for the case of 
perceived objects. (...) Why should we not suppose that ‘that man’ —when a man is in 
one’s field of vision— expresses a way in which a man can be presented in a Fregean 
Thought, made possible by the fact that the man himself is present to the mind by 
virtue of being seen? (...) In answering the question how the man is presented in such 
Thoughts, there is no substitute for saying ‘He is presented as that man’, exploiting his 
perceived presence to make oneself understood. 
(McDowell, op. cit., p. 218). 
 
McDowell mixes criticism with positive proposal here17; a proposal which, as he 
says, he does not propose to argue in his commentary. In fact, I do not think there is 
                                                
17 He even claims that the approach suggested would be more consistent with Searle professed direct 
realism about perception, the view that in perception we characteristically directly perceive objects and 
states of affairs in the world. This touches on a point in which there seems to be real tension in Searle’s 
views, as has already been mentioned in the previous section. 
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necessarily an opposition between the kind of approach to which McDowell alludes 
in this text and a token-reflexive approach of the general sort to which Searle’s 
proposal belongs, although showing this will require, apart from development, taking 
exception to the literal sense of McDowell's last claim, that in explaining how a 
material particular —a man, say— “is present to the mind” in the cases at issue there 
is no substitute for the formulation that McDowell mentions. On the contrary, what is 
required, and what is possible, is an elaborate theoretical account of the demonstrative 
modes of presentation of material objects. These issues will be dealt with in the next 
chapter. 
 
 
3. 5. Preliminary justification of the attentional proposal 
 
In § 3. 3. we had an opportunity to look at parallelisms and similarities between 
my proposal for accounting for perceptual demonstrative judgements and Searle’s 
approach to the description of the content of perceptual experiences and perceptual 
judgements. Such parallelisms will be developed and commented upon at other places 
in the dissertation (cf. the first sections of Chapters 4 and 7). I would now like to look 
in detail at only one specific issue concerning my proposal that is brought up by its 
parallelism with Searle’s position. Indeed, the main justified objection to Searle’s 
proposal to which I have alluded in the previous section may well carry with it 
parallel doubts about the way in which the act of attention could be brought to bear 
“demonstratively” on the determination of the demonstrative perceptual judgement or 
thought. Specifically, it might seem that my proposal is bound to fall prey to a version 
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of McDowell’s concern in that the inclusion of the act of attention would seem to 
involve a sort of objectionable “indirection”, in that the object perceptually identified 
is only “reached” by previously “capturing” an internal object, to wit, the concrete 
mental act of attention. 
I find the doubts in this respect fully justified, and although a more complete 
response to them will only be possible when my proposal has been fully developed, I 
think that at this stage an account can be given in which the cognitive access to the 
internal entity postulated ceases to be mysterious, and the postulation of this access is 
seen only as what I think it really is: the recognition that perceptual consciousness 
involves a (basic) sort of reflective consciousness. 
Psychologists nowadays think of perception in terms of the reception and 
processing of information. Some decades ago certain psychologists issued the idea 
that in order to make sense of the quantity of information subjects receive, this 
information must be fitted into previously existing schemata, to use the term 
originally introduced in this context by Bartlett in Remembering (1932) and which 
has been given currency more recently by Ulric Neisser in Cognition and Reality 
among others. Neisser introduces the notion of a schema with the help of an example 
thus: 
 
If we happen to see someone smile, for example, there may be information to specify 
(a) the shapes of his teeth; (b) the changing positions of his lips; (c) the fact that he is 
carrying out a certain culturally-significant act; i.e., smiling; (d) something about his 
mood, which may be cheerful or sardonic or merely polite depending on the context in 
which the smile occurs. When we perceive his mood, we are not engaged in the same 
perceptual cycle as when we are attending to his lip movements. We develop a different 
(though perhaps overlapping) set of anticipations; we pick up information that extends 
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over a different span of time (...). 
(Cognition and Reality, pp. 21-22) 
 
Some philosophers (see Hamlyn, 1983)* have interpreted Neisser’s notion in a 
strong way, according to which it would imply that what is perceived will not be 
perceived as anything unless the perceiver has prior concepts, knowledge and beliefs. 
Thus interpreted, the claim that perception takes place in the framework of schemata 
is very much at odds with the Gibsonian approach to perception, according to which, 
in sight for example, the ambient optical array provides enough information in itself 
to make it quite unnecessary to refer to anything inside the perceiver. 
I do not think that accepting this strong interpretation of schemata is at all 
mandatory. Neisser’s idea of a schema can be given a weaker interpretation, which 
may be seen to be in consonance with the most acceptable of Gibsonian claims. As 
can be anticipated from the above quotation, Neisser’s schemata are part of 
perceptual cycles, a notion that is aptly summarized by Roessler in “Perception, 
Introspection and Attention” ( p. 56) as follows: 
 
A perceptual cycle, in Neisser’s sense, consists of three elements: an anticipatory 
schema, specifying what kind of information the perceiver aims, and expects, to 
acquire; exploratory activity guided by the schema, such as looking or listening; and 
finally, the information picked up as a result of this activity, which in turn modifies the 
schema. 
 
I agree with Roessler when he qualifies Neisser’s notion of a perceptual cycle as 
“relatively undemanding and inclusive” (op. cit. p. 57). Neisser insists on the vast 
amount of information that we, as perceivers, have at our disposal, and his idea is that 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
to process this quantity and variety of information we have to be endowed with a 
previous “schema”. But even newborn babies have schemata: 
 
... there can never have been a time when we were altogether without schemata. The 
newborn infant opens his eyes onto a world that is infinitely rich in information: he has 
to be ready for some of it if he is to engage in the perceptual cycle and become ready 
for more (...) What babies do know, I believe, is how to find out about their 
environment, and how to organize the information they obtain so it can help them 
obtain more. They do not know even this very well, but well enough to begin. 
(Cognition and Reality, p. 63) 
 
 The second part of this text attemps a minimal description of a necessary 
condition for perception which would at the same time be the subject’s contribution to 
it, by reflecting his current interest. In the first part of the text this is claimed to be 
innate, although elsewhere Neisser emphasizes that it is learning which strengthens 
and develops the innate schemata: as we learn we are able to make more and more 
conjectures about the environment we find ourselves in, and we tend to expect certain 
responses to our conjectures from it. In this way the information gathered would 
partially depend on the abilities of the perceiver. Neisser puts it in this way: “We can 
see only what we know how to look for” (op.cit. p. 20). 
Neisser does not expand on the force with which the word ‘know’ should be 
taken in this formulation. But we must, I think, interpret it in a weak way which does 
not give rise to Hamlyn’s interpretation. Learning does not alter the essential 
character of schemata. It is still, so to speak, “the same kind of thing” that a newborn 
baby has, not something that is conceptually articulated, and it is in this way that it is 
useful to the perceiver for organizing the incoming information. 
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This “undemanding” interpretation of Neisser’s ideas should be kept in mind as 
our interest turns to two central aspects of schemata: 
 
In my view, the cognitive structures crucial for vision are the anticipatory schemata that 
prepare the perceiver to accept certain kinds of information rather than others and thus 
control the activity of looking (...) At each moment the perceiver is constructing 
anticipations of certain kinds of information that enable him to accept it as it becomes 
available. Often he must actively explore the optic array to make it available, by 
moving his eyes or his head or his body. These explorations are directed by 
anticipatory schemata, which are plans for perceptual action as well as readinesses for 
particular kinds of optical structure. 
(Op. cit. p. 20-21) 
 
In short, schemata both direct the activity of looking and prepare the subject for 
what can be found. Furthermore, “[t]he outcome of the explorations —the 
information picked up— modifies the original schema. Thus modified, it directs 
further exploration and becomes ready for more information” (ibid. p. 21). 
Neisser is then effectively conceiving perception as involving “intentional 
elements” where talking of achievement and failure makes sense. But it is not only 
that this talk makes sense. The key point is that the subject must somehow  be aware 
of achievement (or failure) because only thus can it be detected that a perceptual 
cycle has been closed and a new one can be initiated. Using Roessler’s term, the 
subject needs to monitor the success, or otherwise, of his activity; that is, there must 
be “some kind of monitoring, aimed at establishing whether the intention is fulfilled” 
(“Perception, Attention, and Consciousness”, p. 59).18 
                                                
18 In appealing to Neisser’s ideas in the preceeding paragraphs, I am not appealing to an empirical 
theory of scientific psychology at all. Even if coming from a empirical psychologist, Neisser’s 
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Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that the “searching” activity at stake 
involves attending to the environment. Thus, I suggest that what I have called ‘acts of 
attending’ in previous sections can be seen as being individuated by perceptual 
cycles, and hence, the need to monitor the success or otherwise of the subject’s 
activity is at the same time a need to monitor when an act of attending has been 
accomplished, so that a new one may start. 
For a better understading of this claim, I think at this point it is convenient to 
take into a consideration an objection that Burge raises about Searle’s proposal in 
“Vision and Intentional Content” and which might equally, mutatis mutandis, be 
thought to affect mine. Burge is objecting to the fact that Searle’s formulation, with 
its apparent reference to the experiences of the perceiver, requires him to be aware of 
these experiences or to have some immediate cognitive access to them. There are, 
Burge admits, loose senses in which it can be said that perceivers are “aware of” their 
visual experiences. But according to Burge,  the sense in which Searle requires this to 
be so is a stronger one, and he does not think that this captures what “visual 
experience itself transmits to us” (op. cit. p. 210). Because of this, Searle’s proposal 
“gives a misleading picture of mental ability” (ibid., p. 209). In more detail, Burge’s 
claim is as follows: 
 
There are surely various loose senses in which we “directly experience” or are “aware 
of” our visual experiences. They are part of our conscious, visual life; we react to them 
in a discriminating way. But Searle’s view requires more. Reference to those 
experiences must be part of every visual experience of physical objects (...). But ... [t]o 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
reflections are located rather at the level of common sense psychology which can be developed by 
philosophical discussion. 
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make reference to one’s visual experiences, over and above the physical objects that 
one sees by means of them, one must have some means of distinguishing experiences 
from the objects they are experiences of. There is a sense in which the visual system 
itself must make some such discriminations in order to have objective reference to 
physical entities. The system must be capable of screening subjective visual 
phenomena from the deliverances of the system that have objective significance. But ... 
although visual experiences are manipulated within the visual system, they are not 
thereby referred to by the subject in visual experiences. Such manipulations and 
discriminations are unconscious, automatic, and most important inaccessible to use by 
other parts of the cognitive system. Empirical evidence and common sense both suggest 
that they are not supplied to visually based thoughts useable by the central cognitive 
system. 
(Op. cit. pp. 204-5)  
 
The reason Burge gives for these claims is, I believe, to be found in the text 
coming after that just quoted: 
 
For the subject’s judgements to make reference to visual experiences, the subject 
himself, not merely a sub-system of the subject, must be capable of making 
discriminations between experiences and physical objects (...). I think that these are 
what are ordinarilly called ‘conceptual discriminations.’ 
(Ibid.) 
 
Transferring these remarks to the discussion of our view, I completely agree that 
it is the subject himself and not merely a sub-system of his which must be said to be 
able to discriminate between the object attended and the act of attention. What I do 
not agree with, however,  is that a conceptual discrimination is required, and so the 
subject must posess the concepts necessary to make the discrimination. My proposal, 
as already outlined, is meant to be completely congruent with the “undemanding” 
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interpretation of the perceptual cycle. 
So, when I postulate the need for monitoring acts of attention, this is not done in 
the spirit of advancing a cognitive- psychological hypothesis about sub-systems of the 
perceiving subject. I believe that the sort of monitoring I have mentioned, like the 
perceptual cycle as a whole, is something in which the person himself engages. In 
terms that will be explained further in Chapter 5, the postulation at issue is a claim at 
the “personal” rather than the “subpersonal” level. However, this does not mean that 
the perceiver can quite readily make it clear to himself that he is engaging in acts of 
attention, for which he would require the possession of the relevant concepts. 
In this framework we can make sense of the subject’s awareness or cognitive 
access to his own acts of attention which is presupposed by our proposal. And given 
that acts of attention are the only “internal” entity to which my theory appeals, we are 
in a possition to make some sense of the kind of cognitive access to internal entities 
that this theory assumes. This is essentially, to borrow Roessler’s words again, “the 
awareness of an achievement”.19 Since there is intentional activity involved,20 the 
                                                
19 Roessler uses this idea, as well as the idea of monitoring, for a rather different although not 
unrelated purpose, since his main interest is accounting for introspection (cf. Roessler, “Perception, 
Introspection and Attention” , pp. 55-61). 
20 That there is intentional activity involved in perception, even of the kind envisaged here, does not 
make perception itself an outright intentional activity. Following C. Evans in The Subject of 
Consciousness and Eilan in “Perceptual Intentionality, Attention and Consciousness” Roessler makes 
much of the intentional aspects of perception. But  I agree with him when he says: 
... having a particular perceptual experience can be an achievement on the part of the subject. 
But note that this does not make perceiving itself an intentional activity. It is one thing to say 
that attending is something we (sometimes) do intentionally, and that by attending we exercise 
some control over the content of our perceptual experience; it is another to claim, implausibly, 
that seeing or hearing something can be done intentionally. (Roessler, “Perception, 
Introspection and Attention” , p. 57) 
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awareness at stake is one which is “aimed at establishing whether the intention is 
fulfilled” (ibid. p. 59), or the act of attention realized. In short, the awareness of 
whether a perceptual cycle has been completed. 
In this way it can be seen that from our theory that there is an answer to the 
requirement expressed by McDowell in relation to Searle’s proposal for an account of 
the kind of “particular-directedness” to an internal object which is signalled by the 
use of ‘this act of attention’ in my proposal, as it was signalled by the expression ‘this 
visual experience’ in Searle’s proposal. I hope that something was said to alleviate the 
corresponding qualms in relation to my proposal in the previous considerations, and 
indeed, in exactly the “minimalist” direction that McDowell foresaw, since it would 
not be wrong to say that the act of attention “is a possible focus of the mind’s 
attention, simply by virtue of being enjoyed” (cf. the first quotiation from McDowell 
in § 2 above). 
With this the hope of developing a genuine solution to the problem of 
particularity enters the stage again. The fact that a demonstrative perceptual thought 
would concern a particular individual in the way intuitively required would result 
from the particularity of the act of attention involved. 
Hence, to be specific, two judgements concerning respectively numerically 
different, even if qualitatively identical individuals, would still be different 
judgements. Moreover, there is a point about phenomenology here. Searle saw this 
case —or, rather the parallel case of two perceptual experiences concerning 
qualitatively identical but numerically different objects— as one in which there is the 
“[s]ame phenomenology [but] different contents and therefore different conditions of 
satisfaction” (Intention, p. 50). We can now see that this is not right. In the present 
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view, identifying an object as ‘this object’ means identifying it roughly as ‘the object 
attended in this act of attention’ where the current act of attention is, in a way, 
registered in consciousness. Because of this, the judgements or experiences at issue 
would also be phenomenologically different. This could not be otherwise if perceptual 
consciousness involves, in some sense, a kind of reflective consciousness.21 
                                                
21 In this way, Eilan's requirement that “the existence and identity of spatio-temporal objects” is not “extrinsic to the characterization of how things are 
from within” the perspective of consciousness would be fulfilled (cf. “Objectivity and the Perspective of Consciousness”, p. 236), and in an account 
that can in a fair way be regarded as “Searle-like”. 
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I think that the previous discussion gives me grounds for claiming that at this 
stage my proposal shows some advantages over Searle’s in the respect alluded to, 
although further developments in this respect will have to wait until the proposal 
receives further elaboration in the chapters to come. Among other things, in Chapter 7 
we will see how visual experiences are used in my account, so that if it is felt that 
there is something right in Searle’s proposal in this respect, it will also be seen that 
this aspect is not lost in mine. 
By now it will be clear that I am relying on the possibility of meaningfully and 
truly attributing certain cognitive abilities (knowledge, discriminations, etc.) to 
subjects which, although they are personal —it is the person that possesses that 
knowlege— cannot readily be recognized by their possessor, who is not, without 
further ado, in a position to formulate what he knows, discriminates, etc. In this I 
agree with Searle when he rejects the assumption that “the description of a conscious 
[i]ntentional content should be given in terms which are part of the immediate 
consciousness of the agent” in replying to Burge (“Response: Reference and 
Intentionality”, p. 231). Although I will not attempt to engage in a general theoretical 
defense of the opposite view, I hope that my resorting to it in the chapters to come 
will at least be illustrative of the kind of use to which it can be put and the advantages 
it brings with it. 
One final issue to be taken up in a preliminary way here concerns the problem of 
internalism. Although we will be in a better position to face this possible charge in the 
last chapter of the dissertation, it seems possible at this stage to say something about 
it. To begin with, it is quite obvious that the awareness of the “internal entity” —the 
act of attention— which is “cashed” in terms of monitoring, is not to be confused with 
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a further act of attention directed at the (perceptual) act of attention itself. This 
further act may undoubtly take place as well, but then we should not assume that such 
further acts occur in normal perception. Moreover, neither need we assume that when 
they do take place, in introspection, they are akin to cases of perceptual attention 
(pace perceptualist theories of introspection). Thus, there is no “indirection” here of 
the sort that seemed to worry McDowell or Burge most. 
A further distinction between attending to an object in the environment and the 
kind of basic awareness of the act of attention that I am postulating is that as we have 
seen, whereas perceptual attention can be regarded as an achievement, and hence 
awareness of it is the awareness of an achievement, we should not say in the same 
sense that basic awareness of attention is itself an achievement. There is no 
intentionality involved in it. 
Finally, it now seems possible to understand the kind of “internal entity” to 
which the account appeals in a way that is compatible with externalism. In the first 
place, acts of attention seem publically accessible; they appear to be something that 
cognitive scientists can study. And second, even if the basic kind of awareness of acts 
of attention that I have tried to capture with the notion of monitoring is not itself an 
achievement as attending to an object undoubtly is, it seems that monitoring yields 
knowledge about acts of attention where ignorance or error are not excluded, while an 
internalistic conception would exclude this possibility. 
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Chapter 4: Approaches to Perceptual Demonstrative 
Modes of Presentation 
 
 
 
4.1. A “purely perceptual” approach 
to perceptual demonstrative senses. 
 
In the previous chapter, I presented the basic orientation of my approach to the 
analysis of perceptual demonstration in the preliminary formulation of the intentional 
content of perceptual demonstrative judgements. I now turn to the demonstrative 
modes of presentation of particular objects which are “ingredients” in such 
judgements. I first recall some basic notions about the idea of sense, in particular, the 
sense of a singular term. 
As is well known, identity statements constitute the paradigmatic cases in which 
Frege tried to show the necessity of recognizing another semantic property of 
expressions; their sense (Sinn) to use his technical term; in addition to their reference. 
If we identified the meaning of the singular terms in identity statements with their 
reference, then terms with the same reference would have the same meaning, and thus 
the identity statements themselves would not be informative to any speaker, exactly 
as in the case of an identity statement with only a singular term: 
 
(1) The Evening Star is the Evening Star. 
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Nevertheless, we can easily recognize that identity statements with different 
singular terms, like (2), are informative: 
 
(2) The Evening Star is the Morning Star. 
 
Senses are introduced to account for the intuitively clear difference between (1) 
and (2). The informativeness versus the lack of it of (2) in comparison to (1) is 
responsible for the fact that all competent speakers of the language should agree to 
(1), while only speakers whith additional astronomical information would agree to 
(2). This fact signals that (1) and (2) have different “cognitive value” for speakers of 
the language, and thus, that the only terms that differentiate between the two 
sentences —“the Evening Star”, “the Morning Star”— differ in cognitive value. 
As a technical Fregean notion, then, the general idea of the sense of an expression 
is the idea of the cognitive value of that expression for competent speakers of the 
language to which the expression belongs. It is for such an idea than supporters of a 
Fregean theory of sense argue, and it is against such idea that detractors turn. The 
latter argue, in effect, that no general or common property of each of the diverse 
meaningful expressions of a natural language exists that can be recognized as its 
cognitive value by competent speakers of that language. 
Following Dummett,1 to specify the property constituting the sense of an 
expression one must specify the condition something must satisfy to be the referent of 
that expression. The condition at issue is that stating the way in which the referent 
must be identified to understand the language. This is then the condition which 
                                                
1  Frege: Philosophy of Language, especially Chapters 5-7 and 12.  
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speakers of the language, purely by virtue of being competent speakers know an 
object meets if it is the referent of an expression: the speakers of the language, purely 
by virtue of being competent speakers, think of the objects-referents as satisfying 
such a condition. Ideally, the competent speakers of the language, purely as such 
competent speakers, know that the object or objects that are referred to by the 
expression at issue meet that condition. 
Thus, on the one hand, sense is something that meaningful expressions of a 
language have, a certain property of expressions, but on the other, senses are 
properties of or conditions on objects. (This is captured in the double way we talk of 
senses: as senses of expressions, and as modes of presentation of objects.) And, 
moreover, such conditions have a special epistemic privilege: they are epistemically 
accessible to a subject qua competent speaker of a language (he or she knows which 
conditions they are). 
Furthermore, at least in the case of expressions that are singular terms, such 
conditions are also individuative, that is they are conditions (meant) to be satisfied by 
precisely one entity. 
It is natural to think of the possibility of extending this Fregean framework 
beyond the domain of language. Instead of individuative conditions an object must 
satisfy to be the referent of expressions epistemically accessible to the competent 
speakers of a language, we may be interested in individuative conditions on objects 
which are epistemically accessible to subjects by virtue of another quality they may 
have. In particular, we are interested here in individuative conditions  which are also 
epistemically accessible or known to subjects by virtue of their being normal 
perceivers. These conditions will be the ones constituting perceptual demonstrative 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
modes of presentation 
When discussing issues in this new context, the termsenses  may not be 
appropriate since they may be thought of as tied to expressions in a language. On the 
other hand, the expression ‘mode of presentation’, for its orientation toward objects, 
so to speak —as capturing conditions on objects— offers itself as a more adequate 
denomination. Indeed, I will predominantly use this expression, (as Peacocke does, 
but for the sake of variety I will occasionally use ‘sense’ as well. This terminology  is 
preferred by authors like Evans and Campbell, although strictly as a variant, that is, 
free from any connotations of being a property of linguistic expressions. 
If we restrict the discussion —as is here our main interest— to the modes of 
presentation of particular (material) objects, we can immediately raise the issue of 
whether there are modes of presentation of objects which are distinctive or 
characteristic of perceptual states ( (seeing a tree in front of one or rather seeing, say, 
that a particular tree is blooming), perceptual beliefs (“That tree is already 
blooming”), or of the beliefs which we have called “partially perceptual” (“That tree 
was planted by my father”). And our search is for (individuative) conditions 
accessible (known) to subjects as (normal) perceivers. 
In this chapter I intend to present my proposal in a way that makes it possible to 
carry out an initial comparison with the other current proposals known to me. For this 
purpose, it is not necessary to develop it fully; nor is it perhaps convenient, least the 
trees not let the forest to be seen. My strategy is, then, to introduce my proposal as a 
specific representative of a general approach, which I call ‘the purely perceptual 
view’. In also presenting the rival proposals as representatives of contrasting 
approaches —the ‘substantial view’ and the ‘subpersonal view’— it will be possible 
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to discuss these proposals and simultaneously place my own among them in the 
panorama.  
In introducing my proposal I will procceed somewhat obliquely. I will first outline 
the general approach my proposal belongs to with the help of two other specific 
versions of the same approach. These may be called ‘the Searlean version’ and ‘the 
Peacockean version’, although neither of them is actually defended by a philosopher 
(at least not at the present time), but which will help in painting the general picture. 
In Chapter 2 § 3 I mentioned that Searle does not make a proposal about 
demonstrative mode of presentation in general in Intentionality (or anywhere else), 
but only about the senses of demonstrative or indexical expressions. In the previous 
chapter we discussed the central traits of Searle’s theory of the intentional content of 
perceptual experiences and of perceptual judgements, from which any explicit 
suggestion about a specific perceptual demonstrative mode of presentation of objects 
is absent (which we saw McDowell complaining about at the end of § 5 of that 
chapter). Nevertheless, from Searle’s theory of intentional content we can obtain 
conditions for such demonstrative modes of presentation, such as the following one: 
 
(3) tree causing this visual experience. 
 
This, in effect, might be prima facie regarded as a reasonably individuative 
property or condition, and also as epistemically accessible to the subject. It would 
hold the promise of being reasonably individuative if we first put aside qualms raised 
by the fact that in its linguistic description a demonstrative expression —apparently 
referring to an internal object— is used, and that this use obviously requires an 
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explanation (see § 3. 4), and second, if we make a “straightforward” reading, so to 
speak, of the word ‘tree’ and of the concept of cause, thus contradicting Searle in 
word and spirit.2 As such, it might be proposed as constitutive of the perceptual mode 
of presentation of the object present both in a perceptual state, in a corresponding 
perceptual judgement or perceptual belief, and in what we have called partially 
perceptual beliefs. 
We can obtain a rather similar putative proposal from Peacocke’s theory in Sense 
and Content. Using Peacocke’s own words (cf. pp. 110 and 113), slightly adapted to 
the present example, the condition in this case would be given by 
 
(4) object of the kind tree (causally) responsible, in the manner required for 
perception, for the properties in that region of the visual field. 
 
Following Peacocke here, it would mean that the properties alluded to in (4) are 
phenomenal properties, since the visual field itself is also meant to be a phenomenal 
field (and not at all anything like the subject's “visual surroundings”). In this way, we 
would again find here  that the responsibility for the individuative work, so to speak, 
has been handed to internal entities. 
When we recall that Searle’s visual experiences also have phenomenal properties 
we seem to be forced to recognize a strong similarity between candidates (3) and (4) 
as defining conditions of modes of presentation, indeed almost “stylistic variants”, as 
                                                
2 Recall Searle’s thoroughgoing internalism, which also involves a notion of “intentional causation”, 
as mentioned in § 3.3. 
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it were, of one another.3 
In the recent paper “A Presuppositional Account of Reference Fixing”, García-
Carpintero proposed conceptualizing the senses of linguistic items as ingredients of 
certain presuppositions, namely, presuppositions of acquaintance with objects. 
Making use of this idea,4 one might propose either of the following as the 
“presupposition of acquaintance” in the states —respectively, a perceptual state, a 
perceptual judgement or belief and a partially perceptual belief— that we are taking 
as examples: 
 
(5) There is a (unique) tree causing this experience. 
(6) There is a (unique) object of the tree kind (causally) responsible, in the manner 
required for perception, for the properties in that region of the visual field. 
 
It seems straightforward that the (putative) modes of presentation expressed in (3) 
and (4) are, respectively, “ingredients” in the presuppositions expressed by (5) and 
                                                
3 The words “in the manner required for perception”, occurring in Peacocke’s original proposal, 
obviously have the role of discarding “devious” causal chains like, say, the one in the case where the 
object caused a neurologist manipulating the brain of the relevant subject to provoke the phenomenal 
properties at issue in her. But the point is, quite obviously, in need of elaboration. Indeed, if (4) were 
seriously proposed as a candidate for constituting the kind of mode of presentation we are looking for, 
some other aspects of Peacocke’s theory should be taken care of (see below). 
4 Here I am again taking the semantic theory of linguistic demonstratives heuristically as inspiration 
for developing proposals concerning perceptual demonstratives (cf. § 3.2). Actually, concerning the 
temporal development of the ideas presented here, it is in part this heuristic strategy which first led to 
the proposal concerning my own alternative “reading” of the way of presentation (see below), and it 
was this, in turn, which led to the somewhat new ways of seeing Searle’s and Peacocke’s proposals 
that find expression in the present lines. 
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(6). 
Sentences of the kind illustrated in (5) and (6) are used to express the existence 
and uniqueness of something (a particular tree in the case at hand). Hence, regarded 
as expressing presuppositions, they express the notion that the existence and 
uniqueness of something is presupposed. And it is fitting to ask whether either of 
these presuppositions of existence and uniqueness —the “Searlean candidate” and the 
“Peacockean candidate”, as it were— is an apt candidate for capturing the kind of 
acquaintance with the object that we may allow is taken for granted by a perceiver in 
the relevant perceptual situation. 
In the parallel linguistic case, García-Carpintero rejects the corresponding 
candidates. Associating mere presuppositions of existence and uniqueness to senses 
would give us, he thinks, a descriptive —rather narrowly or genuinely Fregean— 
theory of senses, just the same theory which has been discredited by the discussion 
ensuing from Kripke’s work on the reference of proper names and transferred to the 
case of demonstratives by Kaplan and Perry. He says: 
 
Talk of senses as ingredients of presuppositions may have suggested that in the 
indexical case, the presupposition is also that there is a unique y. This is not the view, 
however, for it would entail that singular terms are synonymous with descriptions 
capturing their senses, literally (that is, attributively) used. It would then contradict the 
intuitions exhumed by new theorists of reference, which I share. 
(Op. cit. p. 132) 
 
To understand what this seems to amount to in the case of perception, take for 
instance the example of the perceptual judgement in the presence of a particular tree, 
in full view, to the effect that that tree is (already) blooming. The “Searlean” 
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intentional content corresponding to that judgement will be given as follows 
(remember that here we are attempting an externalist reading, to the extent to which 
this is possible at this stage, that is, putting aside the fact that there is an apparent 
reference to an internal element in the specification of the content for the moment): 
 
(7) There is a (unique) tree causing this experience, and that tree is blooming. 
 
Continuing to pursue the inquiry about this linguistic formulation for a while 
taking it as a model of the intentional content of a corresponding judgement, we can 
apply Russell’s theory of descriptions (in reverse order) to (7), thus getting: 
 
(8) The tree causing this experience is blooming. 
 
As a model of the original judgement, which seems to have a definite (perceptual) 
demonstrative character, one could wonder whether this is minimally faithful. 
Admittedly, the demonstrative character is not completely lost since there is still a 
demonstrative expression in the formulation, but one might complain that in the 
judgement which is being modeled it is intuitively the tree which seems to be 
demonstratively presented, while according to the model it is the experience of the 
tree that is represented as being demonstratively presented. (This might come close to 
the spirit of the complaints by McDowell that we saw in § 3. 4.) 
If we were to depart from (4) as a proposal for the perceptual demonstrative mode 
of presentation, we would arrive at (9) as the corresponding “Peacockean” model for 
the content of the perceptual judgement of our example: 
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(9) The (unique) object of the kind tree (causally) responsible, in the manner 
required for perception, for the properties in that region of the visual field, is 
blooming. 
 
As a matter of fact, (9) comes close to capturing Peacocke’s actual proposal in 
Sense and Content (see pp. 110 and 113). We should digress  for a moment to 
mention a key complication. Peacocke (the Peacocke of Sense and Content, that is) 
would consider (9) as giving only an indirect, although central, insight into the 
original intuitive judgement. His theory of perceptual demonstratives in that book and 
his theory of demonstratives in general, was an evidential theory, which means that 
the content of judgements or thoughts with a demonstrative or indexical character 
entertained by a subject would be identified with a certain pattern of evidence, and 
this was taken to consist in the canonical evidence that would make the subject 
disposed to make the corresponding judgement.5 Peacocke held that a general way of 
characterizing the relevant evidence related to a straightforwardly demonstrative 
thought —the evidence which would dispose a (ordinary) subject to judge the 
thought— was by identifying such evidence as (part of) that which would constitute 
                                                
5 As is well known, Peacocke eventually abandoned the views on content contained in Sense and 
Content (at least in part due to the fact the he eventually came to find the notion of canonical evidence 
problematic). There are, however, two general ideas in his “evidential view” (his own term) of content 
in that book. The first is the idea of relating intentional content constitutively to evidence, and the 
second is construeing evidence “internally”, rather than “externally”. It seems clear that Peacocke later 
abandoned the second idea, but it is not so clear to me whether he preserves, and to what extent, the 
original perspective concerning the first. For what concerns us here, cf. “Demonstrative Content” pp. 
123-5. 
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evidence for an adequately conceptually sophisticated thinker —one who possessed 
the relevant concepts— to judge a certain second thought, to wit, precissely the kind 
of thought that we try to exemplify with (9). In our example that is, the relevant 
pattern of evidence related to the original perceptual judgement (“That tree is 
blooming”) would be indirectly captured by (9), because the evidence that would 
cause a subject to make the original judgement is (part of) the evidence that would 
bring a correspondingly sophisticated subject, that is, one who possessed the concepts 
expressed by the theoretical terms in (9) (‘visual field’, ‘region of the visual field’, 
‘properties of a region of the visual field’) to judge the thought expressed or modeled 
by (9). 
Putting aside Peacocke’s own views of the relation between a perceptual 
judgement, like the one in our example, and the theoretical model in (9) in Sense and 
Content , the issue we were interested in was whether expressing the content of that 
perceptual judgement as in (8) or (9) is unfair to the specific (perceptually) 
demonstrative character of such a judgement (and the corresponding issue for the 
intentional content of a perceptual state or a partially perceptual belief). To 
complaints to that effect it might perhaps be replied that demonstrative “reference” or 
“indication” to an internal element is, in fact, all that perceptual demonstrative 
thought about an ordinary physical object amounts to, although, of course, this claim 
would need clarification and defence. 
In any case, we seen to take a small step forward in the analysis of our example if 
we propose a referential reading for the descriptions in (8) and (9) instead of a 
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descriptive one.6 It seems intuitively more acceptable to think that presuppositions of 
acquaintance with an object, if there are such notions, should be conceived as being 
akin to referentially interpreted descriptions of that object rather than to attributively 
interpreted descriptions of it. The contrast between the two interpretations of 
descriptions was delineated intuitively by Donnellan some time ago: 
 
... when a definite description is used referentially, not only is there in some sense a 
presupposition or implication that someone or something fits the description, as there is 
also in the attributive use, but there is a quite different presupposition; the speaker 
presupposes of some particular someone or something that he or it fits the description” 
(“Reference and Definite Descriptions,” p. 288; Donellan’s italics). 
 
In the “Searlean view” of the perceptual judgement that I have been describing, 
this would amount to suggesting that when we make the judgement at issue we are 
presupposing of a particular tree that it is causing our current visual experience, 
instead of presupposing that there is a unique tree which is causing this experience. 
With small changes, something analogous would hold in the “Peacockean version” of 
the proposal. Hence the mode of presentation of the object in either of these views 
would be given by the individuative condition that is an “ingredient” of the 
“referential” presuppositions. 
Let us call the “Searlean” and “Peacockean” views developed so far purely 
perceptual views of perceptual demonstratives, that is, purely perceptual views of the 
mode of presentation of the object in perceptual states, and the relevant perceptual 
and partially perceptual beliefs or judgements. In any version of such a view, the 
                                                
6 This is the move suggested by García-Carpintero for the parallel case of linguistic demonstratives; cf. 
“A Presuppositional Account of Reference Fixing”, pp. 133-135. 
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particular concerned in these perceptual states, if there is one, is first and foremost 
characterized by possessing some individuative property that concerns the fact that it 
is being perceived, instead of being characterized in terms of a more “substantial” 
property it may possess. 
Now, the account of the intentional content of perception or perceptual 
judgements that I began to develop in the previous chapter is also meant to involve a 
purely perceptual mode of presentation of the object, if any, presented to the subject. 
Moreover, this can be seen by  carefully following the line that brought us from a 
“Searlean” of “Peacockean” view of the relevant intentional contents to a conception 
of the corresponding mode of presentation of the object in the target perceptual states 
and judgements. According to my proposal then, the object is presented as the object 
attended in this (current) act of attention. More exactly, the object is presented in a 
way that we could model imperfectly with the description (10), when it receives a 
referential reading: 
 
(10) The object attended in this act of attention 
 
Following on from what has been said above in connection with the “Searlean” 
and “Peacockean” views, by characterizing the subject’s mode of presentation with 
the help of the description in (10) what I am tring to get at is that what is constitutive 
of a demonstrative perceptual judgement is the perceiver's taking for granted that the 
judgement is about a particular object, precisely the very one which is currently the 
focus of attention. In characterizing the state of the perceiver as on of “taking for 
granted” or “presupposing” here, I am tring to capture the idea that the fact that the 
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judgement is precisely about the object being attended does not in any way occupy 
the attention of the perceiver, even if some sort of awareness of it is reflected in any 
of his actions in which the object attended is involved.7 
I hope to be in a position to dig more deeply into my proposal's relation to the 
“Searlean” and “Peacockean” proposals, as these have been previously developed, in 
Chapter 7 when we examine the relations of attention to the phenomenology of 
perception. In the meantime, since I will continue developing that proposal my taking 
it as the representative of the “purely perceptual” approach to perceptual modes of 
presentation from now on will be understandable. Also, we may recall that appealing 
to an internal entity in accounting for demonstrative intentionality is common to the 
different versions of the approach, and that while we do not have any accounts of this 
appeal concerning the other versions of the same approach (which is not to claim that 
no such account could be developed) at hand, some work already been done on my 
own version of the approach (cf. § 3. 5). 
A fuller development of our proposal will have to wait until the aspect of the 
subject mentioned in the previous paragraph (the relations of acts of attention to 
phenomenal properties) has been taken care of. But I hope that enough has been said 
by now to facilitate a comparison with other, “non purely perceptual”, approaches to 
the senses of perceptual demonstratives at this stage, and to note some consequences 
                                                
7 As suggested in the previous footnote, I think that the apparatus used by García-Carpintero for 
characterizing the senses of expressions as ingredients of presuppositions could in part be adapted to 
the case of modes of presentation of objects in perception. In particular, we might presumably want to 
say that a perceptual state s of an agent can be said to presuppose a proposition p if and only if it is 
reasonable to infer from the fact that the agent is in the state s that he takes p to belong to the action 
context (cf. the definition of presupposition for the linguistic case on p. 131 of “A Presuppositional 
Account of Reference Fixing”). 
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of my proposal in the course of the discussion. 
 
 
4.2. The “substantial” view of perceptual demonstratives. 
 
Although my aim in this dissertation is mainly restricted to perceptual 
demonstrative modes of presentation of physical objects as explained in Chapter 2, § 
3, a new kind of perceptual demonstrative mode of presentation will play an 
important role in the following discussion: demonstrative access to positions in space. 
This is chiefly due to the central role that positions play in the accounts of perceptual 
demonstrative modes of presentation of physical objects which I am about to examine 
in this section. 
I do not think that this is the place to expand on a general discussion of the 
relation between demonstrative access to positions and perceptual demonstratives of 
objects, and in any case, I do not feel that I can really discuss the new kind of 
demonstrative phenomena in their own right. For the purposes of the discussion of the 
proposal in this section, I will mainly take for granted that there is some account or 
other that would be useful here. I hope that I can do this without prejudicing the 
discussion of perceptual demonstratives of physical objects, which is really the aim of 
this dissertation, in any way.8 
The ideas on perceptual modes of presentation that I will be discussing in this 
                                                
8 In Chapter 7, I will be ready to discuss what I take to be the basic conscious access to spatial 
positions and the role it plays in an account of perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation of 
physical objects. But I will not undertake the further task of giving an account of the demonstrative 
presentation of positions. 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
section are for the most part due to Gareth Evans, but for reasons of expediency I will 
proceed by expounding them first under one particular interpretation, one that I in fact 
surmise is not entirely correct. The interpretation at issue is McDowell's, and hence I 
will refer to the view, thus interpreted as the Evans-McDowell view, making it very 
clear that McDowell himself would disclaim any contribution of his own to that view 
to judge by his writings. He would simply take it as the view Evans actually held. 
In Chapter 3 § 1 we saw how Searle thought that in analyzing perception 
something should be added to the causal Gricean approach. Evans talked in terms of 
“information-links” rather than of “causal links”, perhaps to avoid associating himself 
with a view that, like Grice’s leads to the introduction of phenomenal properties in the 
analysis of perception. Otherwise, the step he takes is similar to Searle’s: it is not 
enough to require the right information-links; the intentional content of perception 
should allow for a certain cognitive perspective of the object on the part of the 
subject. 
In the previous section I tried to make it clear in general terms, what the 
perspective Searle postulated is, or rather, leaving aside, Searle’s actual views for our 
purposes, what is the perspective or mode of presentation of the object that a 
“Searlean view” postulates is. In the following text we have the basics of a rather 
different view of the cognitive perspective on the object: 
 
We are now in a position to answer the question what makes demonstrative 
identification of spatially located material objects possible. In the ordinary perceptual 
situation, not only will there be an information-link between subject and object, but 
also the subject will know, (...) upon the basis of that link, where the object is. 
(Evans, Varieties of Reference, p. 170) 
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Indeed, in what I am calling the Evans-McDowell view, the individuative 
knowledge about a physical object that is necessary and sufficient for the mode in 
which the object is presented to the subject (at a certain time) is just knowledge of the 
position the object occupies (at that time): 
 
Such identification [demonstrative identification of material or physical objects] 
depends on the subject’s locating the object. 
(McDowell, “Peacocke and Evans on Demonstrative Content”, p. 255). 
 
At this point, we need to pause to look at what is at stake here from a wider 
perspective. The first thing to recall is that Evans put the characterization of the 
individuative condition being sought in the case of demonstrative thought about 
physical objects in general (perception, memory, etc.) in terms of providing 
“discriminating” or “identifying” knowledge of the object, since this was in turn  to 
be a particular case of a totally general requirement for a discriminative conception or 
for possessing discriminating knowledge of the object in his own terms (op. cit. pp. 65 
and 89). Indeed, Evans attributed this general requirement of possession of 
discriminative knowledge to Russell (p. 65) and described the desideratum as implied 
by Russell’s Principle of Acquaintance, one which he (Evans) formulated as requiring 
the subject “to know which particular individual in the world he is thinking about”, as 
a necessary condition for having a thought about something (p. 44, my italics; cf. also 
p. 65, where Evans emphasizes these words).9 
                                                
9 In “A Presuppositional Account ...”, García-Carpintero mentions Boër and Lycan’s account of the 
(ordinary) notion of knowing who, according to which knowing who somebody is turns out to be 
essentially a matter of knowing properties of the person at issue that identify him or her and which are 
important for contextually salient purposes. In this contextual dependence of the requirement García-
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Evans then proposed to use the requirement of discriminating conception in terms 
of the notion of a fundamental Idea. A fundamental Idea or mode or presentation 
(recall that ‘Idea’ is the technical term introduced by Evans for modes of presentation 
of individuals) of an object is one such that when a subject possesses such  an Idea of 
the object, “one thinks of it as the possessor of the fundamental ground of difference 
which it in fact possesses” (op. cit. p. 107). In turn, the fundamental ground of 
difference of an object, it seems, must be provided by a correct or privileged answer 
to the question of what differentiates that object from any other of the same sort. 
Evans introduced this notion by giving examples; so, the fundamental ground of 
difference of the number three would be being the third number in the series of 
numbers, and the fundamental ground of difference of the shape square would be 
having four equal sides joined at right angles (cf. loc. cit.). In the case of a position in 
space, what distinguishes it is “its relations to each of the objects constituting the 
frame of reference” (p. 151), and in the case of physical objects, what singles one of 
them out from the others at a certain time, no matter how qualitatively similar they 
are, is its spatial position at that time, as such a spatial position is determined relative 
to an objective frame of reference (i.e. by its relations to the objects constituting the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Carpintero finds “a reason to doubt the correctness of any such general claim as RP [Russell’s 
Principle]” (p. 125). However, to see this as a reason against Evans’s endorsement of the principle 
would, I think, be unfair in view of Evans’s rejection of relying on “the colloquial use of the 
expression ‘knowing which’” —or ‘knowing who’, for that matter—, of his general qualms about a 
rough presentation of the principle, of his noteworthy efforts to give a substantial account of the 
knowing who/which requeriment, which rules out an interpretation of it as “contextually dependent”, 
and finally, of his specific argument for its need (cf. Evans, op. cit. pp. 89-92). 
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frame of reference).10 
Evans’s general distinctive proposal for the discriminating knowledge that is 
required —for having thoughts about objects of any sort— is, then, that it must 
involve fundamental Ideas or modes of presentations of objects of that sort (cf. op. cit. 
§ 4.5, especially pp. 106, 108-110; also p. 114). The importance of this for the case 
that concern us is that (perceptual) demonstrative thought about physical objects must 
involve Ideas or modes of presentation of the objects that discriminate them in terms 
of their own fundamental ground of difference (cf. Varieties of Reference, § 4.5, 
especially pp. 106, 109-110; also p. 114). The moot point is exactly how these 
fundamental Ideas are involved, and what we have seen is that there is a fairly 
straightforward answer to this: the mode of presentation is constituted by the 
fundamental Idea —by knowledge of location in an objective frame. Here is 
McDowell’s explanation of this point: 
 
Evans’s idea ... is that in the presence of the general ability to locate oneself in the 
objective world (to put egocentrically identified places and egocentrically located 
objects into an objective frame of reference), egocentric location of a place or a 
material object can constitute satisfaction of the ‘know which’ requirement even when 
that is glossed ... in terms of the idea of the fundamental ground of difference for places 
and material objects. The subject’s ‘Over there’ or ‘That one’ can express knowledge 
of which item —that is, which element in the objective order— his thought concerns.” 
                                                
10 It seems that Evans eventually came to find relying on the notion of an objective frame of reference 
in an account of demonstrative identification problematic (cf. section 3 of the Appendix to chapter 7 of 
Varieties of Reference,). The problems he found would not stem from the “well-known 
interdependence between what differentates objects from one another and what differentiates places 
from one another” (p. 151) but from the possibility that “the seemingly objective mode of thinking 
about space is, after all, contaminated by egocentricity” (p. 265). I will not go into these later concerns 
here. 
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(Op. cit. p. 259) 
 
According to McDowell, then 
 
[t]he point of appealing, in the course of the explanation, to the mere general ability to 
align egocentric and objective location is that the mere ability suffices to explain how 
an actual egocentric placing can count as an actual placing in the objective order. 
(Op. cit. p. 258; my italics). 
 
We can explain what McDowell is saying in these texts by resorting to the 
example of an event of visual perception of a (blooming) tree in the previous section, 
or rather, to the corresponding perceptual judgement, and using certain devices we 
used there to characterize judgements and modes of presentation. 
Let p be the actual position of the tree as characterized in relation to the 
perceiving subject, in a way which the linguistic predicates ‘just in front’, ‘at-mid-
distance’, ‘not-too-far’, even if helpful, model rather imperfectly. And let p* be the 
actual position of the tree as it would be characterized in a “cognitive map”, that is, in 
relation to the objects constituting the frame of reference. We can, then, model the 
way in which the object is presented to the perceiver in a first, very crude, 
approximation with the description: 
 
(11) The object at position p. 
 
Of course, this would be inadequate on several counts, first and foremost in 
suggesting that the object is presented perceptual-demonstratively as whatever is at 
position p, and so, that a perceptual demonstrative mode of presentation is a variety of 
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a descriptive-attributive mode of presentation. We know from the previous section, 
however, that we can improve things a little, perhaps even significantly, by reading 
description (11) referentially. A second defect of (11) as a model is that represents the 
perceptual subject as possessing conceptual capacities that he perhaps lacks. 
Certainly, the subject does not need to have the concept of a (egocentrically 
characterized) position to locate the object seen egocentrically. But we can put aside 
this problem here, since this is a general sort of difficulty which any proposal will 
have to face. 
With the same provisos, let us consider description (12) as a candidate for 
(modelling) the mode of presentation of the object: 
 
(12) The object at position p*. 
 
What we saw McDowell saying is that if the perceiver is a normal person, who 
correspondingly has a normal (more or less perfect) ability to locate things 
egocentrically characterized —especially including himself— in the objective spatial 
order, then to this perceiver the object being presented as in (11) counts as if it were 
presented as in (12). So, we can say that the object is in fact presented to the subject 
under the mode of presentation (imperfectly) modelled by (12). 
We may ask, so what happens when a subject is lost, so that he cannot effectively 
integrate egocentric with objective location? This case must also be construed in a 
way that accords with the foregoing: 
 
Thus, when a subject’s perceptual experience places an object for him, his statement 
‘It’s over there’ (say) can count as expressing knowledge on his part of where in the 
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world the object is, even if he is lost. Of course if he is lost he cannot give anything in 
the nature of a map reference; but even so he counts as knowing, of a certain position in 
the objective spatial order, that the object occupies it. 
(McDowell, op. cit. p. 257) 
 
We thus arrive at two formulations of the requirement for the “discriminating 
conception” of the object according to McDowell's interpretation of Evans, which 
should be regarded merely as “stylistic variants” of one another: 
 
(i) The identificatory or discriminating knowledge of the object that the subject 
must have in order to entertain a thought about it is to know where (in the 
objective order) the object is. 
(ii) The identificatory or discriminating knowledge of the object that the subject 
must have in order to entertain a thought about it is to know, of a certain position 
in the objective spatial order, that the object occupies it. 
 
For reasons that are fairly obvious, I will call such an account of the mode of 
presentation of an object in a perceptual situation, or of relating thoughts, a 
substantial view of the mode of presentation, that is, in effect, a substantial view of 
perceptual demonstratives. Moreover, the descriptions at (12) and (13), with all their 
imperfections as models of the mode of presentation intended, can serve as vivid 
reminders of the character of this view in front of purely perceptual views of the 
mode of presentation when they are contrasted with the descriptions at (8), (9) and 
(10). 
Now, if this is the view, what is the argument for it? We might perhaps reconstruct 
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an argument from McDowell’s insistence on the reason for the importance of 
location: 
 
... location matters because where the object is, at a particular time, is fundamental to 
its being the particular object (of its kind) that it is. 
(Mc. Dowell, op. cit. p. 255) 
 
This would then be the (re)constructed argument. 
 
(Premise 1) A perceptual demonstrative “singles out” a particular material 
object. 
(Premise 2) To single out an object, the subject’s thought must discriminate or 
identify it. 
(Premise 3) The location at which an object is at a particular time is 
fundamental to its being the particular object (of its kind) that it is. 
(Premise 4) The subject must discriminate or identify an object by what is 
fundamental to its being the particular object that it is. 
_______________________________________________ 
(Conclusion) The subject discriminates or identifies the object by locating it. 
 
But if this were really the argument, one would want to know what the grounds 
are for premise 4. So far as we can see, no reason for this is provided by either Evans 
or McDowell. 
I have already advanced my suspicious of McDowell’s account of Evans on the 
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present issue.11 We noticed that Evans insists on that fundamental Ideas or modes of 
presentation are involved in modes of presentation in general. But there is the issue of 
how Evans conceived of this involvement in the case of perceptual demonstratives, 
and I surmise that this is where McDowell is not quite right. 
As I have just noted, Evans’s thesis concerns modes of presentation in general, 
and his reasons for it are correspondingly general. They stem from his well known 
Generality Constraint (cf. Varieties of Reference, § 4.3) and although I will try to 
reconstruct the general argument, this is what I think is the key passage: 
 
It seems to me that the idea of how objects of a given kind, Gs, are distinguished from 
each other and from all other things must enter our very conception of a state of affairs 
involving a G. For there is no thought about objects of a certain kind which does not 
presuppose the idea of one object of that kind, and the idea of one object of that kind 
must employ a general conception of the ways in which objects of that kind are 
differentiated from one another and from all other things. 
(Op. cit. p. 108) 
 
It is not my intention to quarrel with these contentions. Maybe Evans is right here. 
But the issue we are pursuing now is precisely how the idea of one object of the kind 
at stake must “employ” such a general conception, which is none other than what 
Evans calls the fundamental ground of difference. We are back, in effect, at the issue 
of how the fundamental Idea of the object is “employed” or “becames involved” in 
the mode of presentation. 
According to Evans it seems that there are only two general ways in which a 
                                                
11 “With some trepidation”, as Peacocke puts it in a similar connection, bearing in mind McDowell's 
privileged connection with Evans’s work, and especially his role in the edition of the manuscript of 
Varieties of Reference at Evans’s untimely death. 
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fundamental Idea can get involved. One is directly, that is, the mode of presentation is 
a fundamental Idea. The other happens, predictably, when the mode of presentation is 
not a fundamental idea, and in such a case things get a little intrincate. But, at the 
same time, this is the case that will interest us most, because as will be seen, it turns 
out that perceptual demonstrative Ideas of material objects are among non-
fundamental Ideas of objects —contrary to what McDowell’s interpretation seems in 
the end to imply. So we will proceed slowly here. 
Evans’s non-verificationist theory of content makes use of the key theoretical 
notion of knowing what is for a proposition (of a certain form) to be true. As befalls 
theoretical notions in general, this notion cannot be defined but has to find particular 
interpretations corresponding to the different forms or kinds of propositions. Thus, an 
explanation of Evans’s view concerning a certain kind of content, at least when non-
fundamental Ideas or modes of presentation are at stake, is best approached in two 
steps. In step one the explanation of the view is approached by making clear the role 
played by the key notion, without attempting simultaneously to explain this notion; in 
step two what knowing what is for the proposition of the relevant sort to be true 
amounts to for the case at stake is finally explained. 
We begin step one by glossing the following central text: 
 
When our Idea of an object is of a non-fundamental kind, we know what it is for a 
proposition of the form '–a is F¬ to be true, because we know that it is true (if it is) in 
virtue of some pair of propositions of the forms '–δ = a¬ and '–δ is F¬ . 
(Evans,Varieties of Reference, p. 111) 
 
(Evans uses ‘a’ and ‘F’, respectively, as schematic letters for a non-fundamental 
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Idea of an object and a predicative concept, and  ‘δ’ as a schematic letter for a 
fundamental Idea of an object.) 
What Evans means would be clearer for the reader if the text just quoted 
continued with the words: “and we know what it is for propositions of these forms to 
be true”. As we are about to see, this is most clearly implied in what actually follows. 
So, we can rely on the continuation of the text quoted to gloss Evans’s claim. 
It follows from Evans’s, or rather, Strawson-Evans’s Generality Constraint that 
the capacity to entertain the thought (with the content) that a is F is the joint exercise 
of two separable abilities: the (cognitive) ability to think of a particular object, and 
the (cognitive) ability that consists of knowing what it is for something to fall under 
the concept F (op. cit. p. 103). Our concern is with the first of these two abilities, and 
as we have noted, according to Evans it requires identificatory knowledge of the 
object. All this is of course still very general and abstract. But let us summarize the 
situation until now in these very general and abstract terms, before proceeding to 
bring it to a more specific and understandable level. 
We have, in fact, the following three claims: 
 
(i) We know what it is for a proposition of the form '–a is F¬ to be true. 
(ii) This is due to the fact that we know what is for propositions of the forms '–δ = 
a¬ and '– δ is F¬  to be true. 
(iii) Knowledge of the kind described in (ii) gives the kind of knowledge in (i) 
because we know the (further) fact that a proposition of the form '–a is F¬ is true (if it 
is) in virtue of some pair of propositions of the forms '– δ = a¬ and '– δ is F¬. 
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Briefly put, since '–a is F¬ is “composed” as it is (of '– δ = a¬ plus '– δ is F¬) 
knowing what is for the “composed” proposition to be true requires knowing what is 
for the “composing” propositions to be true. All right then, but when can it be said 
that we know what it is for these propositions to be true? Here is Evans’s answer, 
perhaps still rather disappointing at this level of generality and abstraction: 
 
... our Idea of the object and our concept of the property constitute, respectively, 
knowledge of what it is for propositions of these forms [namely, '– δ = a¬ and '– δ is 
F¬] to be true. 
(Op. cit. pp. 111-112)12 
 
Here an essential connection is claimed to exist between 
 
(A) having an Idea a of an object (where a is a non-fundamental idea of an 
object), and 
(B) knowing what it is for a proposition of the form '–δ = a¬ to be true (where δ is 
a fundamental idea of the object at issue). 
 
(I am leaving out the parallel connection for the concept of the property, since this 
is not the present focus of interest.) 
If this is still disappointing, it is only because we are moving at a level of 
                                                
12 When this text is put just after the previous one (they are connected by means of an ‘and’ in Evans’s 
book), it is seen at once that the only reason why there is talk of what constitutes knowledge of what it 
is for propositions of these latter forms to be true in this second part is that it is precisely such 
knowledge which yields knowledge of what it is for a proposition of the form '–a is F¬ to be true. 
Thus, I hope that the plea for imagining the words “and we know what is for propositions of these 
forms to be true” inserted between both fragments is fully justified. 
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generality and abstraction that does not allow us to see what all this amounts to when 
applied to the case which interests us, that is, to perceptual demonstratives. I will 
shortly proceed to step two, but let us pause for a moment just to confirm, by quoting 
the continuation of Evans’s text in which it is clear that for him, possession of the 
kind of knowledge described in (B), discriminatory knowledge in a strong sense, so to 
speak, suffices to satisfy what is required by the Generality Constraint regarding the 
first of the two abilities required: 
 
Provided a subject knows what it is for identifications like '– δ = a¬ to be true, a link 
is set up between his Idea, a, and his entire repertoire of conceptual knowledge, and 
he will be able to grasp as many propositions of the form '–a is F¬ as he has 
concepts of being F. 
(Ibid. p. 112) 
 
Let us now proceed to step two and finally find out more about knowledge of type 
(B) for the case we are interested in —(perceptual) demonstrative modes of 
presentation of physical objects. Here is Evans’s key passage: 
 
We are now in a position to answer the question what makes demonstrative 
identification of spatially located material objects possible. In the ordinary 
perceptual situation, not only will there be an information-link between subject and 
object, but also the subject will know, or will be able to discover, upon the basis of 
that link, where the object is. Given the subject’s general knowledge of what makes 
propositions of the form '–π = p¬ true, for arbitrary π, when p is an Idea of a position 
in his egocentric space, and given that he has located, or is able to locate, the object 
in his egocentric space, he can then be said to know what it is for '– This = the object 
at π now¬ to be true (for arbitrary π). Hence he can be said to have an adequate Idea 
of the object. 
(Evans, Varieties of Reference, pp. 170-171) 
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The issue here is to understand clearly the import of the words “the subject will 
know, or will be able to discover, upon the basis of that link, where the object is” in 
the first half of this passage. And I hope that this significance will be plain as soon as 
we focus on its second “technical” part. Evans is in effect saying that if the subject 
possesses the general ability to align positions in space as egocentrically framed with 
positions as objectively framed —‘ π ’ in the foregoing text is a schematic letter for 
such positions, then knowledge of the egocentrically framed position of the object 
suffices to count the subject as having the required identificatory knowledge. 
Technically put, this ability suffices to count the subject as knowing what it is to know 
a proposition of the form '–δ = a¬ to be true (knowledge of kind (B) above). To 
realize this, it has to be understood that the proposition meant by Evans when he 
writes the expression ‘'– This = the object at π now¬’ is precisely a proposition of the 
form '–δ = a¬ (or, to be exact, of the equivalent form '–a = δ¬).13 Evans has simply 
chosen to model a fundamental mode of presentation, δ, of the object with a 
descriptive phrase of the form 
 
the object at π now, 
 
which in this context functions as a reminder that a fundamental Idea of a material 
object identifies the object by its position as objectively framed. 
Let us now take stock. Evans considers demonstrative Ideas to be a primitive kind 
                                                
13 A comparison of the two proposition-forms —'– This = the object at π now¬’ and '–a = δ¬— where 
the ‘this’ in one correlates with the ‘a’ in the other, makes it plain that a perceptual demonstrative Idea 
is a non-fundamental Idea of an object. 
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of mode of presentation. Thus, they cannot be captured by a reductive definition. In 
the last text quoted, Evans is concerned with giving a sufficient condition (as opposed 
to a sufficient and necessary condition) for counting a subject as possessing an Idea 
of a material object. It is very simple: you must have the general ability to align 
egocentric space with objective space, so to speak, and know the egocentric position 
of the object. 
So far as I know, at no place in Evans’s book is there really a basis to claim, as 
McDowell does, that, for Evans knowledge of the position of the object as 
egocentrically framed counts as knowledge of the location of the object as objectively 
framed. It is one thing say that knowledge of the position of the object as 
egocentrically framed suffices for the kind of discriminatory knowledge required and 
quite another to say that that knowledge counts as knowledge of the object as 
objectively framed. And those two things are to be kept separate, even if the Idea of 
the object as objectively framed enters the characterization of the discriminatory 
knowledge required. 
But there is more. Until now I have been neglecting the words “or is able to locate 
[the object in his egocentric space]” in Evans's key passage quoted above. This does 
not seem a casual slip on Evans’s part at all. There are a handful of other places 
which indicate that actually locating the object egocentrically, on the basis of the 
information link, is not required by him (cf. Varieties of Reference, pp. 150, 170-4 
and 179). Hence, it seems that according to Evans the subject could in some sense be 
wrong about the (egocentric) position of the object and still count as possessing a 
sufficiently “discriminating conception” of it. Evans’s sufficient condition is, then, 
still weaker than I have presented it. It is therefore plain on all counts that he did not 
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require actual objective location of the object. This is not the discriminative 
conception of the object that the subject is required to have. 
As a result of this we seem to be obliged to conclude that Evans’s actual view of 
the perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation is clearly weaker than the one 
McDowell attributes to him; the “Evans-McDowell” view. Nevertheless, it still seems 
to be somehow “more substantial” a view than any belonging to the “purely 
perceptual” approach, just because, in Evans’s view, fundamental Ideas are still 
somehow involved in the mode of presentation. It seems fair to say that according to 
Evans the subject must not only have a conception of what  the fundamental source of 
discrimination of the object perceived from all others  is, as a general requirement for 
possessing a perceptual mode of presentation of the object, but that this conception 
enters indirectly —in a way that is admittedly not altogether clear— in each and 
every (perceptual) demonstrative mode of presentation. This is, I take it, what is 
implied by requirement (B) in the end. 
Be that as it may, my claim is only that it is Evans’s requeriment (B) that makes 
this view “more substantial” than a “purely perceptual” view, even if clearly “less 
substantial” than the view attributed to Evans by McDowell and, it would seem, 
endorsed by the latter. 
And now we must ask, what is Evans’s argument for (B)? Recall that this is a 
general requirement, not one that is specific for perceptual demonstratives. We 
should, then, return to the discussion of Evans’s view of the discriminative 
conception at the general level. 
The relevant argument is contained, I believe, in the following text: 
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... there is at most one proposition of the form '–δ is F¬ whose truth is capable, as 
things stand, of making the particular-proposition true. Which fundamental proposition 
is uniquely relevant to the truth of the particular-proposition must be determined in 
advance by the Idea a: the Idea a will determine some proposition '– δ * is F¬ as 
uniquely relevant to the truth of the proposition '–a is F¬ in virtue of the fact that '– δ * 
= a¬ is the only true proposition of the form '– δ = a¬. Evidently a subject cannot be 
credited with such an Idea a unless he knows what it is for a proposition of the form '– 
δ = a¬ to be true. So we can take the subject’s Idea-of-the-object, a, to consist in his 
knowledge of what it is for an arbitrary proposition of the form '– δ = a¬ to be true. 
(Varieties of Reference, p. 110) 
 
In the last sentence of this passage, Evans (rightly) says ‘can’, while he actually 
moves on to take the conclusion as having instead the meaning of a ‘should’, as is 
seen from the fact that the proposal he endorses in his book, as we have had an 
occasion to note, is that the subject’s Idea-of-the-object, a, consists in his knowledge 
of what it is for an arbitrary proposition of the form '–δ = a¬ to be true, and from the 
further fact that it is precisely this claim which he takes to be the conclusion of the 
argument in the text just quoted. The claim in italics is, in fact, found verbatim in 
Evans’s book preceded by the words “So we can take ...”, which follow the text on p. 
110 quoted above. Hence, the argument for Evans’s proposal is contained precisely in 
the lines that precede the formulation of that proposal. 
It seems correct to say then that Evans gives his claim the force of a ‘should’, 
while his actual argument actually justifies the weaker formulation with ‘can’. Hence, 
I think that his argument's conclusion does not follow from the premises. Indeed, I 
think that one could agree that a subject cannot be credited with an Idea, a, which is a 
(perceptual) demonstrative mode of presentation, unless he knows what it is for a 
proposition of the form '–δ = a¬ to be true, whatever this might reasonably be taken to 
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mean, while at the same time disagreeing as regards to taking the subject’s Idea-of-
the-object, a, to consist in his knowledge of what it is for an arbitrary proposition of 
the form '–δ = a¬ to be true. 
Evans’s theory has been interestingly criticized by Campbell in “Sense, Reference 
and Selective Attention”. His main point concerns an aspect of Evans’s proposal 
which is closely related to the one we have been discussing. In the same way in which 
according to Evans’s view there is an essential connection between (A) and (B) above 
(that is, betweeen having an Idea a of an object and knowing what it is for a 
proposition of the form '–δ = a¬ to be true), there is also an essential connection 
between possessing the (observational) concept of a property F and knowing what it 
is for a proposition of the form '–δ is F¬ to be true. Campbell’s point is that Evans’s 
theory is wrong in assuming that the possession of an observational concept of 
concrete objects requires to have fundamental Ideas of these objects, because in fact 
such concepts are first introduced and explained in the context of (perceptual) 
demonstrative thoughts. The general thrust of the criticism, then, seems to be that in 
Evans’s account perceptual demonstratives are to be explained by appealing to 
capacities to account for which we need an account of perceptual demonstratives in 
the first place. (cf. “Sense, Reference and Selective Attention”, pp. 62-3.) 
Further discussion of the role of spatial location in the perceptual demonstrative 
determination reference must be delayed for a while (until Chapter 7 in fact), since 
this issue is related to the development of my proposal. But let me say here that my 
position will not be in conflict with what I take to be a “feeling” about Evans’s 
position shared by many. As I see it, even if Evans’s conception (B) of the knowledge 
“encapsulated” in a perceptual demonstrative mode of presentation cannot be 
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sustained, one can still believe that there is something fundamentally right in his 
concrete requirement for the ability to place the object egocentrically, and even for 
actually locating egocentrically the object in normal cases. I hope that, as the view 
formulated and defended in this dissertation unfolds further, this element in Evans’s 
view can come to be integrated into it in a natural way. 
 
 
4.3. A “subpersonal” view of 
perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation. 
 
In the paper “Sense, Reference and Selective Attention” John Campbell presents 
an intriguing view of perceptual demonstratives. For present purposes we can jump 
directly into the novelties of his approach by focussing on the criteria he gives for 
sameness of (perceptual) demonstrative modes of presentation:14  
 
This problem of the sense of a perceptual demonstrative is a problem about selective 
attention. To find when two demonstratives have the same sense, we have to look at 
the principles that the perceptual system uses to select a collection of imagistic 
information as all relating to a single object. The use of a demonstrative depends on 
some principle of selection being used to isolate some of one’s current imagistic 
information as all relating to one object. When we have two demonstratives that 
depend on the same imagistic information having been selected using just the same 
principle, then we have sameness of sense and the identity statement involving those 
demonstratives will be uninformative. 
(Op. cit. p. 60) 
                                                
14 Campbell uses here the term ‘sense’ for this mode of presentation; cf. the remarks on the first line of 
this passage in Chapter 2 § 2. 
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The method or “principle” of selection that John Campbell is talking about here is 
one that a correct empirical cognitive-psychological theory of selective attention will 
claim is the one actually used by our attentional system. In the case of visual 
perception, the “principle” at issue is the one which, according to some psychologists 
led by Anne Treisman, the visual system uses for “binding” together certain so-called 
“features” (colours, shapes, etc.) as belonging to one and the same object, namely, 
location. These “features” constitute  “imagistic information”, according to 
Campbell’s views in the above-mentioned paper. 
I will explain in some detail the basics of Treisman’s theory in the next chapter as 
we focus on the concept of attention and theories of attention. And we will be 
concerned with this “imagistic information” —which so prominently figures in 
Campbell’s text— in Chapter 6. Finally, I will discuss Campbell’s proposal more 
closely in Chapter 7, once I have succeeded in formulating my own more fully as a 
backdrop against which its outline will be more clearly marked. I will restrict my 
discussion here to singling out the argument which I think leads Campbell to what is 
probably most striking in his proposal, namely, the fact that it is based entirely on an 
empirical theory, whatever this turns out to be specifically, and to express some 
preliminary doubts concerning the argument and its conclusion. 
Let us now turn to Campbell’s main example of a “principle of selection”, so we 
are in a better position to appreciate what some of the implications of taking this step 
are. Campbell writes: 
 
What are the principles that we use to select a body of information as all relating to a 
single thing? One fundamental method of selection that we use is location: each of 
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the pieces of perceptual information we have about various features such as colour, 
shape and so on has a location implicitly assigned, and information designed as 
coming from the same location is selected as all relating to a single object. (...) When 
you try to attend visually to an item on the basis of some other feature that it has, 
such as its colour and its size, your selection of that item has to be mediated by its 
location. (...) The implication of this is that demonstratives which depend on spatial 
attention —attention which uses location as the principle of selection— will have 
their senses individuated by the locations used in selecting the underlying collections 
of information. We can use this point to explain the distinction between cases in 
which trading on identity is legitimate and cases in which trading on identity is not 
legitimate. The question is whether the same principle is being used to bundle 
together the underlying perceptual information as all true of a single object. 
(Op. cit. p. 61) 
 
The direction taken by Campbell is opposed to any a priori determination of 
perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation. Thus, with regard to Evans’s theory, 
we have the following: 
 
The insight in Evans’ account is that perception of location is central to grasp of the 
perceptual demonstrative. But the kind of a priori argument he gives seems bound to 
fail. The centrality of perceived location for the sense of a demonstrative is rather, I 
have suggested, a consequence of the empirical fact that in vision at any rate, 
perceived location is of pervasive importance for selective attention. 
(Op. cit. p. 63) 
 
Notice that Campbell's last claim in this quotation —about the centrality of 
perceived location for the senses of demonstratives— might be true without this 
implying that we should opt for a theory of senses in which identity conditions are 
fixed by appealing to an empirical theory. What then, are the reasons for Campbell’s 
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taking the extraordinary step of proposing an empirical view of perceptual 
demonstrative modes of presentation?  
It seems that Campbell’s reasons for his identity conditions on perceptual 
demonstrative “senses” and with them his theory of the “senses” themselves, are to be 
found in his earlier paper “Is Sense Transparent?”, in which he raises the issue of the 
need for a criterion of legitimacy for taking for granted that we are perceiving, indeed 
perceptual-demonstratively identifying, the same object. (We have just seen the 
beginning of the formulation of one such criterion at the end of the text on p. 61 
which I have quoted above, where Campbell uses the phrase “trading on identity” to 
describe that which should be ruled by the criterion.) He is specifically thinking of the 
following two paradigmatic cases: demonstratively identifying the same object at 
about the same time but through different sensory modalities (like sight and touch), 
and identifying the same object through the same sense —be it sight, touch or 
hearing— in a brief time span. It seems clear that when such cases appear in an 
inferential “chain of thought”, one is legitimated in taking for granted, as opposed to 
judging,  that we are demonstratively identifying the same object. 
In “Is Sense Transparent?” Campbell claims that it must be the identity of senses, 
whatever they are, which makes it legitimate to take for granted or “trade upon” the 
fact that two (perceptual) demonstrative modes of presentation have the same 
referent.15 And  also that —specifically in the perceptual case— we trade on the 
                                                
15 Campbell first advances his proposal on p. 276. Subsequently it would seem to have a programatic 
character (cf. “the name of the criterion we need is sameness of sense”, p. 278). This means that in 
searching for a theory of perceptual modes of presentation, and especially in looking for a principled 
necessary and sufficient condition for the sameness of two perceptual modes of presentation one 
should be guided, according to Campbell’s proposal, by the leading idea that perceptual senses or 
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sameness of reference of the relevant demonstratives when we perceptually “keep 
track” of the object, an ability that —crucially— must be understood, according to 
him, as a skill at the sub-personal level. Thus, Campbell says in connection to the 
perceptual demonstratives which, for the purposes of the present discussion, we may 
also try to use the expressions ‘that (touched) glass’ and ‘that (seen) glass’ as models, 
respectively: 
 
It is true that cognitive skills of the thinker are in play here, as he keeps track of the 
object from [sensory] modality to modality. But these are not conceptual skills of the 
thinker: they do not have to do with his abilities in conceptual reasoning, unlike the 
ability to engage in mathematical computation, for instance. The cognitive skills in 
question here belong to a sub-personal level; they are part of the cognitive 
substratum that makes a conceptual life possible at all. 
(Campbell, “Is Sense Transparent?”, p. 283; Campbell’s italics.) 
 
Although pausing to review talk of the “subpersonal level” must be left for the 
next chapter, and assessing its significance for our problem to the final one, I think 
that we can now get the first overall impression of Campbell’s argument we need for 
present purposes by reconstructing it in outline as follows: 
 
(P1) We need a criterion that establishes when it is legitimate to take for granted 
that two perceptual demonstratives determine the same reference. 
(P2) Identity of senses gives us such a criterion. 
(P3) But we rely on co-reference when we are keeping track of an object. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
modes of presentation are whatever it is that makes it legitimate to trade upon identity. But, of course, 
this is not a stipulative decission on Campbell’s part. Thus, it can be discussed theoretically. 
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(P4) This keeping track must be conceived as a subpersonal ability. 
(C1) Therefore, perceptual demonstrative senses are identical when, and only 
when, we are “keeping track” in that sense. And hence, (C2) identity conditions for 
senses are to be formulated at a subpersonal level. Since it is obvious that only 
empirical theories of cognitive science can give us such formulations at the 
subpersonal level, it is to such theories which we must turn. 
For present purposes I will only discuss in detail the claim which most directly 
concerns the general nature of senses, namely that it is identity of senses which must 
give the criterion for the legitimacy of taking for granted, or trading upon, co-
reference of perceptual demonstratives. (I will tackle the “subpersonal level” premise 
in the final chapter of the dissertation). 
Campbell’s argument for the claim at issue is based largely in discarding two 
alternatives that on the face of it were not very promising from the start, as Campbell 
himself recognizes (cf. “Is Sense Transparent?”, pp. 278-80). These alternatives are 
first, that one could legitimally trade upon co-reference of two perceptual 
demonstratives just when the two are tokens of the same type, and second, that we 
can do so when there is de facto sameness of reference. Apart from this, Campbell is 
claiming to be merely making  a point for singular terms that Strawson made a long 
time ago in criticising Quine’s view that it is possible to explain logical truth without 
appealing to the meanings or senses of the expressions involved (op. cit. p. 278). The 
specific example mentioned by Campbell is that inferring the conclusion, e.g. ‘John is 
sick’, from the premise ‘John is sick’, is only valid when the word ‘sick’ is taken to 
have the same sense in both premise and conclusion. However, this case concerns the 
ambiguity of a linguistic expression (as Campbell himself remarks) and this is not at 
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stake in the present discussion. Hence, whatever Strawson’s original views, it is 
simply not obvious how they generalizes to the present case. Therefore, any proposal 
to this effect should be argued for independently. 
Quite apart from Campbell’s reasons for his criterion, I think it is not a correct 
one. This, I believe, is shown precisely by reflecting on how we take legitimately for 
granted sameness of reference in a linguistic case which is somehow closer to present 
concerns than the case of the ambiguity just mentioned. Consider the following 
inference: 
 
John came late. 
He wore a leather jacket. 
________________________________ 
Somebody who wore a leather jacket came late. 
 
It seems obvious that, with the proper proviso for the circumstances of utterance 
of the premises, one could legitimally infer this conclusion. Subjects, by virtue of 
being competent speakers, know that the same person is referred to twice in the 
premises, but nevertheless ‘John’ and ‘he’, the relevant words here, do not have the 
same sense, whatever the senses of these words might reasonably be taken to be. 
Thus, Campbell’s criterion fails, at least for this kind of linguistic case.16 And if it 
                                                
16 One could be concerned here about the fact that a proper noun and a demonstrative expression are 
involved in the example, so this does not concern only demonstratives. I believe that the same 
conclusion could be reached through examples involving only demonstratives, but this would take us a 
long way from the current focus of interest. Fortunately, I think we can spare ourselves this detour 
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fails for the linguistic case, I do not see any reason why it should be correct for the 
case of demonstrative reference in thought. 
It is not disputed here that identity of sense is a correct sufficient condition for 
legitimately taking sameness of reference for granted, that is to say that it is legitimate 
to trade upon co-reference in making inferences when the senses of the singular terms 
involved are the same. However, I think that cases like the one of the example 
patently show that it is not at all a correct necessary condition. 
I do not want to leave this preliminary discussion of Campbell’s approach without 
briefly touching at this point on at least one of Campbell’s paradigmatic cases: the 
case of identifying an object through different sensory modalities (the cross-modal 
case). The reason for proceeding to a brief discussion of his position on this case at 
this point is to dispel the impression that his comments could lend any support to a 
potential verdict against an intuitive position on the case, other than the one that 
might come from Campbell’s general argument, which we have already begun to find 
problematic. 
The intuition at issue is just that the modes of presentation involved in the cross 
modal case are different. More precisely, a different mode of presentation type (or 
subtype) corresponds to each sensory modality. I think it is fair to say that this is a 
clear intuition. But Campbell objects that this cross-modal case is very much in 
contrast with the classical paradigms in that, when it comes to these, subjects lacking 
the relevant knowledge for accepting the identity spontaneously doubt its truth, while 
no similar spontaneous doubt arises when a subject identifies an object cross-modally 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
since, contrary to the idea I may have given above, Campbell is really looking for a general criterion 
that embraces all “singular terms” (cf. e. g. “Is Sense Transparent?”, p. 276). 
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(cf. op. cit. p. 284). I fully agree with Campbell’s observation here, but I think that an 
explanation can be provided for it that prevents it from counting in favour of 
(potentially)17 regarding the senses involved as different. In fact, what seems to 
                                                
17 I add the qualification ‘potentially’ to recall that the verdict is, according to Campbell, transferred directly to empirical theories for its determination. 
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underlie the classical paradigms is that the knowledge relevant for judging the 
identities is easily accessible to the subject, so that the subject correspondingly also 
knows easily when he lacks the relevant knowledge, and this explains the 
“spontaneity” of the doubt. It may happen that subjects in the cross-modal situation 
are also using knowledge that is accessible to them —as subjects— in some sense, but 
which is not easily made explicit. 
A second objection to the above intuition from Campbell is that the perceptual 
case contrasts clearly with the use of linguistic demonstratives in another respect. 
When we think of two occurrences of the same demonstrative type in an identity 
statement —‘That is (identical to) that’— there is no presumption that the two 
demonstrative tokens refer to the same individual (think of the statement as being 
accompanied by two different demonstrations). But there is indeed such a 
presumption in the cross-modal case. As an example, take the identification which a 
subject makes of a glass which is visually perceived with the glass he is holding in his 
hand or touching with it, and which may be modeled thus: 
 
That glassvisual is that glasshaptic . 
 
Again, I agree with Campbell in that there is indeed a presumption in these cases 
to the effect that the two demonstrative tokens refer to the same individual. 
Furthermore, Campbell holds that as long as the subject “keeps track” of the relevant 
glass, she is legitimate in taking sameness of identity for granted (cf. op. cit. p. 283). 
And again, I think we do not need to quarrel with this claim. What I do not see is why 
it should carry any implication in favour of the claim that the modes of presentation 
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involved are (potentially) identical. In the end, however, I would like to suggest that 
pronouncements using the notion of “keeping track” depend very much on how we 
understand this notion. If, contrary to Campbell’s empirical understanding of the 
expression, we take it in the sense of “maintaining (perceptual) attention”, very much 
in what we may consider its ordinary sense, my own view of perceptual 
demonstratives would be in agreement with the principle that where there is keeping 
track of an object the mode of presentation does not change. (I will expand on these 
matters in the final chapter.) 
I have argued against Campbell’s general criterion for identity of modes of 
presentation or “senses” in the perceptual case and to the extent to which his 
argument uses this criterion in favour of an empirical approach to the senses' identity 
conditions, as reconstructed at the beginning of the present section, I think that we 
should not find his argument compelling at the present stage. Moreover, I think that 
there are independent reasons for finding Campbell’s conclusions suspicious. In 
describing the general idea of a mode of presentation at the beginning of this chapter, 
I said that modes of presentation characterize objects by means of conditions that are 
individuative and whose satisfaction by an object is epistemically accessible to 
ordinary subjects. It seems to me that, in approaching modes of presentation via an 
empirical theory, the issue of whether senses as he characterizes them still satisfy the 
second condition is immediately raised. It is this aspect of the discussion of 
Campbell’s proposal which will constitute the focus in the final chapter. 
I hope that at this point my proposal for the perceptual demonstrative modes of 
presentation can be seen to occupy a sort of middle ground between the Evans-
McDowell view, and Evans’s view proper on one side, and Campbell’s view on the 
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other. In opposition to Campbell, I hold that it is possible to give an a priori account 
of the identificatory knowledge that subjects apply in perceptual demonstrative 
thought to a certain extent, and in this I side with Evans and McDowell. However, the 
way I view this knowledge, it is less or much less “substantial” than Evans or 
McDowell think. So, I agree with Campbell that there is no a priori account of the 
sort they attempted to establish. 
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Chapter 5: Attention from a Psychological Point of 
View 
 
 
 
 
5.1. Approaching the notion of attention. 
 
In the two preceding chapters the word ‘attention’ appears quite frequently, but at 
no time is its usage questioned. I have been relying on an ordinary understanding of 
the word, while the suspicion may rightly arise that this reliance is too strong. It is 
high time for some conceptual clarification. 
A common use of the word ‘attention’ picked up in a dictionary characterizes 
giving attention to something in terms of looking at it, listening to it or thinking about 
it carefully. This agrees to a great extent with the basic use I make of the word here. 
In turn, this ordinary use is, I believe, related to William James's famous definition of 
attention in The Principles of Psychology: 
 
Everybody knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear 
and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or 
trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, or consciousness are of its essence. (p. 
261) 
 
As James states, it is likely that there is a sort of “common notion” of attention, 
but his choice of key words to convey it is striking. Obviously, James is using the 
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words ‘taking possession’ in quite  a suggestive metaphorical sense here. Notice, 
however, that this verbal expression is one of achievement. If one takes possession of 
something, one has accomplished what one set out to do. But, of course, one can try 
to take possession of something without succeeding in doing it. It seems to me that we 
can assimilate the ‘trying’ version of James’s ‘taking possession’ to at least one strand 
of what the dictionary definition above contains: thorough there is an implication of 
intentional activity on the part of the subject. 
The dictionary definition also suggests a straightforward division between two 
kinds of attention, as having to do either with the senses or with thought. And this fits 
the division James  also made between “sensorial attention” and “intellectual 
attention” exceedingly well. 
However, in making the conceptual connection of attention with “focalization, 
concentration, [and] consciousness” I believe James’s definition goes well beyond the 
dictionary definition. The words that immediately follow the text quoted may clarify 
how James viewed the second of these notions: 
 
It implies some withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others 
...  
 
In any case, these words convey a first sense in which attention can be 
conceptualized as selective, and, indeed, the phrase ‘selective attention’ —with who 
knows how many different nuances— became famous with the renewed interest in 
attention in post-behaviouristic psychology. 
One very striking feature of James's definition is the strong (essential) association 
of attention with consciousness. The problem is, of course, how exactly attention is 
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associated to consciousness. One thing at least seems clear, without going beyond the 
notions that James uses; ‘taking possession’ can be associated with consciousness 
only because of its sense of achieving something. But how is this “taking 
possession”as it relates to consciousness to be understood? 
It seems that this question also divides naturally into two. First, how is “sensorial 
attention” related to consciousness? And second, how is “intellectual attention” 
related to consciousness? It is rather in this form than James’s distinction between 
two kinds of attention survives in the recent analysis of attention by Peacocke in 
“Conscious Attitudes, Attention, and Self-Knowledge”. Peacocke points out a very 
significant difference between how attention is engaged in the two cases. In conscious 
perceptual experience, for example, the focus of the “attentional beam” can be 
shifted, but this is not at all the case when a thought occurs to a subject, or she makes 
a conscious judgement. In the latter cases, attention is present not only when the 
thought or the judgement occurs, but in all the previous necessary moments that a 
subject needs in order to achieve the thought (cf. op. cit. p. 64). 
According to Peacocke, both in thought and perception, attention is occupied, but 
only in the second is there an object of attention in the relevant sense: 
 
In a normal case of perceptual attention to some physical object, feature or event, 
there is something to which the subject is attending. The object of attention is 
perceived: it causally affects the subject. (...) In conscious thought, by contrast, there 
is no object of attention1 (...) The notion of an object of attention which is 
inapplicable in conscious thought is that of an experienced object, event, or state of 
affairs. (...) But thinking is not experiencing. There are objects of thought, but an 
                                                
1 Because of this, Peacocke's view of intellectual attention is very much opposed to James’s view , 
which, as Peacocke points out, is very much tied to a perceptual model of introspection. 
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object of thought is not thereby an experienced object, and is not an object of 
attention in the sense in question. All the same, in conscious thought, your attention 
is still occupied —as it is also occupied in the perceptual cases, and in cases of 
imagination. (Op. cit., p. 65) 
 
Our interest in this dissertation is in perceptual attention in the sense that 
Peacocke explains it in this text. We should notice, however, that Peacocke’s notion 
of attention as having (in principle) an object covers more cases than attention to 
physical objects, events, or states of affairs: 
 
Having a sensation is also an experience. A pain, for instance, can equally be an 
object of attention. (Ibid.) 
 
I do not wish to deny that, in some sense, we attend to pains. But I think we must 
be careful here. We should think about the extent of the terms ‘experience’ and 
‘sensation’ in relation to attention. James, for one, would also like to include “sense 
impressions” in his “sensorial attention”, and indeed, as prime examples of it: 
 
In passive immediate sensorial attention the stimulus is a sense-impression, (...) or 
else it is an instinctive stimulus. 
(James, Principles of Psychology, p. 270) 
 
This kind of attention is not suggested at all by the dictionary definition, as the 
ordinary notions of looking at and listening to apply to physical objects or events. I 
think that a theory that appeals to internal entities akin to “sense impressions” should 
clarify the issue of attention to these entities, or, at the very least, should differentiate 
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it from perceptual attention.2 This whole group of issues is involved in thinking of 
perceptual attention in relation to consciousness, and they will be dealt with in the 
following two chapters. 
At any rate, when speaking of attention it is perceptual attention in the sense 
described by Peacocke that is meant for most of this dissertation. Thus, when I talk of 
attention tout court, I mean attention to ordinary objects, properties and events, unless 
otherwise specifically indicated. And in this dissertation it is specifically attention to 
individual physical objects which constitutes the focus of discussion here. 
There is one last issue I wish to tackle briefly in this general overview. In the last 
passage quoted from James, he talks about passive attention, in effect, distinguishing 
it from voluntary attention. Passive attention occurs when something attracts or 
catches one’s attention, whereby one suddenly notices it and is interested by it. In this 
characterization I have used a dictionary definition again, but once more, an ordinary 
use is not far away from James's discussion. 
As noted aboved, in giving attention to something (looking at it, listening to it), as 
in “taking possession” of an object in James's sense, there are clearly intentional 
overtones. In the preceding chapters I have emphasized these intentional elements of 
attention, and this is directly reflected in the use of the terminology ‘acts of attention’ 
(an expression which James also uses). It might be thought that in passive attention 
there is lack of intentionality on the subject’s part. But this is not really so. The issue 
                                                
2 The problem does not arise for Peacocke —at least not in this form— because his present views of 
perception, as opposed to his views in Sense and Content,  do not  seem to recognize entities akin to 
“sense impressions”. But perhaps there is still the question of how the issue of attention fares in 
relation to the entities (non-conceptual contents) which do the theoretical work of separating 
perception from thought in his present theory. 
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is clarified, I think, by appealing to Neisser’s notion of the perceptual cycle that was 
used in Chapter 3. As Neisser says, “the function of an unexpected stimulus is to 
initiate the cycle of perception proper”. Usually, a perceptual state that has been 
unleashed by a sudden stimulus will be immediately followed by deliberately looking 
at or listening to something. 
 
 
5.2. What are cognitive empirical theories of attention about? 
 
When approaching the empirical literature on attention, one is struck by the high 
degree in which a feeling of unease, puzzlement and confusion penetrates it, at least 
in the moments of theoretical reflection, and also on those occasions when the attempt 
is made to put together findings, theoretical tendencies and problems. Among the 
various testimonies of this feeling that could be given, I have chosen the fairly 
outspoken pronouncement with which the authors open one of the most extensive and 
widely referred to surveys of the field to date: 
 
In reviewing the literature on attention we were struck by several observations. One 
was a widespread reluctance to define attention. Another was the case with which 
competing theories can accommodate the same empirical phenomena. A third 
observation was the consistent appeal to some inteligent force or agent in 
explanations of attentional phenomena. These observations are likely to be causally 
connected. It is difficult to conceptualize a process that is not well defined, and it is 
difficult to falsify empirically a vague conceptualization, especiallly one that relies 
on a homunculus. As a consequence, the more we read, the more bewildered we 
became. At a time of despair and panic we turned to William James (1890), where 
we found new hope and inspiration. 
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(W. A. Johnston and V. J. Dark, “Selective Attention”, pp. 43-44) 
 
 To the three factors of bewilderment that the authors mention in this text: the 
missing “definition”; the ease with which theories that perceive themselves as rivals 
can accommodate empirical findings, and the uneasy suspicion that too many of the 
theories in the field contain elements that amount perhaps to little more than to an 
appeal to homunculi which are charged with tasks rather similar to the ones the 
empirical theories set out to explain, a fourth one should, I think, be added. This is the 
pervasiveness of attention in recent psychology. At one point it would have seemed as 
if almost any significant psychological phenomena were “attentional phenomena”. 
This also contributes heavily to making the task of synthetizing work on attention 
rather unmanageable. 
The “solution” which the authors of the survey claimed to have found —turning to 
William James for inspiration— is also not infrequent. To a extent, I myself have 
resorted to this source of inspiration. One could turn to James in search of help for 
conceptual clarification, as the text quoted suggests. But as the survey at issue itself 
shows, help from James is insufficient to attain a minimal conceptual clarification of 
the field. 
Others in a similar situation have turned to David Marr for help.3 As a matter of 
fact, I think that both James and Marr's help is welcome to attain some conceptual 
clarification of the issues that concern us here, even if it is not immediately obvious 
how one should apply or elaborate their ideas to reach it. 
                                                
3 This is what Allport does in his own 1989 survey on visual attention. To my mind his appeal does not 
seem very successful either. 
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There is a most important aspect in looking at how Marr’s ideas about scientific 
research on cognition relate to actual models of cognitive abilities, including those 
developed without influence from  his ideas, as is the case, of course, with all those 
which were advanced before his ideas were known. This aspect concerns the fact that 
Marr’s proposal is essentially a proposal about understanding or explaining cognition 
(cognitive systems), whereas it can also be used, accidentally, so to speak, to provide 
a heuristic strategy for research. 
Much of the “classical” cognitive psychology was, and still is. conducted at 
Marr’s first level, the level at which a cognitive task is formulated as an information 
processing problem. Moreover, in practice this formulation chiefly used notions of 
information handling much at the level of common sense psychological notions. 
Obviously, this must be related to the fact that for a long time, in fact, until the 
development of techniques such as high resolution electroencephalography and 
positron emission tomography (PET), it was at this level of “semantic” or intentional 
description that theory could meet evidence. Thus, when approaching the study of 
cognitive phenomena in a certain domain, one could be led to think (and, actually, to 
think with much justification) that level one was the level for the study to start, and 
indeed this very often happens in formulations which belong rather to a sort of refined 
folk psychology. Now, whether or not one is clearly aware of the distinction between 
regarding Marr’s levels from the point of view of explanation and regarding them 
from the point of view of heuristics, using Marr’s distinction in the latter way is to 
proceed as if research were to be conducted in the temporal order of Marr’s three 
levels: research at level one comes first, then, when possible, research at level two 
follows, and finally (ideally) research at level three culminates the investigation. 
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As a matter of fact, there are actually some passages in Marr’s book that suggest 
this temporal order as the ˝order of research˝. For example, the 1-2 order is suggested 
in the following text: 
 
In order that a process shall actually run, however, one has to realize it in some way 
and therefore choose a representation for the entities that the process manipulates. 
The second level of the analysis of a process, therefore, involves choosing two 
things: (1) a representation for the input and for the output of the process and (2) an 
algorithm by which the transformation may actually be accomplished. 
(Marr, Vision, p. 23) 
 
However, in spite of passages such as this, there can be very little doubt that 
Marr’s target was understanding, or explanation, not heuristics, and that the 
occasional impression to the contrary is due to the choice of example on his part for 
the sake of explanation, which (as in the text above) may be fitting for an AI 
application. Marr’s own work on perception bears testimony of this, as do the most 
relevant passages in his book: 
 
We can summarize our discussion (...) [on] the different levels at which an 
information processing device must be understood before one can be said to have 
understood it completely. At one extreme, the top level, is the abstract ... theory of 
the device (...). In the center is the choice of representation for the input and output 
and the algorithm to be used to transform one into the other. And at the other 
extreme are the details of how the algorithm and representation are realized 
physically. 
(Op. cit. pp. 24-5; Marr’s use of spatial terminology here is due to the incidental fact 
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that he is presenting his summary with the help of a figure; the italics are mine.)4 
 
I think that the bulk of work on attention in cognitive psychology until, say, the 
last ten years, can be seen as if it proceeded by heuristically using Marr’s distinction 
of levels, by concentrating on level 1 research and making only vague gestures at the 
other levels. 
However, to my mind there is a further characteristic element, especially at the 
beginning, which is rather independent of Marr’s distinction. I hope to be able to 
                                                
4 Another relevant issue here concerns how level 1 is basically conceived. Marr’s official 
denomination for this level is the level of ‘he computational theory’ (cf. Vision, p. 27), but this 
denomination is widely been regarded as misleading. Marr’s “official” description is that it is the level 
at which what is computed and why is determined. But his level was  pronouncements emphasizing 
mappings from one kind of information to another (I have just omitted words exactly to that effect 
from the quotation given in the text). But there is an issue about whether one should or should not 
understand those mappings in purely extensional terms, as pairing entities in the extension of a 
property with entities in the extension of another. (In the case of theories of selective attention, which 
will be the focus of our interest, this would amount to characterizing level 1 in terms of the class of 
pieces of information which are “selected”; see below.) It seems to me plausible that Marr’s examples 
do not particularly favour an extensional interpretation. But, at any rate, the important point is, as 
Peacocke remarks in “Explanation in Computational Psychology”, that if one opted for the extensional 
interpretation, a further essential level should then be postulated at which the task that the system 
performs is not only given by alluding to the extension of the relevant property. The remarks in the text 
concerning level 1 should be interpreted as taking this into account. Thus, it is only in not assuming the 
extensional interpretation that I can talk of level 1 as essential for understanding and explanation. Were 
we to assume the extensional interpretation of Marr’s first level, we should substitute something like 
Peacocke’s level 1.5 for Marr’s level 1. Finally, coming back to Marr’s official description, it must be 
said that Peacocke’s has significantly contributed to the analysis of this level —whatever it is called— 
with a general clarification of what the relevant information is: it is a question of the information the 
algorithms rely on. This, in turn, explains in a general way, the “why” part in Marr’s description. 
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indicate both the presence of this other element and its connection to the distinction of 
levels in the course of a brief exposition of some of the historically important models 
of attention in cognitive psychology. 
Broadbent’s original filter theory of attention in his 1958 book Perception and 
Communication, and his 1971 extension in Decision and Stress, could be seen as 
taking its point of departure from the folk psychological idea of selective attention, 
which we saw formed an important part of William James’s analysis of the notion. 
Only that the “selection” that was meant to be performed was not meant to be a 
selection of which the subject was aware at all, but was assigned to a mechanism that 
“filtered” the incoming information. 
Broadbent’s central idea was that in perception the amount of information that our 
perceptual system can take up and use at any given time is only an small amount of 
the total information available. In other words, our perceptual system has, in fact, 
strong limitations for processing information that requires to “select” or “filter” the 
incoming information. Thus Broadbent’s original model postulated two systems. The 
first was a limited-capacity perceptual system through which the inputs which acquire 
control over behaviour must necessarily pass. This system transmits only a small part 
of the available sensory information at any one time. The limitation is due to the 
action of another system that precedes the limited-capacity system, which acts as a 
“filter” which accepts some inputs and rejects others. This filter does not behave 
randomly, but “selects” information which is relevant to current behaviour, and thus, 
there must be a connection between long-term memory —which presumably holds, 
among other, information concerning current behavioural concerns— and the filter. 
At this point, it is useful to employ Dennett’s celebrated personal/subpersonal 
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terminology for clarification purposes (cf. Dennett 1981 and 1989). Notice that, as 
already suggested, the processes postulated by the model are processes of which the 
subject is unaware. In this sense, we could say that is not the person which performs 
anything that is postulated by the model. However, although the contents of the model 
are given in a subpersonal way, as just explained, the model must have implications 
for what is actually observed, and this consists of actions or performances carried out 
by experimental subjects, which are invariably described by the use of descriptions at 
the personal level. 
It is at this personal level that we can find the word ‘attention’ roughly used in the 
dictionary sense. I am, then, suggesting that in connection to cognitive theories of 
attention such as Broadbent’s, this word is used in at least two different but related 
senses. On the one hand, we have the notion as used in experimental settings and 
protocols. This is the word as ordinarily understood; roughly, the dictionary 
definition. On the other hand, however, a more sophisticated notion —such as a 
notion that contains at least some conceptual element of James’s characterization of 
attention— can be used to perform a heuristic role. In the case of Broadbent’s original 
model it is specifically the (personal folk-psychological) notion of selective attention, 
or James’s notion of “withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with 
others”, which plays a heuristic analogical role in the introduction of the theoretical 
notion of filter in the specific theoretical proposal. 
It appears that the heuristic role played by the idea of (something like the 
Jamesian idea of) selective attention in Broadbent’s theory, is played by a common or 
“folk-psychological” notion of effort in another very influential early theory of 
attention: Kahneman’s model in his 1973 book Attention and Effort, where a 
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mechanism which influenced a distribution of energy necessary to realize concrete 
perceptual tasks was postulated. This energy —theoretically dubbed ‘effort’— is 
assumed to be in some way a distinguishable part of the general level of activation of 
the organism, and it is just this distinguishable part which is associated with attention. 
Kahneman himself thought of this theory as somehow complementary to a theory 
which takes into account (as Broadbent’s theory does) limitations of structures 
involved in processing, and so his theory is not to be thought of simply as an 
alternative to the theories of attention that follow this lead. But he did open the 
alternative view which consists of associating attention with some (energetic) limited 
resources to be allocated into cognitive tasks. These were at first thought of as a 
unique amount of non-specific resources (as in Norman and Bobrow 1975). However, 
a number of experimental findings seemed to be incompatible with this assumption. 
For example, it was found that skilled pianists, after short training, could perform 
efficiently at sight while repeating orally prose passages transmitted to them at a 
certain pace through head phones. This and other experimental evidence showed that 
there was little interference when, as in these tasks, the sensorial input came through 
different channels and the behavioural output was in two different modalities (manual 
and vocal). Still other experimental results found other compatibilities in carrying out 
dual tasks (as they are called in the specialized literature), and all this led to the idea 
of multiple, independent resources. 
These developments pose a problem or, rather, make an already existing one more 
acute. We can approach this problem by raising at this point the question of what 
those resources and their distribution have to do with attention at all. At first sight it 
might seem that this question has an easy answer and that there is no difficulty here at 
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all. Take, for example, the experimental findings just mentioned about skilled pianists 
being capable of playing at sight while at the same time reproducing prose passages. 
This seems to be a case in which the subjects have to divide their attention between 
the two cases, and indeed, it is usually classified in psychological literature as a case 
of divided attention. In thus applying the term ‘attention’ to the phenomenon, it is 
meant to be given a use that conforms to its ordinary “folk-psychological” meaning. 
But now, surely, a theory that explains this and other attentional phenomena —where 
phenomena are classified as attentional by the lights of the ordinary or folk-
psychological meaning— clearly seems to merit the name of a theory of attention. 
This use of the expression ‘theory of attention’ presupposes that the reference of the 
term ‘attention’ is fixed by either its ordinary or its folk-psychological meaning or 
both: a theory of attention is a theory which accounts for attentional phenomena —in 
the sense of this expression just explained, which resorts to the ordinary or the folk-
psychological meaning— by means of certain mechanisms (it does not matter which). 
Hence, to return to the multiple resources theory, if this theory accounts for the 
attentional fact described properly —a case of divided attention— and other similar 
attentional phenomena, that theory seems to deserve to be called a theory of attention.  
In raising to prominence the ordinary or folk-psychological notion of attention in 
the way described,  a central place is given to this personal notion of attention, since 
attention in that sense is something that a person does. For, consider the mechanism 
eventually postulated by such theories; they are often called ‘attentional mechanisms’. 
Why so? Because they are the mechanisms used to account for attentional phenomena 
(the personal or folk-psychological notion) according to theories of attention in the 
sense explained. 
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Now, I think that if there were no other sense in which we could make the 
expressions ‘theory of attention’ or ‘attentional mechanism’ plain, we should say that 
attention is only unified at the personal level, and something like this is, indeed, what 
some writers on attention feel inclined to say. 
Something analogous holds for the more specialized labels that are frequently 
used in the literature. Most especially, the same would hold for the theories called 
‘theories of selective attention’. Here the thinking would be that one such theory is a 
theory that purports to account for phenomena of selective attention, where this 
expression should be taken in the personal or folk-psychological sense that we saw 
explained by William James in the preceding section. 
So far so good. Is there then any real problem? In fact, we would appear to be 
quite a long way from the picture of the situation that is reflected in the following text 
by Kahneman: 
 
[T]he main function of the term ‘attention’ in post-behavioristic psychology is to 
provide a label for some of the internal mechanisms that determine the significance 
of stimuli and thereby make it impossible to predict behavior by stimulus 
considerations alone. (cf. Attention and Effort, p. 2) 
 
This seems quite a “nominalistic” use of the term ‘attention’ indeed. Perhaps not a 
flatus vocis altogether, but almost. We seem to avoid the emptyness of that use by 
appealing to the folk notion in the way described. Nevertheless, we may be deceiving 
ourselves here. Perhaps, after all, the situation we have been describing is not very 
different from the one described by Kahneman. Let us first take the attentional 
mechanisms. Surely not every mechanism which is postulated by an empirically 
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supported theory of attention is an attentional mechanism. We do not want to call, for 
example, a short-term memory store an attentional mechanism only because a theory 
of attention appeals to it. What is then distinctive of attentional mechanisms? Maybe 
it is that they are postulated by empirically sound theories of attention —always in the 
sense of this expression that has been described— while they are not postulated by 
theories of other cognitive phenomena. This would exclude short term memory stores 
from the list of attentional devices. But, of course, this would be no solution to our 
problem. Firstly, a characterization that is purely negative does not do much in the 
way of characterizing anything, and secondly, and even more importantly, because 
this would automatically exclude attentional mechanisms to be postulated by the 
theories of other cognitive phenomena. It is in this way that we may begin to see the 
real force of postulating that attention is only unified at the personal level. 
Moreover, an account that relied on ‘attentional phenomena’ in the way we have 
explained, would be much too naive. In real life and in experimental settings also, 
attention intervenes intermingled with many other factors. A little more than a casual 
examination of the evidence for many so-called ‘theories of attention’ would make it 
plain how diverse and varied the empirical problems that those theories are trying to 
account for are. So much so in fact that these empirical problems seem to deserve 
little more than the very vague label of ‘attentional problem group’, by which some 
recent commentators have referred to them (cf. Tudela, “Atención”, p. 136). 
I believe that what are basically the same problems as those we have been 
discussing mar the noteworthy attempt by Allport to argue for a reorientation of the 
whole research field in the paper “Visual Attention”. Allport’s discussion explicitly 
proceeds at Marr’s level 1 of scientific theories of attention instead of focussing on 
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the relevance of a personal notion of attention. It is at that level that he wants to locate 
the reorientation he is proposing. To be specific, Allport concentrates mainly on the 
fact that it is at this level that the characterization of a cognitive item by its purpose is 
assumed to take place. He is, thus, focussing on a task commonly assumed —on good 
grounds— to be also the job of Marr’s level 1 theorizing, which is different from the 
particulars of that level that were discussed earlier in this section. 
Allport finds that the assumption of a “limited capacity system” is common to the 
majority of the theoretical work on attention in cognitive psychology in the 1960’s, 
'70’s and '80’s. All the work that has been mentioned above would be included here, 
and much else besides. Of course, the nature and workings of this limited capacity 
system vary enormously with the different authors, but “the idea of the limited 
capacity, in one form or another, as the basis of attentional limitations has remained a 
central (in some cases unquestioned) assumption in otherwise very diverse theoretical 
approaches to attention” (op. cit. p. 633). More specifically this predominant view is 
characterized as the view according to which: 
 
the basic function or purpose of [selective attention] is to protect the brain’s limited 
capacity system (or systems) for informational overload.5 (Ibid.) 
                                                
5 Allport quotes Broadbent at this point: “Selection takes places in order to protect a mechanism of 
limited capacity” (cf. Decision and Stress). Actually, in the text quoted, Allport says ‘attentional 
mechanisms’ instead of ‘selection’ or ‘selective attention’. I have used this latter expression,  which 
coincides with Broadbent’ formulation, because I think that there are specific problems with a 
formulation that alludes to “attentional mechanisms”, as will be seen below. In contrast, I think that 
Broadbent’s formulation, or the modified formulation in the text, may be seen as statements linking 
attention as conceptualized at the personal level to happenings that occur at the subpersonal level, 
since I take it that the words ‘selection’ and ‘selective attention’ that occur in those formulations refer 
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As I will explain shortly, Allport’s proposal is to substitute this conception of the 
purpose of attentional mechanisms. 
In stating the function of attention according to the predominant view, Allport is 
quite clear that he means that protecting the limited capacity system at issue is 
causally related to the existence of selective attention itself, and the “shutting out” 
from processing of part of the information (cf. p. 632-3).6 The same causal use must 
therefore be attributed to his proposal that the function postulated by the predominant 
view be substituted by a number of different functions corresponding to the diverse 
“attentional mechanisms”. But here our problem is highlighted again. 
My concern is related to Allport’s initial description of the theoretical level at 
which he formulates his proposal. This is as follows: 
 
Understanding any complex mental function no doubt requires explanation at many 
different levels. David Marr (...), particularly, emphasized the importance of clear, 
explicit formulation at the level (...) at which the overall purposes or goals of a given 
category of cognitive processes are to be specified. (Op. cit. p. 631; only the first 
emphasis is Allport’s.) 
 
My concern is, then: do attention or attentional phenomena constitute a category 
of cognitive processes? Essentially, I think the same question can be put in terms of 
“attentional mechanisms”: do “attentional mechanisms” constitute a category of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
to the folk notion and the rest of the sentence alludes to subpersonal processes. I do not find anything 
wrong with the formulations at issue. 
6 Conceptual work by Larry Wright and others have clarified the meaning of such claims. Cf. Wright 
1976; cf. also Pérez Otero 2000. 
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cognitive processes? 
The problem seems to be that as long as we do not have any good reasons for 
giving an affirmative answer to these questions, the class of “attentional mechanisms” 
remains unbounded —we do not know what is distinctive of “attentional 
mechanisms”— and therefore, our attributing any purposes to such mechanisms 
seems to be empty as a proposal that aims to reshape theoretical thought in the area.7 
Is there no way one should proceed here? Notice that if one had a bona fide 
attentional mechanism, so to speak, and one were trying to theorize about its function 
(or functions), the problem would not arise. But such a mechanism should be an 
anatomically and functionally characterizable system of the brain (however complex). 
And how can one have such a mechanism without previous knowledge of its 
function(s) —function(s) that one has good reason to tie conceptually to the ordinary 
or folk notion of attention? The solution to such an apparent circle must lie in seeing 
it not as a circle but, so to speak, as an spiral. There must be some “feedback” here, 
some moving back and forth between proposals for such a mechanism (or even, 
maybe, several mechanisms) and proposals about its functions. 
I do not really know whether at least a significant part of the research on attention 
in recent years can be seen as proceeding in this overall direction, but I suspect that 
                                                
7 In discussing the multiple resource theories we have mentioned above Allport says: “... to the extent 
that more and more specific resources are postulated to account for each new pattern of interference, 
the approach becomes increasingly little more than a redescripton of the data, lacking in explanatory 
power.” (Op. cit. p. 641) I am suggesting that something similar may be the case with Allport’s 
postulation of a whole variety of “attentional mechanisms” serving a whole variety of “attentional 
functions”. 
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there is some basis for thinking this.8 And it seems to me that we can find an 
important illustrative example in the work by Posner and his collaborators and 
followers. 
In its early stages, epitomized by the 1978 book Chronometric Exploration of 
Mind, Posner’s theoretical work on attention does not seem to proceed in a way that is 
completely dissimilar to the way found in Broadbent's filter theory. At its base we 
find a notion, that of being aware or being alert, which seems to provide the heuristic 
drive for the theory (much as this was provided by the folk notion of selection in 
Broadbent’s theory). It also seems to maintain a conceptual link to James’s analysis, 
even if to a different element this time (indeed, we have seen James saying that 
consciousness is of the “essence” of attention). And, as Allport points out, there was 
also the idea of a limited system. Out of these materials, Posner elaborated a level 1 
cognitive theory of attention to account for some data. But as soon as experimental 
techniques allowed it, he and his collaborators increasingly proceeded to try to find 
evidence for a neuropsychological architecture that would postulate a unified 
neurological mechanism for attention. 
Postulating a unified mechanism somehow makes it easier to find a way to 
introduce this mechanism as a (the) mechanism of attention. This is, I believe, true 
even of Broadbent’s filter theory.9 But work by Posner and his collaborators can, in 
                                                
8 Something in that direction seems to be suggested in Allport’s paper, § 16.3. 
9 If Broadbent or Posner are right, attention is not only unified at the personal level. Brewer makes the 
opposite claim —that attention is only unified at the personal level— in the course of trying to clarify a 
long-standing dispute in the neuro-psychological literature concerning the nature of the disorder called 
‘unilateral neglect’ (cf. his “Unilateral Neglect and the Objectivity of Spatial Representation”). He 
claims that the dispute is clarified as soon as one realizes that,  in claiming that the disorder is due to a 
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effect, be seen as increasingly driven by the theoretical aim of providing a theory of 
attentional phenomena which emphasizes Marr’s level 3, and tries to establish 
explanatory connections between level 3 and level 110 in a way that, as far as I can 
see, seems to fit well the above “going back and forth” description.11 An example of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
failure in attention, one party —the “attentionalists”— is in fact claiming that it is an effect of spatially 
biased attention in the person, the patient himself, while the other party —the “representationalists”— 
is in fact claiming that the disorder is a consequence of failures in the subpersonal mechanisms 
building spatial representations (cf. op. cit. pp. 224-225). In this way —since the two parties are in fact 
focussing on different aspects of the phenomenon— a conciliation of sorts would seem possible. Now, 
Brewer’s contention about how the dispute has been confused may be right, given the evidence he 
presents on that dispute. But there is a claim concerning the postulation of a unitary attentional 
mechanism —Brewer specifically mentions Broadbent and Posner in this connection— that I do not 
understand, or if I understand it, it seems to me to be wrong. It is that, in the context of the dispute, 
postulating a unitary attentional mechanism would be “simply to recast attention as one among many 
components in the subpersonal computation of spatial representations, and so to undermine any 
principled distinction between attentionalism and representationalism as interpretations of UN 
[unilateral neglect]” (p. 225). It is the second part of this claim that worries me. I do not see why, to the 
extent that we could count on a distinctive attentional mechanism, it would not be possible in principle 
to claim that it is failure in this mechanism —and not in other mechanisms that also contribute to the 
building of representations— which explains the disorder, and why, therefore, the dispute between this 
position and a position that located the failure in the other mechanisms would not be a dispute driven 
by a “principed distinction between (...) interpretations of UN”. 
10 Cf. Posner and Petersen, “The Attention System of the Human Brain” and Posner, “Attention: the 
Mechanisms of Consciousness”. 
11  It seems increasingly obvious that the approach driven by research at the neurophysiological level 
which has been made possi ble by tecniques as high resolution electroencephalography and positron 
emission tomography constitues the most promising approach to the study of attention when it is 
conducted with due regard to the level of computational theory. Nevertheless, I am going to 
concentrate in Treisman's more classical work as it is the most immediatly relevant for the purposes of 
the present dissertation. 
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this is provided in the following statement about functions: 
 
[I]t is important to divide the attention system into subsystems that perform different 
but interrelated functions. In this chapter, we consider three major functions that 
have been prominent in cognitive accounts of attention (...): (a) orienting to sensory 
events; (b) detecting signals for focal (conscious) processing, and (c) maintaining a 
vigilant or alert state. (Posner and Petersen, ‘The Attentional System of the Human 
Brain”, p. 26.) 
 
I, for one, find a very different spirit in the claim that is made here to that in 
Allport’s talk about functions and mechanisms. The claim, in the context of Posner 
and Petersen’s paper, is a claim about a mechanism that one thinks, with good reason, 
to have been already identified, even if perhaps somewhat tentatively, and whose 
claim to be a unified attentional mechanism is now tested by being faced with 
functions that have been traditionally regarded in specialized scientific research as 
functions of attention. 
Therefore, this new theoretical approach has fully abandoned the traditional 
heuristics in cognitive psychology altogether. The word ‘attention’ is used much more 
substantially than as a term for some varied observational syndrome or as something 
dubiously covering the seemingly ad hoc postulation of “attentional” mechanisms and 
functions. 
 
 
5.3. Treisman’s feature integration theory 
 
In this section and the next we will deal with one particular cognitive theory of 
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attention in more detail, namely, Anne Treisman’s feature integration theory. This 
special treatment familiarise us with several traits of theories of attention which were 
mentioned in the previous section. Moreover, the particular theory at issue is that 
referred to in John Campbell’s account of perceptual modes of presentation; the 
account in relation to which I will further develop my own account. Most importantly 
in the present context, I will use this specific theory to illustrate in more detail the 
relation between folk theories and philosophical reflection, on the one hand, and 
empirical theories of cognition on the other which I have been suggesting in general 
outline, and will do this in a way that will allow me to put forward certain elements 
which will prove central to my description of the perceptual demonstrative character 
of perception of physical objects, as further articulated in Chapter 7. 
We may see Anne Treisman’s first theoretical endeavours on the subject of 
attention as a flexibilization of the framework set up by Broadbent’s filter theory, or 
perhaps as a way to broaden a perspective that she considered to be too narrow. In the 
1969 paper “Strategies and Models of Selective Attention”, Treisman argued for the 
“need to draw some logical distinctions between attention tasks” and wanted to 
“discuss their implications for explanatory models of attention” (p. 283). The 
distinctions at issue were traced to an equivocation in the word ‘attention’ itself:  
 
Words like ‘attention,’(...) have been used to cover a variety of logically different 
concepts. Clarifying these may help to explain the conflicting experimental results 
and to throw light on the underlying mechanisms. (Op. cit. pp. 296-7) 
 
Specifically, Treisman wanted to put forward four different notions of attention, 
although t is not completely clear to me what these four notions are. Jointly they seem 
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to cover roughly the same conceptual area that was later to be covered by the three 
functions of attention distinguished by Posner, namely orienting, detecting and 
alerting. Even if the internal distribution of the area does not coincide with Posner’s, 
at least some of Treisman’s notions also had a functional character (Treisman called 
them ‘attentional strategies’).12 
As suggested by the above quotation, Treisman linked her conceptual distinctions 
to the postulation of different mechanisms. In tracing these distinctions she intended 
to oppose Broadbent’s unified account of attention. As we will see, however, her later 
work on attention would concentrate, somewhat ironically, on aspects of the subject 
that were to bring her closer to Broadbent’s well known perspective of filtering and 
limited capacity mechanism. 
In this later work Treisman embarked on a systematic investigation of subjects' 
performance in a wide range of tasks involving identifying objects with distinctive 
traits or features from among other objects that partially shared those traits and also 
from among objects that completely lacked them. Part of this work led to the 
formulation of Treisman’s most characteristic theoretical standpoint, her feature 
                                                
12 In explaining her fourfold conceptual division in connection with the example of the task consisting 
of detecting a particular type of letter among a display of coloured letters of different size and 
orientations, Treisman says: “[The experimental subject] must first direct his attention to the display 
and not elsewhere in the room, that is, he must select the class of sensory data coming from one 
particular area as the input to the perceptual system. Second, he must attend to the shapes of the letters 
and not their colors, sizes, or orientations, that is, he must select the analizers for shape and reject 
those for color, etc.” (Loc. cit. p. 284, Treisman’s italics). Both notions of attention seem to be covered 
by Posner’s orienting function (cf. Posner and Petersen (1990), pp. 27-33). Incidentally, Treisman’s 
quoted text is representative of the psychologists's habitual overlooking of the distinction between 
personal and subpersonal levels of analysis or theorizing. 
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integration theory; most of the remainder was conducted to test this theory and 
eventually led to several modifications. 
In a nutshell, Treisman’s theory is as follows. At some stage our visual system 
processes a number of features of objects present in a scene automatically and in 
parallel.13 These features are spatially located and organized into types (colour, shape, 
orientation, etc.). This automatic pre-attentional stage is temporally followed by an 
attentional stage in certain situations, e. g. when carrying out tasks that require it, at 
which an integration or “binding” of features present at the location attended takes 
place, finally building a description or file with the defining features of the object 
present at the location at issue. This representation of the attended object is built up 
by perception before any name or semantic characterization takes place. 
 
[Dibuix 1] 
 
The evidence for the independent parallel processing of features of objects comes 
from experiments such as the following. Firstly, when subjects are made to identify a 
particular object that is like all other objects in a display except for one distinctive 
feature, the identification is found to proceed without the increase in the number of 
objects displayed having a significant effect on the time needed. The objects may be 
geometrical figures sharing a shape (e. g. they are all round), but all but one are the 
                                                
13 Treisman was uncertain about the stage in the process in which this automatic parallel processing 
takes place. According to the model in Treisman (1986) this parallel processing takes place from the 
very beginning of visual processing, while in the model in Treisman (1988) single representations that 
conjoin features of several kinds precede the separate analysis or “splitting” of features by types. 
Eventually she found evidence that favoured the latter model (cf. Treisman (1988), p. 204). 
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same colour (e. g. one is red and all the others are green) or the other way round. Or 
the objects can share a shape (rectangular, say) and all but one also share orientation 
(e. g. all are vertical, only one is inclined) or the other way round, and so on. The 
independence of the number of objects displayed shows that the objects are not 
examined “one by one”, or even “one group by one”. This conclusion is reinforced by 
the fact that the target object is usually absent in part of the tests, that is, there is no 
object with a distinctive feature. If subjects proceeded by searching for objects 
individually or in groups, significantly more time should be required to give an 
answer in cases where the supposed target object is absent. 
Another type of experiment seems to give even more direct evidence of the parallel 
processing of features. Objects displayed can vary randomly within the same category 
of feature —or, as the jargon has it, along a “dimension”— (e. g. can be presented in 
a number of different shapes and in varying quantities for each shape) while sharing 
—with the habitual exception— a feature belonging to another “dimension” (e. g. 
colour). Again there is no significant varying effect in performance time as the 
number of object displayed increases (cf. Treisman (1982), (1985), Treisman and 
Gormican (1988) for experiments of the kinds described). Apparently, then, features 
belonging to one type or dimension do not interfere with features in other dimensions. 
If  the perceptual system was distracted by the different shapes of the objects when 
“looking for” a distinctive colour, for example, a significant effect should be expected 
as the number of shaped objects or the variety of shapes increases. 
A variantion of this type of experiment which was not carried out by Treisman or 
her associates, is as follows. Objects displayed, similar to the ones in the experiments 
referred to are shown to subjects one by one very briefly —the relevant time is in the 
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order of milliseconds. After each presentation two questions are put to them, each 
with two alternative answers. Each question concerns a kind of feature or dimension 
of features in the object (e. g. colour or orientation), and the alternative answers 
present two possibilities about the concrete feature present in the object (e. g. vertical 
vs. horizontal). It is assumed that the object is shown to the subject for too short a 
time to enable conscious recall, but the subject has to pronounce on the features at 
issue even if he is not consciously aware of these features. The results of these tests 
are compared with the results obtained when only one (two-alternative, and always 
within the same dimension) question is put to subjects after object presentation. The 
result of this comparison is that, again, there is no significant difference in 
performance —this time with respect to accuracy— between the groups of subjects 
(cf. Duncan 1984). Again, processing features in one dimension does not seem to 
interfere with processing features in a different one.14 
Other types of experiment concern the processing of “conjoined” features, that is, 
they concern objects that differ in one feature with respect to objects from each of two  
groups differing in turn with respect to two features. For example, one group of 
objects may be red triangles (sharing any other features except of course location) and 
the other may be green circles while the “target” object is a red circle. In this sort of 
display it is found that the time of search varies approximately proportionally 
(lineally) with the number of “non-target” objects —also called ‘distractors’— in the 
display. It is thought that these results occur because the subject has to orient his 
attention to the objects' locations in succession until the target is found (serial search). 
                                                
14  Apparently, the attributes or kinds of features tested in these experiments include shape, colour, 
location, orientation, spatial frequency, motion, texture, and brightness (cf. Duncan (1993), p. 56). 
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[Dibuix 2] 
 
The relation of the ability to identify objects which present “conjoined features” in 
the sense described above has with being able to locate such objects is further tested 
in experiments where subjects are shown very brief displays involving several 
objects. While the target object is only different from all the rest in one feature; in 
cases where there are no conjoined features, subjects are able to tell whether there is 
in fact a different object in a display and what the difference consists of, and can do 
this even if they cannot tell where  that different object was in the display due to the 
brevity of the presentation. But when the target differs in one feature from each of 
two groups of objects as described above —cases of conjoined features— then the 
subject is not able to identify the target unless he is given enough time to also find out 
where the object is. 
The result from this kind of experiment support the hypothesis that the 
identification of objects showing feature conjuntion requires attention on the subject's 
part, and that attention in this case has to do with attending to the locations of objects. 
This is the second, indeed the most characteristic, half of Treisman’s feature 
integration theory.  
Further evidence of the dependency of identifying feature conjunction targets on 
being able to locate such targets is found in ˝illusory conjuntion˝ experiments. 
Treisman’s theory predicts that when subjects are not (properly) attending, be it due 
to distraction, to having to attend to too many things at once or, simply, to being 
allowed insufficient time, they will make mistakes in attributing (conjoined) features 
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to objects. These predictions have been borne out by experiments of several sorts, for 
example, in one type displays containing a (short) alphanumeric series were very 
briefly presented to subjects. Those series would begin and end with a black numeral 
—to which the subjects were instructed to attend for later reporting— and would also 
contain objects of other kinds —e. g. coloured letters— in between. The subjects 
were then asked to identify the numerals and also to identify any other occurring 
objects by their features (say, letters in their corresponding colours). Subjects were 
frequently able to correctly identify (at least some of) the features of the objects in 
between belonging to one dimension but not to the other. For example, they were able 
to correctly identify (at least part of) the objects'shapes —say the shapes of the letters, 
and thus the letters themselves— but they were typically wrong about their colours. 
Even more importantly, the subjects would frequently interchange the features of the 
objects, say letter type and colour (stating, for example, that a green ‘c’ and a red ‘b’ 
were in the display when in fact it was the other way round). This latter kind of 
mistake is called an ‘illusory conjunction’ in the literature. 
It seems then that attention in visual perceptual tasks —or, as we may as well say, 
(visual perceptual) consciousness— is essentially related both to the (correct) 
integration of features and to the spatial location at which that integration takes place, 
where these two factors are not independent of each other: integration has to take 
place at a location. These aspects of the theory are shown in the model represented in 
Fig. 1 by postulating a ‘master map’ of locations to which an ‘internal spotlight’ is 
directed, corresponding in the model’s subpersonal level, to the activity of attention, 
as we put it when describing what takes place at the personal level. 
The fact that Treisman’s model places the ‘master map’ at an early stage in 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
processing reflects a theoretical decision motivated by some empirical research. As 
shown in Houck and Hoffman (1986), certain kinds of post-effects (a subset of so-
called McCollough post-effects), require that conjoining features are present even 
without attention,15 which according to Treisman is best explained by postulating that 
the features belonging to an object are to a certain extent represented in an unified 
way before “analysis by features” takes place, especially since there seems to be 
independent evidence of early processing in these cases of  “conjoined features” (cf. 
Treisman 1988, pp. 223-224). 
The integration or “binding” of features that takes place when subjects focus 
attention on locations in the displays according to Treisman’s theory, has as a result, 
according to the same model, the building of a unified representation of the object —a 
“mental file” of an object. Kahneman and Treisman obtained evidence which 
apparently showed that those object representations bore a contingent relation with 
the (semantic) categorization of the object: 
 
We propose the notion of an object file as the representation that maintains the identity 
and continuity of an object perceived in a particular episode. The identity of the object 
is carried by the fact that information is entered on a particular file, rather than by a 
name or a particular enduring set of features. ” 
(Kahneman and Treisman (1984), p. 54) 
                                                
15 When the subject looks for a certain time, e.g. a minute, at patches of green vertical stripes with red 
horizontal stripes, then there is a post-effect consisting of appearing to see patches of black and white 
vertical stripes tinged with red with black and white vertical stripes tinged with green (thus reversing, 
so to speak, the colours of the original patch). The inverse effects are obtained when the colours of the 
stripes in the patches are inverted (red for the vertical, green for the horizontal). What was shown by 
Houck and Hoffman is that those post-effects occur even when distractions of attention are produced 
in different ways so that the subjects cannot attend to the patches. 
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They may be momentary or episodic representations that track an object 
independently of its having been assigned to a definite category, or independently of a 
change in the category to which it has been assigned. For example, something 
categorized as a distant plane is not lost track of “even when we see it flap its wings 
and alight on a nearby tree, thus forcing us to change the label we initially assigned” 
to it (Treisman 1988, p. 219). 
A whole series of experiments belonging to the same generic class of experiments 
from which feature integration theory arose suggest a very different story about how 
the mental files of objects are built up. Those are experiments which show that for 
certain combinations of features serial search is not required to find the target object. 
For example, when the target is a red bar moving up and down that must be identified 
among a group of bars of the same size, part of them green and moving up and down, 
and part of them red and moving left and right, subjects have no difficulty in quickly 
spotting the target, quite independently of the number of distractors. There is now a 
very wide range of results in this direction, coming from the work in Nakayama & 
Silverman (1986), Wolfe, Cave & Franzel (1989) and Treisman & Sato (1990). 
To account for these new findings Wolfe, Cave & Franzel suggested an alternative 
algorithm to find a conjunctive target which is alternative to Treisman’s original 
algorithm —cf. Wolfe, Cave & Franzel (1989). Instead of integrating the features at 
succesive locations (corresponding to successively orienting attention to different 
locations), the procedure was to first shut out any objects in the entire display that 
lacked one of the features of the target, and then to shut out from the remaining 
objects any which lacked the other feature, finally leaving only the target as the 
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“surviving” object. This, of course, makes a quite different claim about the capacity 
and action of attention. 
We will not need to go into further detail here on which conjunction feature tasks 
seem to be carried out by serial search and which ones are not. Nor will we enter into 
the discussion of the modifications Treisman introduced in her model to account for 
the new findings (for which cf. Treisman 1998, pp. 226-7, and Treisman 1993, pp. 19-
20 or the alternative advanced in Wolfe, Cave & Franzel (1989)). I think that enough 
details have been given by now to give a feeling of the nature of the research in the 
field, especially because our interest lies in the trait common to all the theories which 
have been mentioned, namely, their postulation of features.16 In the next section we 
turn to the issue of just what these features are. 
 
 
5.4. Features and qualia. 
 
What are the features spoken of in Treisman’s theory? Reflecting on her work, 
Treisman raises the question of whether features are “real world properties” or are 
mental representational items: 
 
                                                
16 It could be said that the models and theories considered differ at the algorithm level of a cognitive 
theory (level two of Marr’s hierarchy). This is true with regard to the algorithms proposed, but the 
algorithm level also includes, according to Marr, the choosing of representation, and it seems that on 
this subject there seems to be great agreement on the postulation of features as representations (or 
properties thereof) on which the different algorithms work. (An explanation of this kind of discussion 
of features is given in the next section.) 
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So what are features anyway? Back in 1980, they were the colours, orientations, and 
shapes on my ink-drawn tachistoscope cards. That saved me some difficult decisions 
about whether they are the features of the 2D image as coded by retinal receptors, or 
the features of real world, three-dimensional objects. (Treisman, 1993, p. 7; her italics) 
 
Of course, ink marks or printed colours on cards, or even shapes and colours in 
screen displays are, in some obvious sense, “real world properties”, even if they are 
not the properties of three dimensional physical objects. Hence, the way in which 
Treisman uses this term in the quotation above serves only to emphasize that it is 
properties of three dimensional physical objects which are one of the main 
possibilities from among which a choice should be made. 
For our purposes, however, the relevant contrast here is between features as real 
world properties in a properly wide sense, and features as mental entities, that is, 
features as (properties of) mental representations. And in this respect it is quite 
obvious that Treisman makes use of both. Indeed, when a subject is trying to locate an 
object in a card or a screen display which is, say, green in colour and square in shape, 
he is trying to identify a (two-dimensional) physical object with two different 
physical properties. But, it is clear that according to Treisman’s theory the subject is 
using a mental representation of these properties in trying to zoom on an object that 
has them. It is only that Treisman chooses not to mark terminologically the two kinds 
of entities that are involved here, using the term ‘feature’ to cover both, and leaving it 
to context to indicate the right interpretation. The following passages testify to this. 
 
When we perceive and identify any complex object, we normally register not only its 
features (its particular shape, size, color, etc.), but also the fact that they are conjoined 
in a particular configuration. (Treisman & Schmidt, 1982, p. 107) 
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The basic claims made by Treisman and Gelade (1980) were (1) that there is an early 
stage of perceptual processing at which separable dimensions are coded, independently 
of each other, and form regions defined within separate maps by the presence of 
particular sets of features. (Treisman & Schmidt, 1982, p. 110) 
 
I raised the possibility that whereas detection could be triggered by simple features, 
conscious awareness might depend on feature integration ... (Treisman, 1988, p. 201) 
 
In any case, beyond any concrete quotations that one might provide here, 
Treisman's whole theoretical model would not make sense without features being —
in the corresponding sense of the word— part of mental representations and on which 
algorithms operate to build integrated representations of the object (remember the 
˝object files˝ in Treisman’s theory). This much is clear from the very title of her 
theory: experimental subjects do not first integrate physical properties of the objects 
—they are, of course, already integrated in the physical object. What they —or rather, 
subpersonal processes occurring in them— do integrate are mental traits into a mental 
representation of the object.17 
                                                
17 I think that there is a very close link in Treisman’s mind between the technical theory-bound use of 
the key terms of ‘selection’ and ‘binding’, on the one hand, and the folk-psychological sense of 
selecting and “binding” traits that belong in the phenomenology of perception. At least, I believe 
thinking this leads to a better understanding of the metaphor in Treisman and Kahneman’s proposal of 
a (mental) “object file”. I think this notion is first introduced as a metaphorical notion at the level of 
folk psychology, but, to the extent that it helps in the configuration of empirical models supported by 
experimental findings, it ends up as a theoretical notion of the cognitive psychological model. This is a 
way of linking a notion of “phenomenal trait” —that is, something that can be an object for 
philosophical discussion, or something that is assumed to occur in any case at the personal level— 
with a subpersonal trait. For an explanation of how can this happen, see below. 
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On the other hand I believe it is equally clear that Treisman needs the objective 
sense of the term ‘feature’. To begin with, her description of the experimental tasks 
the subjects are asked to carry out would not make any sense without this other use. 
There is a moral, I think, to be drawn from this situation that is relevant to the 
interpretation of the following pronouncement by Treisman in the course of her 
attempt to answer the question we saw her formulating (what are features?): 
 
I have always insisted that this is an empirical question to be answered by converging 
operations designed to diagnose the fuctional features in the visual dictionary. 
Functional features are defined, in terms of the theory ... (Treisman 1993, p. 7). 
 
As we have seen, we can say something about features which comes from 
reflecting on the uses of the term in descriptions of the experimental tasks as opposed 
to the empirical-theoretical explanations of the results. In other words, that the 
contrast I have mentioned between two kinds of things called ‘features’ in Treisman’s 
writings exists is not an empirical question. What is right in what Treisman says is 
that determining what kinds of mental entities are involved in the attentional 
recognition of objects, and also what properties are represented by those mental items 
is an empirical question. 
Concerning the mental entities at issue, Treisman mentions in the first of the 
passages quoted in this section “features of the 2D image as coded by retinal 
receptors”. She could also have mentioned the possibility, in principle, that a theory 
of visual attention to objects  postulates the sort of features of representations which 
are called ‘21/2-D sketches’ in Marr’s theory of vision, suitably extended to provide 
for colours and other properties (cf. the brief explanation of these representations in 
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connection to Tye’s work on pictorial representation in the first section of the next 
chapter). What is an issue that empirical research has to decide is whether, for the 
explanation of visual attention, features as representational parts of the first kind of 
representations —“2D images as coded by retinal receptors” should be postulated— 
or features as representational parts of representations of the second kind —21/2-D 
sketches. Or whether, perhaps, it is a different kind of representation which is 
involved. Finding out what the specific kinds of features belonging to one of these to 
be postulated are, is also of course an empirical task. As a matter of fact, this is the 
issue that Treisman turns out to be more concerned with in the paper in which we saw 
her raising the issue of what features are. 
I will next try to clarify a little further what kinds of mental entities we should 
consider features to be (thus taking the word in its “mental sense”), independently of 
the concrete decisions of the empirical theory concerning the kinds of features 
specifically postulated. 
A theory like Treisman’s theory of selective attention can be best seen, I believe, 
as a theory of the ability of certain way —the attentional way— of perceiving 
physical objects, or the ability to perceive “things” —in the vaguely delimiting sense 
of the word ‘things’— as physical objects. According to the theory, this way of seeing 
consists of a systematic ability, in that the abilities to so perceive diverse objects 
involves more basic abilities, namely the abilities exercised in recognizing or 
discriminating between certain properties in the “things”, each of which may be 
involved in the perception of many different objects. Carrying out these more basic 
abilities requires states which are representational —just because they carry out 
recognition or discrimination of properties of objects. We can identify these states, 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
which in their physical realization presumably consist of complex patterns of neuron 
cell activation, when taken as representational, as the features postulated by the 
theory (in the mental sense of the term ‘feature’). Or alternatively the features can be 
identified, not just with the representations or representational states, but with their 
respective representational properties. Decideing between these two alternatives is not 
important for my purposes.18 
For the sake of clarity, it is convenient at this point to use the device (first 
introduced by Peacocke in Sense and Content) of marking the mental usage of the 
word ‘feature’ to graphically distinguish it from the objective use, and also marking 
concrete features in the same way as representations or representational properties to 
distinguish them from the “real world” properties those representations represent. But 
instead of Peacocke’s apostrophes I will use the symbol ‘#’ as a mark, at the 
beginning and end of the term for ease of recognition (as in García-Carpintero 
(1996)). Thus, for example, I will use the term ‘#feature#’ for Treisman’s mental 
usage. 
Notice now that when Treisman makes it clear that the sense of ‘#features#’ is to 
be linked with her theory, she is at least partially defining the term by the causal or 
functional role that the theory assigns to the #features#. This is shown by the 
character of her theory, which is not one considering the physical implementation of 
the postulated mechanisms (in terms of Marr’s distinctions, it is not a theory at level 
three, nor includes one as a part). According to the theory, #features# are produced by 
                                                
18 This explanation draws heavily on the views on theories of cognition put forward by Fodor and 
Pylyshyn. For the concrete version of these views I use more immediately cf. García-Carpintero 
(1995), § 1. 
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physical objects in perception, and they are integral to the process of perceiving those 
objects. It is the process called ‘integration of #features#’ —such as #green# and 
#square#, say— that takes place when the subject focusses attention, which results in 
a unified representation of the object which is used in the production of judgements as 
to whether that object has the properties of the required target in the experimental 
setting or not, which finally leads to an action —mostly a pointing or a verbal report 
in experimental settings— when the target is eventually found. 
Now, according to some philosophical theories of perception and phenomenal 
consciousness, we have to allow for the qualitative aspects of the way in which 
perception makes us conscious of objects in the world, to which the name ‘qualia’ is 
usually applied. We will have occasion to dwell at lenght on the status of these 
qualitative aspects and/or qualia in the next chapter, but at the moment, and without 
properly entering into this issue we may notice that there seems to be some sort of 
kinship between qualia and the #features# postulated in a cognitive psychological 
theory as Treisman’s —such as #green#, #round#, #square#, and so on. Hence, it 
makes sense to raise the question: what exactly is the relation between the #features# 
of such a cognitive theory and qualia? 
I will try to answer this question with regard to a conception of perceptual qualia 
that requires them to have a representational function. In this view, these qualia are 
the subjective aspects of experience representing properties of its causal antecedents, 
and/or its causal consequences. I will expand on the foundations of such a view on the 
next two chapters. For present purposes I think it will suffice to mention that this 
representational relation would be partially grounded in the fact that systematic 
variation in the properties of the objects perceived or acted upon (say, for visual 
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perception whether they are red or green, square or round) also produce systematic 
variation in definite aspects of perceptual experience (whether this appears to be, say, 
#reddish# or #greenish#, #squarish# or #roundish#), and these in turn normally lead 
to the formation of correspondingly different perceptual judgements (or perhaps to 
different desiderata for action).19 
                                                
19 This rough account aims to occupy neutral ground between pure representationalist views of qualia, according to which qualia are exhausted by their 
representational role —that is, qualia are just a kind of representational contents— whether this should be conceived entirely in terms of causal 
antecedent or should take into account also causal effects, and views which regard their representational function as a necessary but not sufficient 
defining trait. More on all this in the chapters mentioned above. 
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This is enough perhaps to realize that a properly characterizable kinship in 
function may underlie the more or less vaguely perceived affinities between the 
#features# postulated by a cognitive psychological theory like Treisman’s and the 
qualia of philosophical lore. In view of this, I suggest that we are dealing here with 
essentially the same kind of thing, that is #features# can be regarded essentially as 
qualia, with just one main difference which stems from the fact that the respective 
sources of their recognition are quite different, and brings with it consequences for 
their respective epistemological status. The difference lies in the fact that, as we have 
seen, #features#, so to speak, find their ground in scientific theory, and so they are 
individuated at least partially in terms of that theory, and hence in terms that are more 
demanding than the conditions —whatever these are— which are required in the 
individuation of qualia, whose recognition belongs in philosophically elaborated folk 
psychology. 
When thinking about the folk-psychological notion of attention to objects in 
perception, or possible philosophical elaborations of it, one should not find it odd, I 
think, that there is this relation between qualia and #features#. The remarks on that 
notion in previous sections of this chapter may yield a view of attention in which this 
is recognized as a systematic ability also at the personal level articulated by 
philosophical reflection. An ability in whose exercise the identification of properties 
is again involved as a set of more basic abilities. And, from the viewpoint of 
philosophical theories of the analysis of perception which postulate qualia, the 
identification of those properties is mediated by the tacit awareness of qualia whose 
instantiation is caused by them. Thus, according to this view, Treisman’s theory is 
just a more detailed theory of essentially the same systematic abilities. 
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Chapter 6: “Imagistic content” and Phenomenal 
Aspects 
 
 
 
6.1. Imagistic content: a desideratum 
 
Visual perception has a well marked distinguishing aspect which is somehow 
captured by common intuition, which has a positive part and a negative one. To wit: 
when one looks around, the nature of what is displayed is like a colour picture of it; it 
is not at all like a linguistic description of it. 
Whether this nature of visual perception can be extended in some sense to 
perception in other sensory modalities is another question. But this central feature of 
visual perception gives us enough material for reflection, and in what follows I will 
be concentrating on visual perception unless the context of discussion makes it clear 
to contrary. 
The issue is not so much the extent to which perception has this “picture-like”  
nature but whether it has anything to do with the demonstrative condition we are 
trying to bring out in the present work. The purpose, then, is to start with the simple 
intuition that (visual) perception is rather picture-like, to try to pin it down and work 
from it. This will mainly be done in the present chapter. But if, as it seems, it is 
unlikely that such a “picture-like” nature of (visual) perception is an indifferent 
matter to a theory of the demonstrative condition of (much of) the presentation of 
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objects in perception, at some point both conditions or natures must be reconcilied or 
articulated together. I will begin this bringing together of both traits of perception at 
the end of the present chapter, and pursue it in the next. 
The first thing is to acknowledge that until now nothing in our analysis has taken 
into account this simple intuition about visual perception. Thus, when talking of the 
content of perceptual judgements, I have considered several ways of modelling these 
contents with sentences, and in concentrating on the way physical objects are 
presented in perception we have taken into consideration several descriptions to 
which this way of presentation might relate. 
One natural way of looking for help in trying to account for the putative picture-
like character of perception is to turn to other kinds of mental states which would also 
seem to have a picture-like nature. Specifically, what also seem to present the same 
trait are the cases in which we imagine seeing something, that is episodes of what are 
called experiential imagination, as opposed to propositional imagination —imagining 
that something is thus or so. 
Although important contemporary philosophers have warned against mixing traits 
of perception and imagination, it is, I believe, widely recognized by present day 
philosophers that (experiental) imagination shares central features of the presentation 
of objects with perception.1 The hope now is that perhaps by concentrating on mental 
episodes and states of imagination we may learn something about picture-likeness 
                                                
1 Thus, it is true that contemporary philosophers like Ryle, Sartre or Wittgenstein have pointed out 
important differences between both phenomena. But, on the other hand, the similarities are again 
brought up in more recent accounts, for which one can refer e.g. to the similarities in the otherwise 
different accounts in Peacocke (1985) and Hopkins (1998). 
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that will be useful in clarifying the sense in which perceptual states also possess the 
intuitively felt “picture-like” trait, even if, duly instructed by the warnings of those 
contemporary philosophers whose emphasis is on the differences between both 
phenomena, we proceed with caution and avoid deriving consequences that we have 
no reason to endorse. Thus, it does not follow from the alleged picture-like trait of 
both perception and imagination that this condition is present in the same way. In 
particular, in imagining we may be aware of a mental entity of some sort that 
represents something much in the way that a picture represents something. But, 
however it is with imagination, it does not follow that our primary object of 
awareness in perception is a mental entity that represents something in that way. It 
may even be true, but it does not follow at all from the intuitively felt “picture-like” 
character that both have. 
My proceeding to try to characterize the “picture-like” nature of perception  in 
such an indirect a manner might seem odd.2 But I think that, on the one hand, the 
picture-like trait of (visual) imagination is comparatively less doubtful, and hence it 
would seem a good place to start. On the other hand, there is a tradition of discussion 
about the pictorial trait of images in the scientific study of imagination which I would 
like to bring to bear in some way on my inquiry into the phenomenological aspects of 
perception. Once the proper warnings have been issued, the question is how to 
account for the “picture-like” trait of imagining, and whether we can transfer 
                                                
2 In the work alluded to in the previous footnote, Hopkins uses the similarities to account for the 
differences between visual and tactile imagination from the differences between vision and touch. My 
strategy for the present purpose of characterizing the “picture like” character of perception runs in 
just the opposite direction. 
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something from this account to the similar issue about perception. 
In beginning to look for an account of the pictorial trait of imagining, I first want 
to look in this section at the difficulties for an approach that seeks clarification in a 
direct appeal to the sort of recent scientific research on imagery that I have just 
alluded to. This approach begins by drawing attention to empirical findings that seem 
to show clearly that “imagistic representations” intervene in episodes of imagination, 
or mental images are “manipulated” in them. Most famous of these are the processes 
in the carrying out of tasks in the experiments by Shepard and collaborators on 
whether two figures can be made to coincide via bi- or tridimensional rotations, and 
hence are of the same shape.3 It was found that the angle of the rotation necessary to 
bring the figures into coincidence (when they can be brought to coincide) is the factor 
determining the time required to reach a positive right answer —indeed, the time 
required is a linear function of such an angle. Apart from apparently lending 
experimental support to the introspective judgements of the subjects, to the effect that 
what they do to reach an answer is to “rotate in imagination” one of the figures to try 
to fit it to the other, these results provide very good evidence indeed of the reality of 
mental representations of such figures, and maybe also suggest that the 
representations themselves are in some sense “picture-like”. The experiments, 
however, do not make it clear in what sense, if any, the representations have this 
nature.4 
                                                
3 Shepard, R. & Metzler, J. (1971). ˝Mental Rotation of Three-Dimensional Objects˝, Science 171, pp. 
701-703. 
4 There is some empirical evidence to support the claim that imagination and perception are similar, 
although it is not always clear whether what is found to be similar are the processes or the 
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Again, there is good evidence of the mental representation of figures in other well 
known experiments by Kosslyn and his collaborators (Kosslyn’s Image and Mind 
summarizes this work). The initial experiments concern figures with well delimited 
areas —like islands for example— where other appropriate figures of objects are 
placed; for example, in the case of the island, a hut, a well, a tree and a lake, set at 
varying distances in different directions. These experiments  found that the time for 
saying whether (a picture of) an object is present in the picture or not, when the 
subject is required to “fix the imagination” on a previously determined object in the 
area, increases with the distance between both objects. Here the experiments are also 
suggestive of the “picture-likeness” of the mental representation of the figures 
involved, but again, the issue of in what sense, if any, these representations are 
“picture-like” is left open. 
Now, a good guess at the difficulties involved in making the sense in which 
representations may be “picture-like” or pictorial precise can be made by looking into 
the problems of a simple proposal for explaining this sense, which at first would look 
promising. According to this proposal, a necessary condition for a representation's 
having a “picture-like” nature is that parts of what is represented —at least one of 
them— must be represented by parts in the representation. Other conditions could be 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
representations involved (cf. Block “Mental Pictures and Cognitive Science”, pp. 507-8). In any case 
the fact that they are similar does not imply in itself that there is a sense in which both are “picture-
like”. This remains true when not only experimental results but also theoretical considerations are 
taken into account. Thus, David Marr’s account of perception (cf. Vision) reveals representations —
called ‘21/2-D sketches’— that may be similar to representations postulated by cognitive theories of 
imagery like Kosslyn’s. But further considerations —mainly conceptual— must be made to link this to 
‘picture-likeness’. I pursue this issues in the context of the commentaries about Tye’s proposal below. 
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added to this as typical (although not strictly necessary) of pictorial representations: 
that some of the relations among parts of the representation, R, represent relations 
among the parts of what R represents, and that some relations between parts of R and 
the whole of R represent relations between the parts and the whole of what is 
represented. A view of pictorial representations along these lines underlies the work 
on imagery by Kosslyn, and several refinements have been advanced by Tye as 
proposals to make these ideas more precise (cf. The Imagery Debate, § 3.1).5 
 The proposal above may initially seem promising until we realize that we have 
“packaged” the difficultes with the original problem into the notion of a part of a 
representation, and indeed a representing part. In the problem of accounting for the 
sense in which representations have parts, and parts that, moreover, represent 
something, we might be facing difficulties like the ones we originally had. 
This issue can made clear for the purposes at hand by using certain computer 
representations and their processes as models of mental representations and processes. 
Take a matrix n squares wide and m squares high, drawn on a sheet of paper. If we fill 
in a certain number of squares, say nine, in the same colum by shading them with a 
pencil, and a smaller number of squares in the same row, say nine, symetrically on 
both sides of one of the squares of the column not too far from the top, say the third 
square in the column, we get (an image of) a (Latin) cross. If we take the filled arrays 
                                                
5 A very similar proposal is given by Block in his “Mental Pictures and Cognitive Science”, p. 513, but 
it is by no means endorsed by him because of difficulties like the one I am about to mention. Due 
precisely to these difficulties Block claims in the paper that fundamental difficulties lie ahead for 
cognitive science. However, I do not see that such difficulties follow, but I cannot enter into this matter 
here. 
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of squares to be a physical representation of a cross there is a clear sense in which we 
can talk of parts of the representation representing parts of the cross. So far, so good. 
But now think about how the information about which squares are filled and which 
are not (the information about the image, indeed) might be stored in the data base of a 
computer running a graphics programme. It may be that there is a set of sentences 
written in the format (l, k, 0) or (l, k, 1), where the letters l, k are schematic for 
numbers which identify a square by column and row, and the 1 and 0 signify, 
respectively, that the square at issue is filled or not filled. An appropriate set of 
sentences might contain information about a cross analogous to the one we drew 
originally. If the computer system is set appropriately the information contained in the 
set of sentences would be used to make the drawing of a cross appear in the computer 
screen. Thus, we can accept that the set of sentences is a representation of a cross. 
Now, is it true that some part(s) of the cross is or are represented by some part(s) 
of the representation? What is true is that parts of the cross are represented by subsets 
of the original set of sentences (triples). Thus, we seem to be confronted with two 
unpalatable options. One is to identify (in a rather ad hoc way, it must allowed) the 
parts of the representation with such subsets. But then we would be on our way to 
declaring the set of sentences itself to be a pictorial representation, which does not 
seem to make any sense. The other option is to disown altogether the claim that we 
have a pictorial representation at this stage —that is, without looking at the details of 
any possible refinements of the original proposal. 
Tye has proposed what seems prima facie a way out of this impasse. The 
suggestion is that the way mentioned is by no means the only possibility for 
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programmed computers to “hold” images. The following seems to be an alternative 
possibility. The images can be stored in the computer's long-term memory in as 
descriptional a way as you like (as a set of sentences or triples of the kind indicated). 
The computer system can be so set that when the description —the set of sentences— 
is “activated” in the course of running a programme, the computer enters into a state 
in which some units or “cells” —physical regions in the machine— are altered (by 
charging them in a certain way), the cells at issue being those identified by the 
individual sentences or triples in the list. Should we not begin to regard the set of 
activated cells as an image or pictorial representation? 
This seems to open up a new perspective, to which details could in principle be 
added if it really is found to be promising. As the author of the proposal says: “The 
crucial distinction is between, on the one hand, the sentences we use to describe 
various filled cells or the sentences the computer uses to identify certain cells to be 
filled and, on the other hand, the cells so described or identified” (Tye, The Imagery 
Debate, p. 47) 
And now from computers to humans. This should not be a difficult step in 
principle, since our interest in computers is as models of what may happen to us. 
Thus, we can be also seen to have “activated cells” —this time perhaps activated 
groups of neurons, one group per cell— representing the properties of an image. The 
details are discussed by Tye who turns to Marr’s 21/2-D sketches for inspiration. 
These are representations, postulated in Marr’s theory of visual perception, which 
contain certain information about patches on surfaces of a scene. Each 21/2-D sketch 
can be seen as an array of cells and for each patch on a surface of the scene there is a 
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cell in the 21/2-D sketch of the scene that contains information about its orientation 
and depth. In the case of imagery, Tye proposes representations with cells having 
information about similar properties of the images, adding other properties like 
colour, since images may be coloured (cf. op cit. § 5.4). The main difference between 
21/2-D sketches and the pictorial representations of imagery, apart from the details of 
the information carried by the cells, would then be the source of the representation. 
While in perception 21/2-D sketches are formed by the mechanisms of vision from the 
excitatory patterns in the retina, the pictorial representations of imagery are generated 
from long-term memory.6 
What is to be learned from Tye’s approach to pictorial (mental) representations 
about the sense in which mental images have a “picture-like” nature? Not much, I 
think. Indeed, it seems to me that an intuitive grasp of that sense is already 
presupposed in being disposed to judge a representation with the features postulated 
in Tye’s approach as ‘pictorial’, and hence, in an important sense, it cannot contribute 
to clarifying the sense in which images are intuitively regarded as “picture-like”. Let 
me explain. 
Pictures, particularly realistic, coloured pictures with resources allowing for 
perspective, represent something in a peculiar way. They are similar, we say, to the 
scenes pictured. It is not difficult to expand on the sense of this, even if it is difficult 
to capture this sense precisely: pictures represent figures by sharing shapes; in 
                                                
6 Tye regards it necessary to append a disambiguating sentence ‘This is an F’ to such representations 
which makes the image an image of an F (rather than one of, say, a G). I leave aside this aspect of the 
proposal because it is not relevant for the critical remarks I am about to level at Tye’s proposal. If 
anything, this aspect would confirm the features of Tye’s proposal that I find troublesome. 
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pictures things are represented as having spatial relations by means of identical or 
similar spatial relations between the figures that represent them; pictures may have 
colours just like things, and in fact much the same colours (we think). Thus, pictures 
could be taken to a certain extent to be the things pictured. Indeed, in some extreme 
cases we can be so taken by a picture, that we may in fact mistake the picture for a 
real scene. 
Now, we feel mental images represent things in much the same way as pictures do. 
And we are guided by this idea in trying to make the sense in which representations 
postulated by certain cognitive theories of imagery can count as pictorial 
representations precise. No wonder then that discussions about pictorial 
representations in cognitive theories do not help us in describing the sense in which a 
mental image is “picture-like”. 
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which such theories can contribute to our 
understanding of how it is that mental images are “picture-like”. Even if my short 
description has not given much of an inkling of it, Tye’s discussion of pictorial 
representation is to a very large extent driven by the attempt to account for the 
experimental and other empirically more accessible facts concerning imagery. This is 
clearly seen in Tye’s text. Indeed, in presenting his decisive objections to 
descriptionalist theories of imagination he resorts to experimental findings by Ronald 
Finke and Steven Pinker (cf. The Imagery Debate, p. 90), and before presenting his 
own version of the pictorialist theory, he rejects versions more directly inspired by 
Kosslyn by resorting to Pinker's experiments (cf. p. 85). 
Moreover, as even my quick review of Tye’s proposal indicates, his discussion 
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moves within the level of representation and algorithm. ‘Cells’, one of his central 
theoretical concepts, are functional units, and ‘filled cells’ —Tye’s most 
characteristic concept— are “symbols”, that is, representations. He makes some 
allusions to physical realizations, but in the main sections of the book, in which he 
discusses proposals by other theoreticians and advances his own, these serve only 
“local” clarificatory purposes. In short, if Tye is right, his is a contribution to some 
aspects of the explanation of empirical phenomena of imagery at Marr’s level 2. 
The way in which this contributes to our understanding of the “picture-likeness” 
of mental images is, I think, roughly as follows. Our naturally describing images as 
picture-like, trying to make out features of how they are intuitively felt, if it is not 
spurious, must be of some consequence for the explanation of the empirical 
phenomena of imagery. What we describe as holding and modifying “picture-like” 
mental images must find at least a partial, and to a large extent causal explanation in 
cognitive theories of imagery, in ways that should be made more precise. And if 
successful Tye’s proposal is a contribution to such theories; but it does not a 
contribute to our description of those mental images as “picture-like”. 
If this is correct, the sense in which perception is also picture-like cannot be much 
illuminated by an approach like Tye’s. His explanation of the similarities of (visual) 
perception and imagination proceeds at the same level as his discussion of pictorial 
imagery itself. Indeed, in Tye’s case this immediately follows from his taking Marr’s 
theory of perception —and, indeed, the “level 2” part of it— as his model for 
imagination. And it cannot by itself illuminate our intuitive ideas about the picture-
likeness of (visual) perception for the same reasons that his proposals about pictorial 
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representations do not contribute to clarifying the sense in which we describe mental 
images as similarly picture-like.7 
Quite a different approach to the explanation of pictorial likeness in mental 
representations comes from Shepard’s idea of “corresponding likenesses”, or as he 
calls it, ‘second-order isomorphism’. I quote a well known passage: 
 
[I]isomorphism should be sought—not in the first-order relation between (a) an 
individual object, and (b) its internal representation—but in the second-order relation 
between (a) the relations between alternative external objects, and (b) the relations 
among their corresponding internal representations. Thus, although the internal 
representation for a square need not itself be a square, it should (whatever it is) at least 
have a closer functional relation to the internal representation for a rectangle than to 
that, say, for a green flash or the taste of persimmon. 
 (Shepard and Chipman, “Second-Order Isomorphism of Internal 
Representations: Shapes of States”, p. 2) 
 
Although not incompatible with this, I do not find anything in Tye’s approach that 
picks up this idea of “second-order isomorphism”. The idea may strike us as 
attractive, but if we have learned from Tye’s case, we will not adopt it for the purpose 
of characterizing the sense in which both perception and imagination —mental 
images— are picture-like.8 On the contrary, a solution to this desideratum must come 
                                                
7 In her vigorous and most useful review of Tye’s book, Naomi Eilan shows her scepticism about 
relying on empirical theories for answering the question whether images are in any important respect 
like pictures, and criticizes Tye’s approach of trying to account for pictorialness in a way that is 
“restricted to issues of form (syntax)” (p. 138). Although neither what Eilan means by the latter terms 
nor the reasons for her scepticism are entirely clear to me, I hope that the foregoing can be taken as a 
(small) development of the stand she takes on Tye’s approach in her review. 
8 To my mind Campbell makes a false, unjustified step of this sort when he moves from talking of 
“propositional contents” to “propositional representations” (my italics), which immediately leads him 
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from an analysis of how “things seem to us” in perception (or imagination), for which 
we might perhaps find some inspiration from Shepard’s idea. I now turn to attempts 
to do this. 
 
 
6.2. Imagistic content and isomorphism 
 
If we want to make the picture-like trait of visual perception clear and 
concurrently try to clarify the way in which imagining an object or situation also has 
something of the nature of sketching a picture, it seems we must take as a basis “the 
way things seem to us” in perception and imagination. Thus, it appears that this “way 
things seem to us” has to be made to fit with some idea of resemblance. 
The most significant proposal along this path would seem to be that advanced by 
Peacocke in two very closely related papers: “Analogue Content” and “Perceptual 
Content”.9 In those, the distinctive way in which “things seem to us” in perception is 
accounted for by manners in which objects and properties, including magnitudes, are 
perceived. Furthermore, these manners are regarded as specifying the content of 
perceptual experiences, a kind of distinctive content which is qualified as analogue 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
to talk by way of contrast of pictorial representations and to look for support for the latter in the 
cognitive sciences (cf. “Sense, Reference and Selective Attention”, p. 56). This is the very same step 
that Peacocke conspicuously avoids in the way that will be seen in the next section. 
9 Although the first paper was published in 1986 and the second in 1989, the latter comes from a 
conference held in 1984, and there is also internal evidence that “Analogue Content” is in fact a 
revision of the first (and longest) part of “Perceptual Content”. For the most part I will quote from 
‘Analogue Content’. 
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content. Finally, the fitting of these contents with an idea of likeness or resemblance 
is accounted for through the idea of a certain type of “second-order isomorphism”. 
I regard Peacocke’s proposal as supplying the central “Fregean-oriented” account, 
in relation to which we can best discuss the issues involved in considering the 
intuitively felt “picture-like” nature of perception (and imagination), and the sense in 
which this trait is related to a distinctive kind of content. To my mind it also supplies 
the standard against which other approaches, including other accounts by Peacocke 
himself, are to be measured. 
Manners are first introduced by Peacocke quite straightforwardly: “Whenever 
someone perceives something —an object, a property, a magnitude— he perceives it 
in a particular way, or, as I shall say, in a particular manner” (“Analogue Content”, p. 
5) When objects and properties or magnitudes are perceived in the same manner on 
different occasions they are perceived to be the same. This is a minimal necessary 
condition on manners, which are therefore subject to the type-token distinction. What 
is the same on different occasions is the type, not the token: the same manner can be 
instantiated on different occasions and manners are, thus, repeatable traits of 
perceptual experiences. 
Manners of perception, says Peacocke (loc. cit. p. 6), can be described as 
analogue in a certain sense. Very roughly: manners are “dense” or “continuous”. 
More exactly, take a domain where there is some dimension of variation (e.g. size or 
pitch). For each two things (physical objects, sounds, properties, magnitudes) situated 
at different points along the dimension, there are different  manners m, m' of the same 
kind, such that m is either the manner in which the first thing (but not the second) is 
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perceived or the manner of perception of something which includes the first thing (but 
not the second), and m' is either the manner in which the second thing (but not the 
first) is perceived or the manner of perception of something which includes the 
second thing (but not the first) (ibid. p. 7). The alternatives in the formulation —
signified by the term ‘includes’— are meant to account for the fact that for any 
sensory modality and in any domain our perception has limitations of acuity, and 
hence the objects of perception are properly sets of properties or magnitudes which, 
given such limitations, we perceive as “matching”. 
I will not go into the discussion )which certainly exercises Peacocke) of how this 
sense of ‘analogue’ relates to other uses of the word here. For present purposes it is 
enough to record the fact that in the present sense the term ‘analogue’ is applied to 
some sort of content of mental states, while the most frequent uses in the literature 
apply either to  representations —especially the mental representations postulated by 
explanatory cognitive theories, or to processes —especially the mental processes 
contemplated by such theories. 
I will concentrate on a central property of such analogue contents (the manners): 
they are, in a sense, second-order isomorphic. In presenting this notion, Peacocke 
makes it clear that he is following the lead of Shepard’s notion —mentioned in the 
previous section— but he is careful from the start to avoid the sort of pitfall implied 
in directly transferring a notion meant to apply to the mental representations 
postulated by empirical cognitive theories of perception and imagination to the 
problem of clarifying the intuitive sense of resemblance that is at work in both cases. 
Thus, after the quote by Shepard and Chipman that I reproduced in the previous 
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section, he comments: 
 
The present paper is not about internal representations, claims about which need 
experimental investigations, constrained as they should be by their ability to explain 
empirical psychological phenomena. The present paper is concerned rather with the 
correct description of some of the more familiar phenomena themselves. 
(Peacocke, “Analogue Content”, p. 8) 
 
And it is then that he proceeds to introduce the idea of second order isomorphism. 
Since I will be discussing Peacocke’s idea of the kind of “second-order isomorphism” 
that is present in our intuitive sense of resemblance in some detail, I quote here in full 
the corresponding text: 
 
Consider manners of perception of directions. If one such manner is of a direction d 
and another is of a direction d', and d is sufficiently above d', then the perceiver will 
have the impression that the first direction is above the second direction. In the case of 
directions, this will hold for a range of spatial relations, not just that of being above; for 
other things presented by analogue contents, there will be a comparable range of 
relations. Here we have an isomorphism between some of the relations really holding 
between what the contents are of and the relations of which the subject has the 
impression that they hold between the perceived objects; in fact formulated that way, in 
successful perception, it is not just an isomorphism, it is an identity. 
(Loc. cit.) 
 
The first thing to note is that this notion of second order isomorphy adds 
something to the definition of manners as explained above. That definition restricted 
itself to the existence of different manners in which objects of perception are 
perceived, so that assuming perfect acuity for simplification when the direction of 
something, say, is different to the direction of something else, there is a manner in 
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which the first direction is perceived, and there is a different manner in which the 
second direction is perceived. But in that characterization nothing was said about the 
relation between these two manners. Now, what is added by the notion of second-
order isomorphism is a requirement of the relation between both manners. If this is 
the correct way to look at the characterization of manners,10 on top of responding to 
the criterion of existence that is set up by the definition of analogue contents these 
also comply with the criterion of relation between them encapsulated in the notion of 
second-order isomorphism. In fact, the latter criterion seems to be stronger, because if 
manners are related according to it, it seems they must satisfy the existence 
criterion.11 
Now, it is important to fully realize which, according to the relation criterion, are 
the cases where the relation that is claimed to exist between on the one hand, the 
relation between the things perceived, and on the other, the relation between the 
impressions the subject has of those things, is identity, and which the cases are where 
                                                
10 I am not able to discern Peacocke’s intention at this point: the relation criterion meant to be part of 
the sense of ‘analogue’ is or not? On the one hand, the text certainly reads as if the explanation of this 
sense is complete after the introduction of a modification to the definition I have explained, a 
modification motivated by the need to account for some special cases which need not concern us (ibid. 
p. 7). But, on the other hand, the introduction of the isomorphy criterion is prepared just after this and 
culminates a few lines afterwards, and, all this happens just before Peacocke proceeds to discuss how 
“the present sense of ‘analogue’ relate to others’ uses of the term˝ (p. 8). Be that as it may, whether 
part of the definition or not, the relation criterion between manners proves to be most important. 
11 In effect, take two “points” along a dimension such that the subject has the impression that one is 
“further along” it than the other —e.g. above the other. These “points” are then perceived by the 
subject in some manner (because of the definition of ‘manner’), and hence, due to the necessary 
condition on the identity of manners, the manners in which these “points” are perceived must be 
different. 
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such relations will differ from identity. In short, when are the relations between the 
respective objective and subjective relations identical and when are they merely 
“isomorphic”? The criterion given by Peacocke says that this division coincides with 
the division: successful versus unsuccessful perception. Let us pause to consider some 
examples to realize the implications more fully. 
First, take the relation between distances or lengths, which is very much like the 
relation between two directions. Assume that one length is sufficiently longer than the 
other (we say ‘sufficiently’ again to allow for limitations of perceptual acuity). If the 
subject perceives the lengths correctly, he will have the impression that this length is 
longer than the other. Moreover, this result may well be thought to apply to the 
distances themselves, since these can be regarded as relations between points or 
places: if two points are separated (and so related) by a certain distance, our 
impressions in successful perception will be that they are identically separated 
(related), or separated by the same distance. 
Let us now radically change our example and consider properties of sounds, like 
pitch. The case is now that if a sound has a frequency sufficiently higher than the 
frequency of a second sound, a subject will perceive it —if he does not suffer from an 
illusion— as higher in pitch than the second one. Should we then consider higher in 
frequency as literally the same relation as higher in pitch? This is exactly what the 
relation criterion, as formulated by Peacocke, says. But is it right in this case? How 
should one go into this matter? Prima facie, it does not seem from an intuitive 
standpoint that we should regard them as the same relation type at all. Yet I am 
unaware of deeper reasons why those relations should be regarded as non-identical. I 
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feel myself unable to enter into the discussion of the ontological issues that would be 
involved in trying to decide in a principled way about the (type-) identity of such 
relations at this point. So I will not take a definite stand against Peacocke’s criterion. 
Let us look at one final illustration of the criterion. If a certain colour is lighter 
(enough) than another one, and the subject is perceiving properly, he will have the 
impression that the first colour is lighter than the second. Again, the same relation is 
(postulated to be) involved here. This conclusion however does not seem to be so 
straightforwardly applicable to the colours as it does to the case of the distances. But 
we may note that the possibility of reaching it would be open —it seems— if we were 
prepared to regard colours as relations. 
At any rate, the picture that emerges from the relation criterion seems to be as 
follows: on one side are the properties, magnitudes and sounds that we perceive. 
These belong to different types: spatial properties (subdivided into direction, lengths 
etc.), other visual properties like colours, auditive properties (subdivided into 
frequency, intensity, etc.). On the other side are our impressions of such things, or the 
manners in which we perceive them; they too may be grouped into classes. There is 
then an isomorphy between the first types and the second classes, in that the 
properties of the things perceived and the ways in which they are perceived —relative 
directions of things, on the one hand and impressions of relative directions on the 
other— are isomorphic in the strict sense that relations among the first and relations 
among the second are identical.12 I will delay further discussion of this picture of the 
                                                
12 Or, at least, there is systematic correspondence among the variation in the properties, and 
modifications in the manners (cf. the case of frequency and pitch described above). 
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correspondence between the “ways” of perception —conceived as the imagistic or 
analogue contents specified as manners in this chapter— and the things perceived 
until the next chapter, once I have tried to clarify the relation between manners and 
the phenomenal aspects of perception. 
 
 
6.3. Imagistic content and phenomenal properties 
 
Peacocke regards the manners of the perception of objects and properties as 
accounting for the phenomenological aspects of perception; indeed, as what accounts 
for the kind of “individuation of the content of perception [that] is answerable to 
considerations of phenomenology in the first instance” (“Analogue Content”, p. 12). 
Matters of phenomenology in experience, however, were introduced to present day 
philosophy to a great extent through Thomas Nagel's reflections and his famous 
phrase: “What is it like?”. The question is now: how does Peacocke’s attempt at 
capturing phenomenology relate to this perspective? I will argue that it is sensible to 
regard manners as at least part of the phenomenal aspects of experiences in a sense 
which fits Nagel’s intentions and meaning. Moreover, to experience something in a 
certain manner should, it seems, be regarded as a phenomenal property of the 
corresponding experience, again in a Nagelean sense. 
For the present purpose, Nagel’s centrally relevant passage is this: 
 
[T]he fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is 
something it is like to be that organism [...] —something it is like for the organism. 
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(Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, p. 166) 
 
As can be seen, here Nagel is trying to describe what having experiences is in a 
general way or generically. And he associates constitutively this having experiences 
with the “subjective side” of what it is to be an organism. This is a general feature of 
his paper, since Nagel is interested in “the facts of experience —facts about what it is 
like for the experiencing organism” (op. cit. p. 172). 
In contrast to Nagel, we are presently interested in a Nagelean formulation that 
would try to capture the “subjective side” of a single experience (of a subject). But 
we find that there is no application of the “it is like” phrase to a particular experience 
in Nagel’s paper. Nevertheless, it does not seem unreasonable to make up one which 
seems to be at least very close to Nagel’s thought. What we are interested in, we 
should say, is what it is like for the subject when he/she is undergoing a particular 
experience. 
Now, we are more specifically concerned with perceptual experiences here. And 
we think that perceptual experiences are typically characterized, at least partially, by 
the fact that something is represented in them. By substitution in the phrase above we 
obtain the Nagelean formulation we were looking for by saying that for the view at 
issue there is something that it is like for the subject when he/she is perceptually 
representing things on a particular occasion. 
This formulation leaves open to determination the bearing the things represented 
may have on what it is like for the subject when he represents them mentally. This is 
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as it should be, since any further position on this issue needs more argument.13 
We can examine other formulations and compare them to see how they stand in 
relation to the Nagelean formulation, especially in regard to the respect mentioned. 
For convenience, I will them all in the form of questions (question (i) corresponds of 
course to the Nagelean formulation). 
 
(i) What is it like for subject S when he is perceptually representing X  on a 
particular occasion? 
(ii) How does X look to S? 
(iii) How does the thing X that S represents to himself look or seem to S? 
(iv) What is it like for S to represent X to himself?14 
                                                
13 In Sense and Content Peacocke argued that not all the phenomenal properties of experiences are 
possessed by these in virtue of the things —objects, properties, relations, states of affairs— those 
experiences represent (cf. pp. 8-26). Peacocke calls the theorists that hold the contrary view ‘extreme 
perceptualists’. He call the rest of the phenomenal properties ‘sensational properties’.  It is not clear 
how the distinction of these two kinds of phenomenal properties fares in relation to the new framework 
of non-conceptual content on which Peacocke worked after Sense and Content, and in particular in 
relation to manners.  
14 For simplicity, we may take X to stand for a single physical object in all these formulations, but in 
principle we might also take it to stand for a couple of objects, or for a single scene containing several 
objects. Formulations (iii) and (iv) are suggested in García-Carpintero (1999), p. 106. The reflexivity 
in them only seems to play the role of making a formulation shorter in terms of the perceptual 
experience S is undergoing (an experience which represents X). Formulation (ii) is perhaps suggested 
by the assertive formula (‘X looks F to S’) employed by Jackson in Perception for the “phenomenal 
use’ of ‘looks’ (cf. p. 33). Jackson claims indeed that there are at least two different uses of the verb 
‘looks’, a phenomenal and an epistemic one. Whatever it is with this semantic thesis, however, I must 
confess that I do not find the formula and the instances of it given by Jackson perspicuous for the 
purpose of revealing the phenomenal use, since it is not at all clear that the ‘F’ in it should not cover 
physical predicates, which would distort Jackson’s aim. See the main text immediately below. 
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Now, the interpretation of these questions is not clear as it is. We need to attend to 
the kind of answer they will receive. Take (ii) for example. We might think that an 
appropriate answer to this kind of question is of the form ‘X is F to S’, where ‘F’ 
ranges over predicates like ‘triangular’, ‘red’ or ‘longer than Y’. But these predicates 
seem to express physical properties of physical objects. These may be regarded as the 
properties of the perceived physical objects and events have if perception is taking 
place (if it is successful); in other words, the properties which the perceptual 
experience represents as instantiated in the objects and events at issue. Hence, if the 
predicates ‘F’ is meant to cover are physical predicates, in answering a query of the 
type (ii) as presently understood, one would be characterizing the experience S 
undergoes in terms of the properties represented by that experience. There is nothing 
wrong with this, as far as it goes. But someone who took such answers as the answers 
to queries about the subjective aspects of experience would clearly be taking an extra 
step: he would be, in effect, putting himself in the position of claiming that such 
aspects are exhausted by the representational properties of experience.15 And I do not 
want our question (ii) —nor any of the four questions above for that matter— to be 
interpreted so that they presuppose that this extra step should be taken. 
We may perhaps see what is at issue here in a different way. Take one of 
Peacocke's examples in (Sense and Content, p. 12). Someone is standing on a road 
which stretches from her in a straight line to the horizon. There is a tree at the 
                                                
15 This is the position taken by “extreme perceptualists” —in Peacocke’s denomination— like Tye in 
The Imagery Debate; cf. chapter 7. 
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roadside, one hundred yards from the person, and a second tree two hundred yards 
away, also at the roadside. Let us suppose that those trees are seen as equally tall —
the experience represents them as of the same physical height. Now, it seems that 
questions of types (ii) and (iii) can be readily interpreted so that from this information 
about how trees are seen we obtain straightforward answers to those questions. Take 
(iii) for example. We may well imagine this exchange taking place: 
 
A. How do the two trees that S represents to herself look or seem to  S? 
B. They look (seem) of equal height to S. 
 
But take now the corresponding question of type (iv). The following exchange 
does not seem out of place: 
 
A. What is it like for S to represent the two trees to herself? 
B. It is not the same for S to represent the first tree as it is to  represent the 
second tree. 
 
The difference at issue here is the one pointed out by Peacocke: the first tree 
occupies a larger portion of the visual field than the second tree (in the example it is 
assumed that the trees are at least similar in dimensions other than height). 
It seems that the Nagelean question (i), designed to ask about the subjective 
aspects of perceptual experiences is also meant to encompass such aspects as the one 
that differentiates the experience S has of one tree from the experience S has of the 
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other in the example mentioned. In this sense, type (iv) questions would seem to stand 
closer to type (i) questions. 
I am not claiming that it is not possible to interpret type (ii) and (iii) questions as 
we are presently interpreting type (iv) questions. On the contrary, I think they may be 
so interpreted. This can be made clear by using the handy word ‘way’. I think the 
following is a possible answer for appropriate questions of all these three types: 
 
(1) The way in which the first tree is represented is not the same as the way in 
which the second tree is represented. 
 
This seems similar to a corresponding (admittedly more strained) answer, to a type 
(i) question using the word ‘way’: 
 
(2) The way it is like for S when S is perceptually representing the first tree is 
different from the way it is like for her when she is representing the second 
one. 
 
Thus, it is not that type (i) and (iv) questions should be unequivocally grouped in 
opposition to type (ii) and (iii) questions. Rather, my discussion of questions (i)-(iv) 
is meant to make it clear that they do not have a single interpretation, and that we 
must be careful in determining how we understand them when inquiring about the 
phenomenal aspects of experiences. 
Now, how does this bear on Peacocke’s manners? First of all, some precaution 
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seems in order here. The semantic proximity of the words ‘way’ and ‘manner’, and 
the ease with which the formulations in (1) and (2) could be redone by substituting 
‘manner’ for ‘way’ might suggest a quite straightforward assimilation of Peacocke’s 
imagistic or analogue content with phenomenal aspects in the Nagelean tradition. But 
this would be too quick. I have already qualified the word ‘way’ as ”handy”. Too 
handy, in fact. 
We may confront the Peacocke of “Analogue Content” with his own example in 
Sense and Content. As it turns out, the visually perceived trees' matching in height is 
not sufficient for concluding that their height is perceived in the same manner. An 
additional match in other dimensions is not sufficient for concluding that their sizes or 
forms are perceived in the same manner. And an additional match of colours is also 
not sufficient for concluding that the trees themselves are perceived in the same 
manner. All this is due to the fact that, although matching is necessary for identity of 
manners, it is not sufficient (“Analogue Content”, pp. 5-6). But the reason that 
Peacocke gives for matching not being sufficient has to do with reasons of limitation 
of perceptual acuity, which are responsible for the nontransitivity of matching (cf. loc. 
cit.). Thus, we are left in the dark about whether Peacocke would still contemplate a 
different source for the non-sufficiency of matching. In other words, we do not know 
whether he would still regard a factor like the one mentioned above —the difference 
in the portions of the visual field occupied by the respective trees— as a relevant 
factor in the new theoretical context, that is, as a factor to be reckoned with in 
differentiating the content of the experiences at the level of manners. 
But, whatever the case is with Peacocke himself, I cannot see any prima facie 
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reason why the contents he tries to highlight should not involve this additional factor. 
And if we admit this we will in fact be allowing imagistic or analogue contents, more 
or less as they become definite in Peacockean manners, to constitute at least part of 
the phenomenal aspects of the Nagelean tradition. 
Moreover, if we were prepared to regard these phenomenal “aspects” as bona fide 
properties of experiences, and if we were prepared to use the traditional term ‘qualia’ 
to cover all these phenomenal properties,16 I do not think that it will be wrong to 
cover Peacockean manners with the traditional name of ‘qualia’ as well. 
 
 
6.4. Attention, phenomenal aspects  
and demonstrative intentional content 
 
Perception has a distinctive phenomenal character; of course, each sense modality 
carries with it its own distinctive phenomenology. What seeing something is like is 
clearly different to what hearing something is like. Nevertheless, perception as a 
whole presents a distinctive character when compared to thought, at least when 
thought is not underpinned by images or perception itself. The contrast is akin to that 
between understanding the thoughts or propositions that the speaker conveys to us 
when reporting the news on TV, and seeing images of the reported events. 
In the previous section we found reasons to include imagistic and/or analogue 
                                                
16 That is to say, this use of the term ‘qualia’ does not presuppose that it is not applied to a property of 
an experience if the experience has the property somehow in virtue of what it represents. 
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contents among the phenomenal aspects of perception. Moreover, I suggested the use 
of the contemporary traditional designation for these aspects —namely, ‘qualia’— 
which would then include such contents in the way indicated. What I still want to 
leave open is the question about the relation of these qualia to the representational 
properties of perceptual experiences. I have claimed that we should not assume 
without further argument that the subjective aspects of experience are to be accounted 
for entirely by such representational properties of perceptual experiences. I might 
even have hinted at the surmise that the phenomenal aspects of perceptual experience 
cannot be reduced to representational properties of it. But I have not taken a definite 
stand on the relationship between both things —phenomenal aspects and 
representational properties of experiences—  and to recall this I will continue to use 
the words ‘phenomenal aspects’ instead of the more connotative ‘qualia’ 
occasionally. (I will have to commit myself to one or the other when considering a 
possible charge of internalism in the next chapter.) 
Now, in visually attending to an object, in auditively attending to a sound, or in 
the tactile exploration of the surfaces of objects we find, respectively, the same 
distinctive phenomenal character as in visually perceiving the object, in auditively 
perceiving the sound or in perceiving the surfaces of objects by touch.17 This much 
                                                
17 The link between attention and phenomenal aspects is somewhat reinforced by the considerations 
made when subjecting empirical work on attention to analysis in the last section of the previous 
chapter, at least, if we were prepared to make stronger commitments to these phenomenal aspects. 
Indeed, I claimed there that the phenomenal aspects or qualia of folk psychology and conceptual 
analysis and the #features# of cognitive theories of attention correspond to each other by their 
functional roles, the main —or only— difference being in the fine grainedness with which such 
functional role is characterized. Thus, when we say that, at least for certain cognitive theories of 
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would be obvious, of course, if attending to objects or sounds is essential to a way of 
perceiving them. And I think we can safely assume this, although this assumption is 
not strictly necessary to the claim about the phenomenal aspects of attention just 
made.18 
Consider now what these thoughts lead to when we put them in the context of our 
main conjecture (formulated in Chapter 3, §1; cf. also Chapter 4, §1) that (perceptual) 
attention to an object is constitutive of the perceptual demonstrative intentional 
content of a perceptual state directed at that object or a perceptual belief about that 
object: we reach the conclusion that phenomenal consciousness of an object —in a 
sense in which this involves phenomenal aspects is (constitutively) required for the 
perceptual demonstrative intentional content of a perceptual state directed to that 
object. 
Let me make this inference clearer in the following way: 
 
(1) (Perceptual) attention to an object is constitutive of perceptual demonstrative 
intentional content of a perceptual state directed at that object. 
(2) Phenomenal aspects are necessarily involved in (perceptual) attention. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
attention in cognitive psychology, attention also has phenomenal aspects or that in attention qualia 
are instantiated, we are claiming something that bears very close relationship with the corresponding 
claim based on conceptual analysis of folk psychology. Nevertheless, for current purposes I do not 
need to appeal to the results of the previous chapter. 
18 In Perception, pp. 26, 27, Jackson claims that we “may see something without noticing it” (p. 26), 
and that “being conscious of seeing a tomato [say] involves seeing a tomato”, so that the question 
about what it is to be conscious of seeing a tomato “presuppose[s] what it is to see a tomato” (p. 27). 
This might be so. But the kind of awareness of objects that is involved in perceptually attending to 
them comes short of the reflexive consciousness involved in the states Jackson mentions. 
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_______________________________________________ 
(3) Phenomenal aspects are constitutively involved in perceptual demonstrative 
intentional content. 
 
I think that some independent plausibility for the claim made in the conclusion of 
this inference comes from the well known phenomenon of blindsight, that is the 
existence of people who lack vision directed at a part of the visual field, subjects who 
sincerely deny that they are able to see anything there, but who when experimenters 
insist in that they make a conjecture about the situation of objects or lights in the 
blind field are found to be right in a proportion which is significantly higher than 
chance19. 
In this phenomenon of blindsight, I think that attention, the absence of the relevant 
phenomenal aspects in the subject’s experiences, and the lack of perceptual 
demonstrative intentional contents go together. It is quite obvious that blindsight 
patients lack the phenomenology of vision when they make their conjectures about 
objects in the blind field. It is also widely agreed that they cannot be properly said to 
visually perceive or see the object or light at issue (something that is presumably 
connected with the former fact). It is perhaps not so frequently remarked that they 
cannot be properly said to attend (perceptually) to an object. Certainly, in trying to 
                                                
19 The classical reference for experimental details is Lawrence Weiskrantz, Blindsight: A Case 
Study and Implications (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). Ned Block in ‘On a Confusion About a 
Function of Consciousness’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (1995), pp. 227-87, addresses 
interesting questions about consequences of blindsight in relation to our understanding of 
consciousness. 
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make the conjectures that are required of them, they are attentive in some sense: they 
are not distracted and they direct their eyes purposefully to a region of the 
surrounding space. Nevertheless, they cannot be said to attend perceptually to the 
objects as neither can they be said to see the objects or lights at issue. 
What should be added to the foregoing is that blindsight people are unable to 
demonstratively address themselves objects or lights. Indeed, there may be little 
doubt that such subjects lack the capacity to point to an object and say ‘That is in 
front, on the right’ or ‘That is such and such’ (and of course it is not a linguistic 
deficiency which is involved here). 
Certainly, these remarks fall short of providing a full independent justification for 
the conclusion of the inference, but they seem to suggest an intimate connection 
between the phenomenal aspects in perception on the one hand and attention and 
demonstrative content on the other.  
The conclusion of the above inference states quite generally that phenomenal 
aspects are (constitutively) involved in perceptual demonstrative intentional content, 
but it does not say anything about how they are involved in it. In the next section I 
will examine a partial answer to this question, one which I do not think is on the right 
track, and this will give us a basis for a new attempt to develop an account of the 
relationship between phenomenal aspects and perceptual demonstrative modes of 
presentation in the next chapter. 
 
 
6.5. An attempt at “separating” demonstrative contents 
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and imagistic or phenomenal contents 
 
We have seen that phenomenal aspects are essentially involved in perceptual 
demonstrative intentional content and the issue now is to find out how they are 
involved. Our central point of interest is how perceptual demonstrative modes of 
presentation are related to phenomenal aspects. 
Everything we have said about the involvement of phenomenal aspects in 
perceptual demonstrative intentional content in the previous section points to the 
acceptance of what I will call Peacocke’s thesis: Phenomenal aspects contribute to the 
individuation of the perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation of objects and 
properties (including magnitudes). 
If phenomenal aspects contribute to individuation, one (extreme) possibility is that 
this is due to the possibility that those aspects could be identified with perceptual 
demonstrative contents. Peacocke investigated the matter rather thoroughly with 
manners acting as the phenomenal aspects at issue, and concluded that those 
phenomenal aspects —the manners— were not in one-to-one correspondence with 
such demonstrative modes of presentation, and so, a fortiori, were not identical with 
them (“Analogue Content”, p. 12; “Perceptual Content” p. 310). Indeed, according to 
Peacocke, “manners of perception constitute a genuine level of content in their own 
right” (ibid. respectively pp. 9 and 306). 
Peacocke’s argument for these latter claims uses a sort of inverted Müller-Lyer 
situation (cf. ibid, pp. 10-11 and 307-310, respectively): two “segments” (a column 
and the side of a window, a line and a bar on a wallpaper pattern), which are 
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approximately the same length and which moreover are perceived as if they are the 
same length, although the perceiver suspects that they are in fact not  the same length 
(not even to a degree of approximation whithin which the subject is able to 
discriminate).20 In the case at hand Peacocke assumes that the lengths at issue are 
perceived in exactly the same manner. But he reasons that because of what the 
perceiver suspects the modes of presentation of the lengths must be different, since 
modes of presentation are essentially governed by Frege’s criterion (as the context 
makes clear, Peacocke is thinking specifically of demonstrative modes of presentation 
as the best chance for his thesis's opponent). Applying the criterion to the present 
case, if the lengths were presented through the same mode of presentation, the 
thought that both lengths are the same —‘This lenght is the same as that lenght’— 
should be uninformative. However, in the imagined situation, that thought would be 
anything but uninformative since the perceiver in fact suspects it to be false. Since the 
manners are thought to be the same, but the (demonstrative) modes of presentation 
involved could not possibly be identical, it follows that these are not in one-to-one 
correspondence and hence they cannot be identical. 
Now, any claim that such-and-such class of things correspond on a one-to-one 
basis with such-and-such class of things can be denied in either of two different ways 
(or in both ways simultaneously): either   more than one thing in the second class 
corresponds to one and the same thing in the first, or more than one thing in the 
second class corresponds to one and the same thing in the first, or both. As we can 
                                                
20 Taking into account the limitations in the subject's perceptual capacities adds a complication which 
is not relevant to the argument, so, I will largely ignore talk of approximation while discussing 
Peacocke’s argument. 
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see, Peacocke’s argument denies one-to-oneness by arguing in favour of one specific 
possibility: two different (demonstrative) modes of presentation can correspond to 
one and the same manner. Hence, (demonstrative) modes of presentation cannot 
supervene on manners; thus, while manners play a role in the individuation of 
(demonstrative) modes of presentation (Peacocke’s thesis), the bond between them is 
a weak one. According to this view manners cannot be constitutive of perceptual 
modes of presentation. 
However, it does not seem to me that we should accept that the manners can be 
identical in the kind of case adduced by Peacocke while the modes of presentation in 
a perceptual judgement are different. My reason for saying this is not that we really 
know what conditions are implied in the identity of two Peacockean manners and that 
we can see that those conditions also suffice for the identity of modes of presentation, 
because, to begin with, it is not clear what the sufficient conditions for the identity of 
manners are.21 But if the manners are identical, the lengths must seem visually as to 
                                                
21 Taking into account the non-transitivity of matching for apparent magnitudes has the consequence that, at least for the case of magnitudes. matching 
exactly the same things —the Goodmanean criterium— does not suffice for identity of manners. Take apparent length, for example. Let l1 and l2 be 
two lengths such that, for any length which the subject perceives as matching l1, she also perceives it to match l2. Applying the Goodmanean criterion, 
the corresponding manners, µ1, µ2, should be identical, as should be manners µ2, µ3, when this last corresponds to a third length l3, such that 
everything that matches l3 as things seem to the perceiver also matches l2. Because of the transitivity of the identity, we then have µ1 = µ3. As is well 
known, however, l1 and l3 need not match in length according to how the things seem to the perceiving subject. And, if they do not, µ1 ≠ µ3. The 
contradiction shows that the sufficiency criterion is wrong. (Cf. “Perceptual Content”, p. 303: “We know from the nontransitivity of matching that this 
necessary condition of identity of manner cannot also be sufficient”.) 
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be patently the same to the subject. If this is the situation, I fail to see how the 
perceiver  can spontaniously doubt, much less thoughtfully suspect, the lengths to be 
different. If she suspects or doubts that they are different she must have some sort of 
grounds for the suspicion or doubt. Perhaps she knows or believes that the concrete 
situation of perception makes one prone to illusion in perceiving lengths; or perhaps 
she has the general information —or believes it to be a fact— that she is unusually 
unreliable at visually estimating distances. However, in any of these and similar 
cases, her judgement “This distance [the line’s distance] is  not likely to be the same 
as that [the bar’s] distance” is not a perceptual judgement, but a judgement made 
(partly) on the basis of an inference from what she knows, or thinks she knows. Put 
positively, as far as the content of the subject's perceptual state is such that the 
identity of lengths is manifest to her, and her state is isolated from interference from 
other contents, it should play a role akin to the judgement “This distance is the same 
as that distance”. Thus, I do not think that Peacocke has successfully argued that 
manners “are distinct from the components which enter the content of judgements 
based on perceptual experience” (“Analogue Contents”, p. 9). 
Peacocke provided a rationale for this putative distinction: 
 
The distinctess of the contents of perception at the level of manners from the contents 
of attitudes seems ultimately to derive from the different demands made by the two very 
different notions which individuate the two kinds of content. Individuation of the content 
of perception is answerable to matters of phenomenology in the first instance, while the 
content of attitudes is answerable to matters of epistemic possibility —and these two 
notions can come apart. 
(Peacocke, “Perceptual Content”, p. 314) 
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Our criticism of his argument suggests a revision of the rationale. Maybe such two 
forms of answerability are after all more intimately linked than Peacocke’s line of 
reasoning suggests. Finding more about this is a task also facing us. 
In the work under scrutiny here, Peacocke concentrates on manners of properties 
—mostly magnitudes— and in their relation to their putative demonstrative modes of 
presentation of them, and I have followed his lead in this section. But in this 
dissertation we are primarily interested in the perceptual presentation of objects, and 
so it is primarily manners of presentation of objects that interest us. Or rather, since 
Peacocke’s remarks on this issue are so scant that we cannot decide with a reasonable 
degree of certainty what his thinking about manners in circumstances that interest us 
would be, what interests us is the way in which our own representatives of imagistic 
or phenomenal aspects are involved in the individuation of perceptual demonstrative 
modes of presentation of objects. At this point our criticism of Peacocke’s argument 
suggests that, at the very least, perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation 
supervene over phenomenal aspects. I will examine this matter in the next and final 
chapter of the dissertation. 
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Chapter 7: Attention, Consciousness and Perceptual 
Demonstrative Thought 
 
 
 
7.1. Bringing phenomenal properties closer 
to propositional content 
 
In this section I will sketch a proposal for making phenomenal properties play a 
role in the determination of the propositional content “linked to” perception, which, 
as I hope will become clear, can be seen as a development of the “Searlean proposal” 
I suggested in section 1 of Chapter 4. My purpose is for the outline of this proposal to 
act as a foil to the development of my own proposal, as introduced in the first sections 
of Chapters 3 and 4. 
As we saw in Chapter 3 Searle himself made a proposal for the whole intentional 
content of the perceptual states or perceptual judgements which are the focus of our 
interest. As we know, the most clearly underdeveloped aspect of Searle’s proposal 
came from the fact that it was formulated with the help of a demonstrative expression 
apparently referring to an experience, while Searle does not explain how such 
experience should be conceived in detail, nor what the nature of this apparent 
reference to it was. As we saw —§ 4 of that chapter— McDowell suggested that the 
‘demonstrative’ element in Searle’s proposal should not be understood, as a reference 
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to anything at all, but as signalling the fact that some kind of access to the current 
experience was being postulated in the proposal, indeed something which he 
described as an access to it “simply in virtue of being enjoyed”. 
I now want to build on the phenomenal aspects of experience discussed in the 
preceeding chapters to give some details both on what perceptual experiences are and 
what this enjoyment of experiences amounts to. To this end I will use the notion of a 
quale as a qualitative property of experiences. The usual view of qualia holds them to 
be intrinsic qualities of experiences, where the word ‘intrinsic’ is given an 
internalistic reading. This view would certainly fit Searle's internalistic leanings 
(mentioned in section 3 of Chapter 3) and so it would be fitting to use them in 
developing a “Searlean proposal”. However, as I also want to use qualia in the 
development of my own externalistic proposal, I will leave open the possibility that 
they may be coherently conceived as non-intrinsic in that sense in this section 
proceeding to examine this possibility in the next. 
Another element which I will use here is the idea of “second-order isomorphism” 
that we saw in the last chapter, but giving to it a more definite and committed twist. 
There are certain obscurities contained in this notion and as I see it the idea is very 
similar, if not identical, to Frank Jackson’s idea of functional dependency, even if this 
idea has been developed within the framework of a sense-data (internalist) theory of 
perception while Peacocke’s notion of “second-order isomorphy” was inspired by 
developments in the cognitive sciences (cf. § 2 of the previous chapter). 
In Chapter 7 of his book Perception, Jackson argued that a key condition for 
perception —he was talking more specifically of visual perception— is roughly that 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
the properties of a sense-datum, of which the subject is aware, are functionally 
dependent on the properties of an object as a consequence of the way in which an 
event involving this object causes the subject to have the sense-datum at issue. The 
properties of sense-data are exactly the qualia we are ready to discuss, and the more 
fully-developed idea of functional dependency seems to be as follows. 
On the one side, there are the “manifest” or observable properties of the physical 
objects that we perceive (basically various kinds of spatial properties and colours). 
These are systematically divided into classes and systematically related within each 
class, forming “spaces” of properties. On the other side there are the qualia which are 
properties of our perceptual experiences. They too may be grouped into classes and 
form spaces.1 The spaces of corresponding properties —say, colour properties and 
                                                
1 For the procedures and techniques for the configuration of such spaces cf. Austen Clark’s Sensory 
Qualities, Chapters 4 and 5. I do not find a clear differentiation of the manifest or observable 
properties in things or the corresponding phenomenal properties in experiences in Clark. Whether such 
properties are different is, indeed, a disputed question; Jackson himself maintains that they are the 
same (cf. op. cit. pp. 74-81 and 103), while, I certainly believe that it is very difficult to swallow the 
proposition that colour properties of things are the very same properties as colour qualia. We normally 
conceive of colours as being “in the things”, and analysis can keep this view even if we come to 
conceive of colours as dispositional properties of things —dispositions to refract light in different 
ways— affecting us in definite ways. On the other hand, colour qualia are qualities in our experience 
of things. Certainly, in the dispositional view, our effects come into the definition of colours, but these 
definitions do not consist entirely of our effects, something which is the case for colour qualia. Also, in 
a physicalist development of these views both properties are as different, the first ones being 
reflectance properties of things causing determinate neurophysiological reactions, while the second 
would consist of neurological states of our brains. I do realize, however, that I have stepped on very 
difficult terrain here. It seems as if the spatial properties of things and the spatial-qualia have clearer 
chances of being regarded as (type) identical. But again, the ontological issues here are difficult, and I 
would not like to commit myself to any definite stance on this issue. The general idea of a 
correspondence —more or less of the sort indicated— between the “field of sensations” and the range 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
colour qualia— are roughly isomorphic in the sense of there being systematic 
structural correspondences between them. 
The old empiricist idea of the “resemblance” between our sense impressions and 
the properties of things is thus captured by the idea of systematic correspondence —
functional dependence, second-order isomorphy— between observable properties and 
qualia; or at least this is the intention of the philosophers propounding this idea. I do 
not think that I can avoid committing myself to a version of the latter idea, even if 
trying to ascertain exactly which goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Traditional theories of sense-data such as Moore’s have conceived these as mental 
particulars in the category of objects, and Jackson follows this line. It might be more 
plausible to regard a sense-datum as a particular sensory event.2 These are 
characterized by their properties: the instantiated qualia phenomenically 
characterizing the consciousness of an individual subject —in particular an individual 
perceiver— at a moment in time. 
Making use of this apparatus García-Carpintero has tentatively advanced a 
specific proposal for the intentional content of perceptual states. Suppose, for 
example, that the perceptual state or perceptual experience is one that we would 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
of observable properties seems to be an old one. In contemporary philosophy it appears in Husserl in a 
version where the place of properties seems to be occupied by tropes or “moments” (cf. § IV of 
Mulligan’s study of Husserl’s theory of perception for an exposition and for references). I take the 
particular version in the text from García-Carpintero (2000a), pp. 73-74, 80-82. García-Carpintero may 
have modified some aspects of his views on these issues later. 
2 García-Carpintero sometimes marks this move by using the German term ‘Erlebnis’ —a term used by 
philosophers such as Husserl and Carnap— instead of ‘sense datum’ or the more indeterminate 
‘sensory event’. 
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intuitively describe as having the content that there is a medium-sized pink cube one 
foot in front (of the subject, say S). Then: 
 
[T]he truth-condition constitutive of the intentional content of E (and determining that E 
is indeed a perceptual experience, as oppossed to a merely apparent one) is fixed in this 
way: (i) S is related, by a (typically) non-intentional relation of phenomenal awareness, to 
a complex sensory event as of #medium-sized# #pink# #cube# #in-front#, and (ii) the 
truth-condition of E is realized if and only if the event causing E is of a type of events 
actually being in a causal-explanatory relation, in normal conditions, to sensory events 
phenomenally experienced by S as of #medium-sized# #pink# #cube# #in-front#. 
(“Putnam’s Dewey Lectures”, p. 216.3 Italics in the original). 
 
We can distinguish at least three elements in this theoretical specification of the 
intentional content of the perceptual state or experience. First, the purely 
representational element given by the fact that the state at issue represents things 
correctly when the event causing it is of some specified sort. Second, the way of 
cognitive access element, given by the subject’s relation to the sensory event or 
Erlebnis, a relation of awareness which García-Carpintero conceives as non-
intentional and which he calls ‘noticing’ in other writings (García-Carpintero (2000a), 
p. 74). The two are linked in the truth-condition which determines the sort of event 
represented, when things go well, by the relation which García-Carpintero calls a 
“causal-explanatory” relation. However, this should not be thought of as a mere 
causal-explanatory relation because, as we already know, it holds between events —
                                                
3 In the formulation quoted the author uses Peacocke’s prime convention for referring to phenomenal 
properties. Here I have substituted García-Carpintero’s own version of that convention (as explained in 
Chapter 5 § 4). 
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“external” events and sensory events— which are systematically related by a relation 
of “resemblance”, that is, by the kind of isomorphism or functional dependency 
mentioned above. For this reason the third element in the proposal could be called the 
external significance element. 
I will discuss several aspects of García-Carpintero’s position, especially those 
concerning the second element of his proposal —the awareness of qualia and the 
character of the qualia of which the subject is thus aware— in the next section, when 
dealing with the issue of which aspects of those ideas I will incorporate to my own 
proposal. My concern now is whether a proposal about the demonstrative trait  of 
much of our perceptual awareness with objects in perception can be formulated from 
this proposal about the intentional content of an experience, or from a (natural) 
development of it. For this purpose, I will assume here that there is no problem in 
attributing awareness of a sensory event or a quale to perceivers, even awareness of a 
sort that could be described as being had “simply in virtue of enjoying it”, to use 
McDowell’s words. If we have a satisfactory explanation of the awareness of sensory 
events or qualia it might be thought that we would have the only key element that was 
missing for the development of a proposal along the lines of the Searlean viewpoint as 
explained in section 1 of Chapter 4 —a “Searlean proposal”, so to speak— to explain 
the demonstrative character of perception. 
García-Carpintero explicitly claims that “experienced phenomena can [serve] as a 
sort of ‘modes of presentation’ which contribute to determining the objective contents 
of perceptions and other mental states” (“Putnam’s Dewey Lectures”, p. 215). The 
issue is then how we are to understand exactly the way in which such “experienced 
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phenomena” can serve as a (sort of) mode of presentation of a physical object in 
perception, for the specific case that interests us: a demonstrative mode of 
presentation, and I see a difficulty here which I will now try to explain. 
Recall that the relation with a particular sensory event plays a key role in García-
Carpintero’s proposal for the intentional content of an experience. Thus, by the way 
the intentional content has been intuitively characterized in the example used in his 
definition, one should not be mistakenly led to think that such intentional content, 
described from the subject S's point of view, could be modelled by the sentence: 
 
(1)There is a pink cube of medium size one foot in front of me. 
 
It is rather sentence (2) which might serve as a model here: 
 
(2) There is a pink cube of medium size one foot in front of me causing this 
sensory event (noticed by me). 
 
At this point it would be not completely unreasonable to say: here we have an 
answer to the question of what it is for an experience to demonstratively present an 
object in perception. This would run as follows: take E, the perceptual state alluded to 
in the description of García-Carpintero’s tentative proposal above. For E to 
demonstratively present an object is for it to have an intentional content which is 
roughly modeled by (2) and is theoretically explained by the definition quoted above 
(García-Carpintero’s definition). 
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This answer would, I believe, be sufficient to fulfil a strong desideratum García-
Carpintero himself seems to accept for the intentional content of a perceptual 
experience: 
 
Evans and McDowell have notoriously contended that the content of a claim involving 
demonstratives and other indexicals is individuated in part relative to the significations of 
the indexicals in it. A claim made with a sentence featuring the same “purely qualitative” 
meaning might nonetheless be a different claim [...] Analogously, an account of 
perception which subscribes to the characteristic tenets of representative theories is 
nonetheless free to claim that the perceived object is an essential element in the 
individuation of the content of perceptual experiences. 
 (“Searle on Perception”, p. 35) 
 
Although the text is not entirely clear —at least to me— on this point, it would 
seem that the analogy of the perceptual case with the semantic case which is made 
here is also meant to embrace the case of a perceptual experience with a different 
object which is qualitatively alike. If this is correct, García-Carpintero’s proposal 
seems to fulfil the desideratum since a different object, however qualitatively alike, 
would imply a different experience, and a different experience —again, no matter 
how qualitatively alike— would imply a different content, since according to the 
proposal the intentional content of the experience is responsible to the experience 
itself (to its quantity, so to speak, not only to its quality). 
But even if the proposal satisfied the strong externalist requirement mentioned, 
our problem seems to remain unsolved. It appears that there is something lacking in 
the explanation of exactly how the proposal can be up to the task. For García-
Carpintero holds that unlike the case of Peacocke’s manners the intentional content of 
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a perceptual experience is not separate from the perceptual judgement, but it is rather 
the qualitative or phenomenal character of the experience which contributes to the 
characteristic kind of intentional content of the experience and the judgement alike, 
by constituting the subject's “modes of presentation” or cognitive perspective in both 
cases. Specifically, it would seem, that a judgement is articulated into components 
with their own content, and an experience contributes to the content of those 
components with its phenomenal or qualitative character. According to García-
Carpintero, it is in virtue of this contribution that the modes of presentation of objects 
are both tacit and analogue in perceptual judgements. 
 
The “modes of presentation” of the objects and manifest properties represented in those 
judgements (modes of presentation in which the experiences themselves play the 
fundamental role) differ from those involved in other beliefs in at least two aspects: they 
are tacit (they can be possessed in the absence of the capacity of verbally articulating their 
nature in an explicit way, their nature being, moreover, ... partially ineffable), and they are 
analogue (they represent in virtue of specifically spatial and temporal resemblances). 
These maybe are reasons to deem the constituents of perceptual judgements different in 
relevant aspects to the constituents of other judgements, and perhaps to single them out by 
calling them ‘percepts’, while reserving the term “concepts” for the second. 
 (“Las razones para el dualismo”, pp. 86-87, footnote 39) 
 
 Thus, according to García-Carpintero, thanks to the role played by the 
experiences (the Erlebnisse? their notings?) modes of presentation in perceptual 
judgements (and in the intentional contents of the experiences themselves) are tacit 
(due to the way in which they are accessible), and analogue (on the basis of the 
isomorphisms existing between the qualitative spaces of phenomenal properties and 
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the qualitative spaces of manifest properties)4. What we do not know is exactly what 
role the experience plays in constituting the mode of presentation. 
One obvious prima facie possibility here would be that the mode of presentation is 
a sort of qualia conglomerate, the relevant qualia being those instantiated in the 
corresponding sensory event. But this would not do, since it would give a “purely 
qualitative” content which does not seem adequate for making a contribution to the 
whole intentional content of the judgement or experience in a way that gives this an 
opportunity to change if the perceived object were different but caused qualitatively 
identical impressions. In short, trying for this solution does not seem compatible with 
the “claim that the perceived object is an essential element in the individuation of the 
content of perceptual experiences” (cf. the above quotation from “Searle on 
Perception”).5 
Thus, I do not see how a natural development of the elements introduced by 
García-Carpintero to account for the intentional content of perceptual states could 
yield an acceptable proposal about the “demonstrative character” of much of 
perception, even if these elements were used in conjunction with Searle’s ideas to tie 
                                                
4 García-Carpintero’s talk of “specifically spatial and temporal resemblances” here is not, I believe, to 
be given a special significance, given what I explained when talking about the isomorphisms between 
the spaces of qualities above. 
5 I suspect that this problem has something to do with the fact that understanding the predication of a 
property to an object in a verbally expressed perceptual judgement does not require attending to that 
particular property but only having the general capacity of being able to focus on it, while 
understanding the perceptual reference to an individual object requires specific attention to that object. 
This contrast, which is fundamentally not linguistic, is alluded to in Campbell’s “Sense, Reference and 
Selective Attention”, p. 58. 
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perceptual intentional content to the token perceptual experience undergone by a 
perceiving subject. (Of course, no criticism of any position García-Carpintero has 
actually held follows from this.) 
 
 
7.2. Qualia as non-fully intrinsic properties 
 
In the previous section we looked at a proposal for the intentional content of an 
experience which involves sensory events and phenomenal properties. And in section 
4 of the last chapter we saw reasons for thinking that phenomenal aspects were 
involved in demonstrative phenomenal content, but hesitated to raise those vague 
“aspects” to the status of properties. This hesitation came about because I was 
proceeding slowly, following in the steps of theories of intentional content, like 
Peacocke’s based on manners, which did not overtly embrace phenomenal properties 
or qualia. However, as we shall see the commitments of the proposal to be presented 
in the next section about how phenomenology is involved in perceptual demonstrative 
modes of presentation are not less than those in the proposal about the intentional 
content of experience with which we dealt in the last section. Hence, I feel it is time 
to make clear what those commitments are. This is also independently required by the 
tentative remarks in the last sections of Chapter 5 about the functional role of qualia, 
which were the bases for their partial “assimilation” to the #features# postulated in 
empirical theories of attention like Treisman’s. 
Nevertheless, even a reasonably detailed sketch of an overall theory of the 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
phenomenology of perceptual experience is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Because of this, I hope to succeed in highlighting only those aspects that clarify my 
commitments just enough to locate my position, even if this involves some 
simplification. One major simplification upon which I will comment at the outset but 
will not mention further concerns the fact that in focussing on qualia I might easily  
give the impression that I think phenomenal properties are atomistic elements and that 
the phenomenology of perception consists to a great extent of the instantiation of such 
elements.  I wish to disclaim any involvement with this overly simplistic view here.6 
To concentrate on what fundamentally interests us, in section 3 of Chapter 6 we 
saw reasons for including the representational properties of experiences —or at least 
those of which the subject can be aware— among the phenomenal aspects of 
experience, and now that we are ready to talk of phenomenal properties or qualia 
there seems no reason not to include those properties among the properties that 
characterize the “what it is like” of experience. There would not appear to be any 
issue here. From this point of view, the issue lies rather in whether those 
representational properties exhaust the properties that characterize the 
phenomenology of experience. 
I think that this issue can be more exactly formulated in the following way. The 
representational properties of experiences must be properties that experiences have at 
least in virtue of the inputs from the environment when subjects undergo such 
                                                
6 I think that a theory of phenomenology must deal with the grouping phenomena dealt with by 
Peacocke at the end of Chapter 1 of Sense and Content (pp. 24-26), the kind of phenomena treated in 
work by the Gestalt school of perception. I do not see that postulation of qualia, by itself, can provide 
an account of such phenomena. 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
experiences, and their consequences for the formation of beliefs and for action. 
According to this view those experiences are defined by their having a functional 
role, part of which is a certain informational or (distal) representational role, and thus 
the issue about phenomenal properties of experiences is whether they are exhausted 
by such kinds of (externalistically defined) functional role or, in other words, whether 
this kind of functional role of the phenomenal properties characterizes completely or 
only in part the phenomenal properties of experiences.7  
There is a group of philosophers for whom this whole perspective is ill-conceived. 
To this camp the truly phenomenal properties of experiences are intrinsic qualities of 
them, entirely characterized “from the inside” of consciousness, and recognizable 
only from one’s own case through introspection. This is the view which corresponds 
to classical conceptions of “sense-impressions” in modern philosophy, and to theories 
of sense data in contemporary philosophers, and it is outstandingly represented 
mowadays by philosophers like Block or Chalmers. For this view of course there is 
no question at all of qualia being characterized even partially by a supposed 
functional role; in an “externalist” conception of this they might be. This conception 
is entirely consistent with the view that it is conceptually completely coherent to think 
                                                
7  The first is precisely the position of the “extreme perceptualists”, in Peacocke's perhaps not entirely 
fortunate terminology. Extreme perceptualists sometimes prefer to avoid terms like ‘qualia’ or even 
‘phenomenal property’ altogether because of the fact that their connotations are attuned to the position 
which I will explain shortly. And indeed, there is some issue about whether the position which I will 
endorse here does not go so far in recognizing tenets of those philosophers so as to imply a revision of 
those connotations which turns out to be too strong for referring to it as a view which accepts qualia 
(as opposed to a view that rejects them). 
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of the possibility of being in a state of consciousness where perceptual qualia are 
instantiated without there being any physical things at all around the perceiver, not 
only on a particular occasion —something that the theoreticians in the rival camp 
would easily agree with— but in general. Or, in other words, it is a position for which 
there is no generic dependency of the instantiation of qualia upon the presence of 
physical things in the perceiver's environment (the lack of dependency is not only 
specific for the concrete case). This is just the kind of fully internalist conception that 
we saw Searle endorsed in Chapter 3.8 
Contrary to this, the position I endorse maintains that functional roles like the ones 
mentioned above are essential for qualia. Specifically, it holds that the instantiation of 
any perceptual qualia (type) depends (generically) causally on the instantiation of a 
corresponding manifest property in the environment —that is, a property of the kind 
that the subject's sensorial equipment enables him to discriminate— and that this 
dependence can be established by conceptual reflection. 
A compelling argument for this position has been provided recently by García-
Carpintero (cf. “Por la ‘quineación’ de los qualia cartesianos”). The argument is 
based on attributing a controversial property to qualia, namely that they are 
                                                
8 The defining characteristic of the internalist position is that the instantiation of qualia does not 
depend constitutively on properties of subjects' external environments. The lack of dependence is 
conceptual and can be determined a priori by philosophical reflection from our notion of qualia. Thus, 
Block, who denies this sort of dependency —which the kind of separation he establishes between 
phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness implies— is fully in the internalist camp, even if 
he holds that there may be a nomic dependence (to be discovered a posteriori) between the first and 
the second (cf. Block, “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness”, pp. 232 y 245, n. 10). 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
corregible, or more exactly, that ignorance and error about them on the subject's part 
are possible, at least in a certain specific sense or to a limited extent (perhaps one 
should rather say that they are not absolutely incorregible as the traditional theories of 
consciousness had held). This is indeed a controversial property, but García-
Carpintero shows that the claim has intuitive plausibility and moreover (following 
Dennett in applying ideas of Wittgensteinian inspiration) argues that there is no 
reason to believe in entities that do not have even the sort of minimal corregibility —
ignorance and error— that qualia are held to have on that view. Although the property 
at issue is controversial it has been independently accepted by current champions of 
an internalistic view of qualia like Block. Hence,  first combining the adduced 
intuitive reflections that would show a certain plausibility for the thesis, second, the 
inviability of the alternative and its acceptance by significant defenders of an 
internalist view of qualia, the controversial view that the instantiation of qualia are 
subject at least to a minimal sort of ignorance and error turns out to be a good basis 
for the argument after all. On this basis García-Carpintero convincingly argues that 
such a sort of incorregibility is incompatible with an internalist view of qualia. More 
specifically: that qualia are not intrinsic with regard to the objective, that is that 
generically speaking their instantiation necessarily implies the instantiation of 
objective properties (i. e. physical properties in a broad sense). (Cf. op. cit. pp. 128-
135). It is in this way that qualia have, constitutively, external significance. 
This brings me back to the perspective at the beginning of this section, for if 
qualia have “external significance” in the sense mentioned, it might be thought that 
they are exhausted, as it were, by that external significance. I confess that I regard this 
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as a much more attractive position than the one that holds that qualia are intrinsic (in 
the sense mentioned) in the particular case of perceptual qualia and especially visual 
qualia. I also think that for the defence of my proposal (which I will present in the 
next section) I could remain uncommited on this issue. I am not, however, completely 
sure about this and should at least mention the reasons for a more “substantial” view 
of qualia. In fact, I will go into this issue in some detail because some key 
considerations intervene in reaching a decision that also find an application to the 
different case raised by my proposal. 
I would like to look at the whole matter in the context of a discussion of what 
Peacocke calls the “adequacy thesis” in Sense and Content (cf. p. 8) and hope that this 
will allow me to present my position somewhat more clearly. For the time being I will 
not distinguish between physical or objective properties and among the latter the 
focus is on the observable or manifest properties whose instantiation our physical 
make-up allows us to (fallibly) determine. I will use the letter ϕ to refer to these latter 
properties (ϕ can express complex conditions). The “adequacy thesis” is meant to 
describe the position of an “extreme perceptualist”. In effect, he or she would 
subscribe to the following thesis: 
 
(AT) A complete phenomenological characterization of a perceptual experience 
can be given in the form: ‘It appears (looks) to the subject that ϕ’ (for some ϕ). 
 
Now, (AT) may be rejected for different reasons. One possible reason is that a 
complete phenomenological characterization of a perceptual experience does not even 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
generically imply a statement of the sort mentioned. According to this kind of 
opponent to (AT), it is not necessary for a phenomenological description of a 
perceptual experience to have as a general rule the consequence that the experiencer 
finds himself in an epistemic state with respect to external or environmental 
conditions describable by a sentence of the sort which appears in (AT), even less in a 
certain determinate state describable by a specific condition (which depends on the 
specific quale Q). This is the kind of internalist position we described above, which 
may be present in a more exacerbated form if the internalist at issue holds that there is 
something totally out of place in even suggesting that the phenomenology of 
experiences might imply such epistemic conditions. 
As the above implies, the reason mentioned is not the reason for which I would 
reject (AT). The position I favour here subscribes to the claim of a generic 
dependence of qualia on external properties. This would be approximated by the 
requirement that, for conceptual reasons, the following condition holds: 
 
(1) As a rule, if quale Q is instantiated in subject S, then it appears to S that ϕ (for 
a certain ϕ). 
 
This amounts to holding that thinking that the implication in (1) could always or 
in general be false makes no sense.9 
                                                
9 Condition (1) is too strong. On the one hand, it seems that some kind of (non-perceptual) attention to 
the instantiation of qualia on the part of the subject is necessary for claiming his certain corresponding 
epistemic condition to be true. (An independent problem, of course, would be explaining this kind of 
attention, but the phenomenon does not seem to be in question.) Thus, conditional (1) should be 
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Another possibility for opposing (AT) would be to admit (1) in the form suggested 
but to reject the notion that sentences of the sort at issue in the characterization of 
(AT) could ever give a complete characterization of the phenomenology of a 
perceptual experience. According to this motive for rejection something is missing 
from the description of an experience when it is given in the form of the sentences of 
(AT). But it is hard to say what exactly is missing. Philosophers like Jackson have 
claimed that the verb ‘appear’ —or ‘look’— has both an epistemic and a phenomenal 
sense (cf. Perception, Chapter 3), and that moreover the second is not reducible to the 
first. If that were true, and also assuming that the construction ‘appears ... that’ would 
stand unequivocally for the first use,10 a thesis like (AT) would be objectionable from 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
understood as subject to some “normality conditions”. More importantly, it does not seem that the 
‘that’-clause in condition (1) can be satisfied without the subject possessing the concepts expressed by 
the predicates stating the epistemic condition at issue. It seems sensible to maintain that no epistemic 
condition of the relevant kind can be truly asserted of a subject that is instantiating a certain quale —
#square#, say— if the subject does not possess the concept square (or at least a minimal knowledge of 
this concept). I would not like to require so much because I share the very strong intuition that subjects 
less cognitively sophisticated than normal adults can share representational contents of perception with 
these. Hence condition (1) should be reformulated in a way that such conceptual capabilities are not 
presupposed. On the other hand, if it is correct that (1) carries with it the implication of concept 
possession, (AT) itself carries it also, and for this reason alone, it would turn out to be too strong. 
Thus, a supporter of non-conceptual content would not endorse (AT). This would hold, for example, 
for someone that accepts Peacocke’s manners as supplying the contents of perceptual experiences. In 
fact, I think that (AT) is too strong for the reason explained, but I do not want to use this to support my 
criticism of the thesis. 
10 Jackson associates a non-propositional construction with the phenomenal use and a propositional 
construction with the epistemic use, albeit a different one: ‘It looks as if p (to S)’ (op. cit. pp. 30-31). It 
needs to be said that he does not use the two-uses hypothesis as a premise in his argument in favour of 
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the ordinary usage perspective, since one could then presumably postulate that the 
entities talked about in attributions with the phenomenal use are the ones which are 
missing in characterizations of the phenomenology made solely with the help of 
physical predicates of things. But I doubt very much that there is such a kind of well 
established and generally understood ambiguity, and that, consequently, ordinary 
usage is of much help in establishing the falsity of (AT). 
The most direct strategy for this kind of opposition to (AT) would be to argue by 
counterexample, like Peacocke himself did in Sense and Content.11 But it is uncertain 
that his counterexamples cannot be met by an adequate reply from the “extreme 
perceptualist”. Take for example the case mentioned in § 6.3 of the trees at different 
distances by the roadside. I suggested there that the difference in the perceptual 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
immediate sensory events (sense data) of consciousness in perception, but rather to clear the way 
towards such a position. 
11 Peacocke’s counterexamples in Sense and Content are used to argue against (AT) by maintaining 
that in addition to representational properties perceptual experiences have a different kind of property 
as a matter of phenomenology (cf. p. 8). His view not only implies the distinction between those 
properties, but also the logical independence of experiences having properties of the different sorts. 
That is, not only is it clear that according to the view defended in such work there can be experiences 
which share all their representational properties while differing in their sensational properties, but 
Peacocke also argues the converse: there can be experiences which share all their sensational 
properties while differing in their representational properties, and this happens not only because one of 
them lacks representational properties (cf. pp. 13-15). Thus, as Tye has noticed (cf. The Imagery 
Debate, p. 165, n. 31), there is a clear sense in which for Peacocke sensational properties are not 
properties in virtue of which perceptual experiences have their (representational) contents, which 
makes his position different to classical theories of sense data or qualia. I do not feel Peacocke’s 
position on this issue in his work after Sense and Content is clear, as was glimpsed at the end of 
section 3 of the last chapter. 
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experiences of those trees could be accounted for by a kind of representational 
content, to wit, and ironically, Peacocke’s manners. Whatever manners are, I now 
want to suggest that such a difference could be accounted for by including the 
distance from which the two trees are respectively seen to be the same size; roughly, 
one size from one distance would not appear to the subject as the same size at a 
different distance. If we like, in the two cases we could have different spatial qualia of 
the general form #size-at-a-distance#,12 and such qualia seem to be clearly 
representational properties of experiences. We do not seem to be forced to abandon 
(AT) or the position of the “extreme perceptualist”. This and similar arguments 
against Peacocke’s counterexamples might not be definitive, but at least they should 
make us seriously doubt that they give us solid grounds to criticize (AT) in the way 
we are examining. 
The famous cases of inverted qualia would be a sufficient ground for rejecting 
(AT). These cases would make the following conditional false: 
 
(2) If it appears to S that ϕ, then a certain quale Q is instantiated in subject S. 
 
According to cases of inverted spectrum, it is true that it appears to two different 
subjects that ϕ (for some ϕ), but in one of them quale Q, say, is instantiated while, in 
                                                
12 Cf. Clark’s Sensory Qualities for such qualia. Tye in The Imagery Debate § 7.2.6, and Hill in 
Sensations, pp. 198-199 give two slightly different versions of this argument against Peacocke’s first 
counterexample. Tye generalizes the argument to the other counterexamples, although he avoids 
characterizing his position in terms of “representational qualia” for the reasons suggested in footnote 7 
above. 
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the other, quale Q' (Q' ≠ Q) is instantiated instead. 
I am ready to admit the intuitive plausibility of such cases, or even that they are 
backed by argument, or even that they actually happen.13 But I do not think that the 
case against (AT) should be regarded as closed at this point. This is not because I 
think that philosophers that try to maintain (2) or some kind of equivalent opposition 
to the force of the qualia inversion cases have a good case with the strategy of 
proposing physical conditions ϕ for which (2) would hold, because even if they 
succeed in this, not all physical conditions are relevant when what is at stake is the 
truth of the (AT) thesis (cf. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness, pp. 201-206, for 
such a strategy). I think that this is a thesis about appeareances to a subject, in a 
common sense interpretation of this expression. If one proposed epistemic conditions 
based on similarities or discriminations expressible in the technical apparatus of 
experimental psychology, the sense of the expression ‘appears to the subject that’ in 
the thesis (AT) would be, I think, unduly forced. And the application of the strategy 
tends to flout the restrictions this imposes on the conditions ϕ which are relevant. 
But even if this strategy fails, I think that it can help us to see the need to satisfy a 
symmetrical requirement as an urgent task for the defender of qualia-inversion. 
Because the different qualia that are supposedly instantiated by two different subjects 
of qualia-inversion are qualia of which the subjects can be said to be are aware. Thus, 
when we admit that two individuals are in perceptual states whose intentional content 
                                                
13 For a conceptual defence, cf. Shoemaker, “Functionalism and Qualia” and “The Inverted 
Spectrum”; Jackson, Perception, ch. 2; and for a defence also from empirical considerations: Clark, 
Sensory Qualities, pp. 168-172 and Nida-Rümelin, pp. 146-148. 
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share a certain property, say green, while two different qualia are instantiated in them, 
say #green# in one and #red# in the other, we should be ready to explain where the 
difference lies between being aware of the intentional content of the experience —
being aware of green— and being aware of (the instantiation of) a quale, say #green#. 
Without this, the bare appeal to inverted qualia cases is a rather empty affair. 
It is in this requirement that a great difficulty for the kind of critic of the (AT) 
which I am considering here lies. In answering the question, “What is lacking in the 
description of perceptual experiences that the (AT) contemplates?”, one cannot 
simply resort to introspection because in plain introspection of a perceptual 
experience we find ourselves conscious of the intentional properties of the 
experience, that is (if we are externalists), of the objective properties of things. In 
other words, as most philosophers agree, when we (simply) introspect about our usual 
perceptual experiences “all we find is the world”. 
At the same time this is where the (AT) critic's opportunity lies. If he succeeds in 
explaining what it is to be aware of (the instantiation) of qualia as something different 
from being aware of intentional properties of experience, he will be in a position to 
point out what is lacking in (AT), since what (AT) maintains in the end is that one can 
characterise perceptual experiences “from the inside of a subject” completely by the 
consciousness the subject has of the intentional or representational properties of his 
experience. 
Explaining what it is for us to be aware of qualia as opposed to being aware of the 
representational properties of experiences is not straightforward. Especially for a view 
which aims to maintain at the same time that instantiation of qualia should normally 
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go with instantiation of a representational property of the experience because of the 
functional role of qualia. The argument should proceed by finding clear cases in 
which experiences are alike with respect to their representational properties but 
nevertheless still phenomenally different —i. e. different in respect of the “what it is 
like”— or the other way round. Now, qualia inversion cases offer this case of 
dissociation, and if we could rely on them this “dissociation problem” would be 
solved. But a sceptic may quickly point out that we cannot rely on them in the present 
context on pain of circularity, because we have just been trying to explain the kind of 
awareness of qualia that appealing to such cases presupposes. 
Besides appealing to inverted qualia, other cases have been adduced in the 
literature to persuade us that there is such an disassociation: Twin Earth cases and 
Molyneux cases. But, as Shoemaker has said, even if all these cases have merit, we 
may feel still the pull of those who would like the dissociation argued without 
appealing to such “out of the way examples” (“Qualia and Consciousness”, p. 134). 
And, in this respect, the best cases which I know of appeal to similarities and 
differences in the perception of colours.14 Suppose a subject sees two objects A and B 
as similar in colour, and a third object C as dissimilar in colour. Now  assume that 
colours are dispositional properties in things —surfaces of physical objects in the 
simplest cases— to produce certain reactions in subjects with an specific 
physiological constitution, reactions which are detectable and discriminable by them. 
                                                
14 The argumentative line I follow here was developed by Shoemaker in the above-mentioned paper. 
He generalized the argument and provided further context and details in “The Phenomenal Character 
of Experience”, “Self-knowledge and ‘inner sense’. Lecture III”, especially pp. 258 ff. 
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If we allow this, it will not be adequate to try to explain the similarity in how A and B 
appear to the subject with respect to colour and the dissimilarity in this same respect 
with regard to C simply by saying that this pattern of similarity/dissimilarity is due to 
the fact that the subject is aware the experiences at issue represent objects that are 
similar with respect to colour (in the first case), or dissimilar with respect to colour 
(in the second). For being conscious of this is possible only in virtue of the subject 
being aware of experiences which are similar. The experiences of A and B are 
intentionality similar because they are phenomenally-but-non-representationally 
similar (and analogously about the dissimilarity with regard to C).15 But these 
similarities/dissimilarities in the experiences cannot consist solely of the fact that 
those experiences represent their respective objects as similar/disimilar in respect to 
colour (cf. op. cit. p. 136). Thus, there are respects in which experiences are similar or 
dissimilar which are not representational features of the experiences after all. 
This argument obviously depends on a certain view of what the colours are, but I 
                                                
15 My terminology differs from Shoemaker's because I insist on using the term ‘phenomenal’ to 
embrace any aspect of the “what it is like” (cf. Chapter 6, § 3), be it merely representational or not (I 
say ‘merely’ because, due to the functional role of phenomenal properties all are representational). In 
contrast, Shoemaker chooses to keep ‘phenomenal’ only for the second kind, which I find myself 
forced to to denominate by the cumbersome expression ‘phenomenal-but-non-representational’. In 
some undeniable sense Shoemaker's terminology facilitates exposition, but it has the drawback of 
dissociating ‘phenomenal’ from ‘phenomenology’, since it seems inescapable that how things appear 
to subjects (in the ordinary sense) should be counted as belonging to the phenomenology of 
experience. This, in turn, might perhaps be the source of some misunderstanding. However, nothing 
substantial hangs on these terminological differences, although they should be reckoned with when 
reading passages from Shoemaker such as the one quoted below. 
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do not think that it incurs a strong liability here, because any view that recognizes 
colours and does not regard them as primary properties would do here, and the latter 
view seems rather discredited nowadays. 
If we now come to believe that although the argument has appealed to colours its 
conclusion can be extended to other qualia, we will conclude more generally that 
various or many sorts of phenomenal properties are not exhausted by representational 
properties. Or, equivalently, that qualia are not exhausted by the kind of functional 
role we attributed to them.16  
Reflecting on the argument again we see that in reaching the conclusion that there 
are phenomenal properties of experiences over and above their representational 
properties in the sense explained, we have resorted to (what we took to be) the best 
explanation of the similarities and differences. Because of this, we can see that we 
have finally come to be aware of the non-representational side of qualia by means of a 
theoretical argument. We may then side with Shoemaker  in saying that qualia are in 
some sense primarily objects of “theoretical awareness”.17 Nevertheless, I think it 
                                                
16 In the terms of conditional (1) above, this is equivalent to saying that the property characterizing 
these qualia is not type-identical to the property contemplated in the condition ϕ in the consequent for 
all qualia contemplated in the conditional. As anticipated in the previous chapter, trying to determine 
for which properties or qualia —if any— this identity would hold is not central to this dissertation. Or, 
in my terminology, which qualia —phenomenal properties— have non-representational aspects. 
Because of the argument above, we have reason to believe that at least some have, and, as also 
suggested above, there may be good reasons to extend the argument to qualia other than colour qualia. 
17 There is an independent argument against (AT) that, to me at least, has some force. However, I 
doubt whether it should be classified with the “out of the way” cases. It is based on the scientifically 
well-documented phenomena of blindsight. It seems very hard to deny that blindsighters find 
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would paradoxical to say that ordinary subjects (who do not possess the theoretical 
wisdom to reach the conclusion of the argument) in ordinary situations are not aware 
of qualia (or of the non-representational aspects of qualia). Indeed, if someone wanted 
to assert this, he would thereby have a reason to deny the existence of qualia 
altogether, for qualia are precisely meant to be something that characterizes 
experiential consciousness. Fortunately, there is a way out of this quandary, which, 
far from being ad hoc, has clear intuitive support. This has been superbly expressed 
by Shoemaker: 
 
I see that this piece of paper resembles that one. Reflecting, but with my gaze and 
attention still fixed on the pieces of paper, I “see” that this piece of paper looks similar to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
themselves in perceptual states which may strike them as representationally similar (that is why they 
are able to point to the location of light in front of them both when the light is located in their field of 
vision, and when it is located in the blind field), and hugely different in the phenomenal-but-non-
representational sense. Something analogous might be said when comparing the experiences of a 
normal person and a blindsighter. Of course, to articulate this difference, and even to recognize it, in 
some sense, these persons should be taught what the kinds of similarities and differences at issue are. 
Thus, the argument seems to be subject to the same kind of reflection that I am explaining in the text. 
Tye has tried to dispose of that “blindsight argument” by pointing out that the contrast between a 
normal person and a blindsighted person is that the first “is introspectively aware that [he] is 
undergoing a visual experience with a certain content, whereas [the second] is aware that he is 
undergoing thoughts with that content”. He adds: “This difference is a felt difference —it is given in 
introspection” (The Imagery Debate, p. 124; italics in the original). I cannot see how one can discover 
the differentiating feature supposedly revealed by introspection —that one is undergoing a visual 
experience— without precisely appealing to the phenomenal-but-non-representational character of it. 
The fact that Tye chooses to describe the difference as one that is felt seems to increase the difficulty 
rather than being of any help. To me at least, Tye's reply might be read as an obscure appeal to implicit 
awareness of phenomenal (but-non-representational) differences. 
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that one, and hence that my experience of the one is intentionally similar to my 
experience of the other. Reflecting still further, and again with no shift in my gaze and 
attention, I “see” that while there are cases in which intentionally similar experiences are 
phenomenally different (...), the present case is not of this sort —it is the standard case in 
which experiences are intentionally similar because they are phenomenally similar. All of 
these judgements stem causally from the qualitative character of my experience, but only 
the last is explicitly about it. It seems reasonable to me to say that if an experience issues 
in judgments of the first or second of these kinds, and fails to issue in a judgment of the 
third kind only because the subject did not bring to bear on it the appropriate concepts, 
then its qualitative character is accessible to the subject’s consciousness, and is some 
sense an object of awareness. 
(Shoemaker, “Qualia and Consciousness”, pp. 140) 
 
I think it is fair to distinguish the kind of awareness which, according to these 
reflections, ordinary subjects have of qualia —in comparison with the “theoretical” or 
“explicit” awareness of qualia of which we spoke above— by saying that the first 
kind is a tacit awareness, although, for reasons to be touched upon shortly, we must 
apply this term with caution. This kind of awareness of qualia is not a state in which 
qualia are represented; it is in this sense non-intentional, whereas the explicit 
awareness is conceptually mediated. Furthermore, it is clear that the tacit access to 
qualia that we have attributed to ordinary subjects is not access to qualia by 
introspection, in the ordinary sense. In contrast with this, I think we may agree that 
subjects that are informed about what relevant similarities or disimilarities to “look 
for” are aware of the (non-representational aspects of) qualia by introspection in the 
usual sense. The conceptually sophisticated subject can discriminate up to a certain 
point the sensations or impressions that constitute a particular experience via 
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introspection; he can compare experiences in different respects, make likenesses and 
qualify, and also recall or anticipate qualia. 
Tacit awareness of qualia has a similar status as the awareness of our own states 
of attention to physical objects in perception, which I dealt  with in the last section of 
Chapter 3. They can both be regarded as some sort of achievement. (I mentioned this 
point with regard to qualia above, and I made the point with regard to awareness of 
attention in Chapter 3.) On the other hand, attention itself is an achievement in a fuller 
sense than awareness of attention, just like awareness of qualia, which is not the 
representation of anything, is not subject to the hazards of representation as 
perception undoubtly is. 
A new reflection, which at first sight seems to bring new complications but which 
seems to me to contribute to our (tacit) awareness of qualia is cognitive awareness. 
García-Carpintero insists on this feature of our awareness of qualia. To my 
knowledge he has not explained the grounds for claiming this in full.18 But I think 
that the claim is intuitively plausible and that bringing this intuitive plausibility to 
light may reinforce somewhat the claim about the awareness of qualia. Take a normal 
subject confronted with the task of saying (in good light) whether he has a green 
                                                
18  However, I think that he has travelled a considerable part of the way by using Loar's proposal on 
phenomenal concepts. Loar claims that a conceptually sophisticated subject has what he calls 
phenomenal concepts of qualia, that is, notions of them acquired by each such subject from his own 
case which allows her to recognize qualia when they instantiate again or anticipate their instantiation. 
García-Carpintero proposes a move similar to the one we have seen Shoemaker made   suggesting that 
ordinary subjects can be attributed with the tacit possession of such concepts (cf. “Por la ‘quineación’ 
de los qualia cartesianos”, pp. 126-127). 
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object —no matter which kind— somewhere in front of him and approximately where 
that object is in relation to him. Contrast his situation with that of a second subject 
with blindsight. It is not only the case that the task is easiest for the first subject while 
being difficult (the second part of the question) or plain impossible (the first) for the 
second subject, but it seems to me that the first is justified or entitled in his answer in 
a way that the second is not. For the second subject the answer concerning the 
position of the object “pops out” from nowhere, so to speak; it just “strikes” him. This 
does not seem to be so for the first subject to whom things appear just as they should 
for him to be in a position to deliver such an answer. His answer does not come “out 
of the blue” but seems to have some sort of rational support which the blind-sighter's 
answer is totally lacking. This subject —as he would be quite ready to allow— is 
making an arbitrary statement concerning the whereabouts of the object in a sense in 
which the first is not. 
These reflections seem to lend support to the claim that ordinary subjects have a 
sort of knowledge of their own qualia; a cognitive awareness of qualia. And since 
possessing knowledge entitles subjects to confer knowledge, if the awareness of 
qualia is cognitive it is also (implicitly) “entitling”, that is “reason” conferring, thus 
we can also say if we empty this term of the implication that the subject has reasons at 
his disposal without further ado. (Even if it can be said that the reasons are “at the 
disposal” of the subject because in some sense he possesses justification —as 
opposed to merely been guided by the workings of a subpersonal mechanism, it has to 
be noted that they are only implicitly at his disposal.) Entitling or reason-conferring, 
to what? Entitling or reason-conferring to the objective significances of those qualia. 
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In other words, following this line of thought we are lead to think that awareness of 
qualia endows subjects with reasons for perceptual judgements. It is, then, a line of 
great epistemological relevance, an issue whose discussion, however, lies entirely 
outside the scope of this dissertation (cf. García-Carpintero, “Las razones para el 
dualismo”, p. 84). (As will be seen, I will simply appeal to this line of thought in 
Section 4 to dispel a potential objection to my own approach.) 
We may pause to reflect that we have again been confronted with claims about the 
subject's tacit capabilities (tacit knowledge and tacit reasons on this occasion; tacit 
awareness and tacit possession of concepts  above). Now, in applying the term ‘tacit’ 
(or ‘implicit’) to these capacities it is very important as García-Carpintero has 
repeatedly emphasized to be careful not to confuse this sort of capacity arising from 
the sense of ‘tacit’ or ‘implicit’ used in the cognitive sciences, for which Chomsky’s 
claim that a speaker has a tacit or implicit knowledge of his grammar provides the 
paradigm (cf. García-Carpintero, “Por la ‘quineación’ de los qualia cartesianos” pp. 
106-109). In the present usage we are dealing with capabilities which can be “brought 
to light” or made explicit above all by the sort of a priori intuitions-plus-
argumentation which is characteristic of philosophy, which is crucially related to the 
fact that they are capacities attributed “at the personal level”. In the Chomskian usage, 
in contrast, the term refers to abilities which are sub-personal and only accessible as a 
result of empirical-experimental research. As will be seen, I think that recognizing the 
first phenomenon as a separate and significant kind turns out to be the key to 
understanding the demonstrative character of perception and its relation to 
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phenomenal properties.19  
The general conclusion of this section is that I am ready to take on board the thesis 
that perception of (external) things is cognitively mediated by awareness of qualia, 
with the emphasis on the tacit nature of such cognitive awareness, more or less in the 
way that this thesis was introduced by explaining a tentative proposal by García-
Carpintero in the first section and further expounded in the present section. Indeed, I 
think that once one is prepared to endorse an externalist view of qualia, and the thesis 
of (at least) tacit awareness of them, it is not a big step to arrive at a satisfactory 
proposal for bringing together perceptual attention and the phenomenal properties of 
perceptual experience to account for the demonstrative character of perception in a 
way that does justice to the peculiarities of perception. But, as I argued in the 
previous section, there is indeed still a step here, and I turn now to my proposal about 
                                                
19 Because of the importance of this difference between the two usages of the terms ‘tacit’ and 
‘implicit’. García-Carpintero has proposed rescuing a term from the not-so-distant philosophical 
tradition —the term ‘unthematized’— for the first usage (cf. loc. cit.). One important model for 
reflection on tacit or unthematized capabilities is provided, I think, by Peacocke in “Implicit 
Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality”. For the case of phenomenal consciousness, García-
Carpintero refers instead to the dilucidation in Crimmins’s “Tacitness and Virtual Beliefs” (cf. “Las 
razones para el dualismo”, p. 84). However, as Peacocke notes, Crimmins takes himself to be 
elucidating a notion of tacit knowledge such that when the subject is confronted with an explicit 
formulation of his knowledge it does not appear to him as if he was learning something new. This is 
not the case with the notion of tacit knowledge which is at issue here, or for the “implicit conceptions” 
elucidated by Peacocke in the work mentioned (cf. “Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and 
Rationality”, pp. 49-51). Nevertheless, I think there may be no real contrast here but rather a matter of 
degree (cf. op. cit. pp. 53-54). In any case, as will be seen, I will appeal to Peacocke’s notion of tacit 
knowledge in the development of my proposal in the following sections. 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
how it should be taken. 
 
 
7.3. Qualia and demonstrative modes of presentation:  
a proposal 
 
My immediate task now is to explain the role that qualia play in perceptual modes 
of presentation of singular objects. In Chapter 5 we saw that qualia, so far as they are 
conceived of as being partially functionally defined by the properties that cause them 
—manifest or observational properties— were akin to the #features# postulated by 
empirical theories of attention like Treisman's. We are now in a position to use the 
fact that we seem to be dealing with essentially the same entities here to make a 
proposal about the way in which we should understand the relation between the 
phenomenal and the conceptual-demonstrative aspects of perception, akin to the 
proposal expounded in § 1 which postulates a more intimate relationship between 
them —and so, on this respect quite different from Peacocke’s (and Evans’s)— but 
that succeeds in being faithful to the demonstrative character of perception. 
My proposal follows Campbell at a decisive turning point. Like Campbell, I hold 
that the perceptual awareness of objects which allows demonstrative reference to 
them is centrally a matter of attention. But contrary to Campbell I conceive this 
attention much as common sense and/or folk psychology conceives it. As applied to 
the case at hand, attention is a matter of selecting an object from its perceptual 
background (or perhaps more than one simultaneously, but let us stick to the simplest 
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case). And selecting it for the sake of finding out something about the  environment 
—a kind of activity inserted in something like Neisser’s perceptual cycle (cf. Chapter 
3, § 4). 
The initial intuitions in favour of the claim that this kind of attention is essential to 
reference achieved “on the strength of perception” are simple intuitions to the effect 
that an object's being clearly visible is not sufficient for being aware of it, and about 
the need to draw one’s audience's attention to perceptible objects to be understood 
when communicating information about things in the perceptible environment. 
Campbell has expressed these intuitions in the following way: 
 
There are many ways in which we can refer to concrete objects, but the most basic sort 
of reference is when you can see the thing, or perceive it somehow, and refer to it on 
the strength of that perception. If you and I are looking out of the window, then we may 
discuss the castle before us, identifying it as ‘that castle’, the one we can see. But just 
having the castle in your field of view does not seem to be enough for you to refer to it. 
If you are to refer to the castle, you must do more than have it in your field of view: 
you must attend to the thing. And if you are to talk to me about that castle, you have to 
draw my attention to it, so I get some clue as to what you are talking about. 
(“Sense, Reference and Selective Attention”, p. 55) 
 
Now, I agree with Jackson, García-Carpintero and other upholders of a sense-data 
theory of perception, that we perceive objects by being (tacitly) aware of qualia in the 
perception of those objects. I also agree that (as we have seen in the previous section) 
experiencing qualia is a cognitive achievement —a more basic cognitive achievement 
than perceiving objects. Furthermore, it seems to me that it is plausible to identify the 
background from which an object is “made to stand out” or “selected” in some way 
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with the current perceptual qualia. My claim is that when we “select” an object from 
this background, we do it in virtue of “binding” qualia whose instantiation is caused 
by that object. What I have in mind is as follows. 
On the basis of the foregoing, it is accepted that there is (cognitive) awareness of 
single qualia.20 But it is one thing to be aware of single qualia as in the stream of 
consciousness or “the manifold of sensation”, and quite another to be aware of that 
quale as belonging to the (physical) object. For, in the second case we recognize a 
(cognitive) systematic achievement, roughly in this sense: first, the same quale 
belongs to different objects; second, awareness of qualia as belonging to an object is 
an achievement which presupposes awareness of single qualia as a simpler 
achievement, and third, the first sort of awareness does not simply reduce to the 
                                                
20 The explanation in the text is admittedly a simplification in various ways. As remarked above, I do 
not consider the atomism suggested here as definitive. In particular, qualia may be basically presented 
as instantiated properties in complex sensory events (Erlebnisse) in consciousness. Or they may be part 
of other complex phenomenal properties. Moreover, the possibility of relational phenomenal properties 
has to be taken seriously (as for example in the case of distance mentioned above (cf. the text to which 
footnote 12 is appended). Another very significant limitation of my treatment lies in not taking account 
of the dynamic aspects of perception which as Evans and Campbell have recently argued, are very 
relevant to demonstrative thought and which have even been taken as essential to the perception of 
objects (cf. Mulligan, “Perception”, p. 197; I referred to this limitation in Chapter 3). As I remarked at 
the beginning of section 2 of the present chapter, even an overall theory of the phenomenology of 
experience is beyond the scope of this dissertation. On the other hand, these simplifications do not 
appear to seriously affect the fundamental point that there exists the kind of systematic task that is 
acknowledged in the text. This is the central point. At the very least, it would seem to require the 
recognition of something like single qualia. But, more importantly, systematicity stands whatever the 
elements that constitute it from a philosophical viewpoint ultimately turn out to be. 
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(simultaneous or successive) awareness of single qualia, but involves additionally 
some sort of “combining” or “synthetizing” operation of the mind. This is what I am 
calling the binding of qualia. 
This proposal is closely related to Jackson’s analysis of perception. As part of this 
analysis, Jackson formulated a necessary and sufficient condition for a sense datum to 
belong to a material object. Our task here is not that of analyzing perception per se, 
but only its demonstrative trait. That is, we are focussing on the kind of perception 
that allows the sort of awareness of objects that we recognize as “demonstrative”. 
And we have identified this awareness with (perceptual) attention to the object. It is 
then in the context of explaining this kind of awareness that Jackson’s notion —or, in 
our version, the notion of a quale belonging to an object— intervenes. The 
characterization of this notion is as follows: 
 
A quale Q belongs to a physical or material object M in an episode of 
(demonstrative) perception by a subject S, only if 
(i) an event involving M causes the awareness of Q in S. 
(ii) there are other qualia Q 'whose awareness is also caused by the event 
involving M and which are bound with Q by S.21 
                                                
21 The basic differences with Jackson’s formulation are as follows (cf. Perception, p. 171). First, 
Jackson’s definition concerns a sense-datum instead of a quale, where this sense-datum seems to be 
conceived as a complex mental object. For comparative purposes we may thing of it as a sensory event 
whose (phenomenal) properties are the qualia. The definition given in the text introduces the subject 
explicitly, but otherwise is very close to Jackson’s first condition which is as follows: “[A]n M-event 
causes the having of [sense-datum] D”, where an M-event is an event involving the material object M. 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
 
Now, because of the external significance of qualia, the binding of qualia is not 
something that the subject does arbitrarily, but which corresponds —when perception 
is successful— to (manifest) properties of the object which are “bundled up” in it. 
Hence, because of the external significance of qualia, the binding that constitutes 
selecting has both a subjective side —the binding of qualia proper— and a 
corresponding objective side —the “binding” or “tieing together” of properties in the 
objects which, in fact, are already bundled up in it.22 Because of this, being aware of 
the qualia caused by an object as belonging to this object involves being aware of the 
observable properties of the object as properties of a single object. For this reason I 
equate being aware of the qualia caused by an object as belonging to that object —
which is essentially constituted by the binding of such qualia— with the kind of 
awareness of the object that we call (perceptual) attention to the object and which in 
my mind is defining of the (perceptual) demonstrative access to physical objects: the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
To this condition, Jackson adds just a second condition: “[T]he spatial properties of D are functionally 
dependent on those of M as a consequence of the manner in which M causes the having of D”. In my 
definition this condition does not appear because it is assumed that it is already a part of the conceptual 
background since the notion of functional dependence —in Jackson's sense or in a suitable 
modification of it— is essentially involved in the notion of qualia itself. Thus, we might say, it does 
not explicitly appear, but it is there nonetheless. The novelty comes in the second condition of my 
definition; thus I am essentially only adding a third condition to Jackson’s definition (‘third’, because 
his second condition —or a suitable modification of it— is already implicit in my definition) which 
involves the operation of binding, which seems to me essential to account for the systematicity in the 
sort of achievement that being aware of a quale as belonging to an object is. 
22 Since the properties are already “bound” or bundled up in the object, this improper binding should 
perhaps be regarded rather as a recognition of the properties as bundled up. 
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second thing consists of the first. 
This is basically my proposal to account for the demonstrative character of 
perception, according to which experience plays this role: it delivers the elements —
the qualia— of which the subject is aware as selected and bound (the awareness of an 
achievement). The object is present in the subject’s awareness as a “binding” of 
selected qualia whose instantiation has been caused by it, which are “selected” in the 
sense that the subject is aware of them as belonging to one and the same object. This, 
we can say, is the mode of presentation of the object. And this is also what it means to 
say that the object “is presented to the subject” as attended in the current act of 
attention. ‘Attended to in the current act of attention’ and ‘present to the mind as a 
binding of selected qualia’ thus come to be two linguistic descriptions of the same 
individuating and cognitively accessible property of an object, the property that 
constitutes the condition for its mode of presentation. 
I think that if we are prepared to accept something like the García-Carpintero's 
tentative proposal for the intentional content of a perceptual experience —cf. section 
1 of this chapter— but agree that that sort of proposal does not in itself solve the 
problem of accounting for the demonstrative mode of presentation of objects in 
perception we should find the proposal just advanced quite adaptable. 
Among the many aspects of this proposal which require discussion, one which is 
especially important in view of the prominent place it occupies in rival accounts is the 
issue of the role of spatial location in the mode of presentation. I will discuss this 
issue now because to do so may also contribute to clarifying or adding details to my 
proposal. 
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As we know it is widely accepted that location plays a major role in perceptual 
demonstration. Indeed, as we saw in section 2 of Chapter 4, there are views according 
to which locating the object egocentrically or at least the ability to do this is 
constitutive of perceptual demonstration. But we also saw that McDowell or Evans's 
arguments in favour of this view were not compelling. Furthermore, we saw reasons 
to doubt that location has such decisive role, although it does somehow seem 
important or special. According to my theory, what would the role of location be? To 
begin with, and most importantly, the notion of location is subordinated to that of 
attention from a theoretical viewpoint. This means that whatever role location is 
postulated to play  here will come from the role it plays in perceptually attending to 
objects as this notion has been explained above. This can be explained as follows. 
First we must recognize spatial qualia. From the general viewpoint about qualia 
adopted in the previous section which links them essentially to discrimination we 
must recognize at least three (kinds of) spatial qualia constitutive of location: 
(egocentrical) “latitude” and “longitude”, and (egocentrical) depth (cf. Clark, Sensory 
Qualities, § 5.4.1), varieties of which would be present in different sensory modalities 
(sight and hearing certainly, and probably also touch also). What happens —I think— 
in the case of visual attention and also touch is that the spatial qualia play a very 
special role in the binding of qualia that constitutes attention to an object: other qualia 
—such as the colour qualia— “cluster round” the location qualia.23 This is undoubtly 
a much more modest role for location that was envisaged by the “substantial” 
                                                
23 The impressions of shape one has of an object are regarded in some theories as a qualitative 
dimension on its own. Other theories, however, hold that they are patterns of simpler qualities (cf. 
Clark, op. cit. § 5.4.3). 
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doctrines of Evans and McDowell, but nevertheless it is still an important role. 
Furthermore, even if that “clustering round” the location qualia does not hold for the 
case of attending to an object by the sounds it gives off, I think that these differences 
about the role of location in different sensory modalities —like other aspects that 
belong to a rough characterization of its role— can be established without the need 
for empirical research.24 In this sense there is some room in my view for a priori 
reflection on the role of location in perceptual attention, and subsequently in 
perceptual demonstration. 
If we now, pul together all the threads obtained from Chapters 3 and 4 and from 
the foregoing, my proposal for the demonstrative mode of presentation has the 
following elements: 
                                                
24 Campbell expands on the different characteristic possessed by visual attention and attention in 
hearing and their respective roles on perceptual modes of presentation, in “Sense, Reference and 
Selective Attention”. I do not agree with the altogether empirical status he assigns to the differences 
between the two modalities; on the contrary, I believe that a good deal of what he says can be given an 
a priori foundation (see the section below). How much about the role of location can be at least prima 
facie established by conceptual considerations and what needs empirical investigation from the outset 
is, however, a real issue . For example, one might try to use the idea of opening a file to try to draw a 
more accurate profile of how attention works. Thus, one might say that attention to an object is 
achieved by opening a file for it and filling it with qualia for the object, location qualia to begin with in 
the case of sight. But I think that such attempts, unless they are empty speculations, are rather to be 
seen as theoretical proposals that belong fully in the province of empirical scientific psychology (see 
the reference to Kahneman & Treisman (1984) in § 3 of Chapter 5). Resorting to the notion of mental 
file has been not infrequent ever since Grice introduced the notion of having a dossier for a 
description in “Vacuous Names” (1969). Philosophers like Evans, Perry and García-Carpintero have 
made diverse uses of the notion of mental file, uses that, despite being different, are not unrelated to 
each other (and are also not unrelated to present concerns). To my mind, however, the legitimacy of 
appealing to such a notion in a philosophical, conceptual explanation could be a real issue, except 
when the use made of it does not go beyond the limits of a merely ancillary analogy. 
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(i) In perception objects are fundamentally cognitively accessible as attended, 
more precisely, as the objects of current attention. 
(ii) This basic piece of knowledge that the subject has in this respect, is to be 
understood as implicitly knowing of the object that it is being attended to (rather than 
simply knowing that the object is being attended to). 
(iii) This piece of knowledge is present as something that is presupposed or taken 
for granted in the act of attention, rather than something that is acquired in it. 
(iv) Concurrent with the episode of attention to an object, is the subject's (tacit) 
awareness of this episode, and this awareness is also fundamentally the awareness of 
an achievement, even if an “easier” achievement than attention itself is. 
(v) The cognitive attention to an object in perception consists of a sort of 
“selection” of the object from a perceptual background, which in turn is constituted 
by the binding of sensory qualities caused by the object of which the subject is also 
(tacitly) aware. 
(vi) Because of the external significance of qualia, we can also talk —somewhat 
improperly— of the “objective side” of this binding as the binding of manifest 
properties in the object. 
 
I do think that some intuitions support the different elements in my proposal, but 
of course, I am not suggestiing that its case can be based on its intuitive strength. 
They need support from argumentative confrontation with other alternatives, without 
which it would be nothing more than a plausible story. In my view, this confrontation 
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will proceed essentially by a priori argumentation and also by appeal to common 
sense psychology, since what is at issue here is the common phenomenon we call 
attending to an object. My hope is that the use of the notions of selection (or 
awareness of the qualia as belonging to an object) and binding do not definitively put 
my proposal ipso facto outside the domain of personal-level psychology or not more 
than does the appeal to notions such as that of being (cognitively) aware of a qualia 
and the others we saw referring to subjects' implicit but personal-level capacities. 
However, the proposal is not innocent of empirical implications, in a way that 
should be made clear. In this aspect, the proposal's close relationship to Anne 
Treisman’s psychological theory of selective attention cannot have escaped notice. 
This is no coincidence, of course, since the proposal was inspired by Campbell's, 
which in turn seems partially inspired by Treisman's theory. If anything, my proposal 
is closer to Treisman’s theory than Campbell’s is, since, as I argued in Chapter 5, 
Treisman’s features —the entities which are bound according to her theory— cannot 
be regarded as properties of objects, but as some sort of scientifically based 
“counterpart” of sensory qualities or qualia. 
All this does not imply that my proposal stands or falls with the success or failure 
of Treisman’s theory. The reason why it does not raises significant issues about the 
relation of a conceptual, a priori proposal like the one I am outlining and empirical 
theories of selective attention. This is the main issue dealt with in the two remaining 
sections of the dissertation. 
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7.4. The subpersonal and the tacit in attention 
and perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation 
 
As we recalled in § 1 of Chapter 4 modes of presentation are classically conceived 
of as conditions on objects that are individuative, and whose satisfaction by objects is 
cognitively accessible to the subject. We found trouble in the first respect concerning 
a proposal I put together (somewhat artificially) from elements of views on perception 
belonging to Jackson, Searle and García-Carpintero in the first section of the present 
chapter. The difficulties with Campbell’s proposal I am about to discuss in detail 
concern instead the second aspect of modes of presentation. 
The problems in this latter respect in Campbell’s approach (see section 3, Chapter 
4) come from its empirical stance. It seems prima facie quite plain that if 
demonstrative modes of presentation look to the subpersonal processes postulated by 
empirical theories of perception and attention for their identities, it will be very hard 
to comply with the classical idea that they are “cognitively accessible” to the subject 
(that is, qua “man/woman in the street”, not qua expert). 
As I see it, Campbell has mainly developed his approach to demonstrative 
“senses” or modes or presentation in three largely complementary papers. In his 
intriguing “Is Sense Transparent?” he tried to provide a general rationale as much as a 
direct argument for moving to an empirical stance towards perceptual demonstrative 
modes of presentation. In Chapter 4, § 3 I tried to reconstruct the argument and 
submitted one of its premises to close scrutiny. Further, in his rather daring but to my 
mind interesting paper “Sense, Reference and Selective Attention”, he developed the 
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approach by straightforwardly giving an empirical criterion for the identity of modes 
of presentation (the one quoted at the beginning of § 3, Chapter 4). And finally, in an 
even more recent paper, “Sense and Consciousness”, he tried to dispel or anticipate 
qualms about his empirical approach by trying to point to a “classical setting” for it, 
and also by providing brief rebuttals of the alternatives.25 
To a great extent I agree with his rebuttals. His main adversary is —he declares— 
the naturalists who do not find a place for sense or modes of presentation in his theory 
of perceptual consciousness since, for him, “what gives meaning to a system of 
representations is a pattern of causal correlations between use of the system and 
external phenomena”, and, as a consequence, “[t]he notion of a “truth-condition” 
comes into this account not as what causes and justifies the pattern of use, but as an 
artefact of the pattern of use” (“Sense and Consciousness”, p. 197). As is clear from 
the view developed here, I entirely agree with his opposition to this idea. At one point 
he characterizes these naturalists more specifically as theorists  
 
who think that we do not, ordinarily, grasp any justification at all for the procedures we 
use in verifying or acting on the basis of demonstrative judgements. 
(Op. cit. p. 206). 
 
Again, I agree with opposing this position, but ironically enough his theory runs a 
serious risk on this score, as we will see. 
                                                
25 His talk at the IXth Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology at Salzburg went 
in this same direction while introducing some new elements, but since it has not been published (to my 
knowledge), I will refrain from discussing these. They would not however alter the conclusions of the 
present discussion. 
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Campbell also rejects outright any sensation-based account, on the grounds that 
this would merely concentrate on the effects of perceptible objects, and hence it could 
presumably be made to count as a variant of the naturalist approach.26 I fully agree 
with his classical Sellarsian worry here, but nevertheless I shall engage him in 
discussion at just this point, since it will clearly signal the place occupied by my 
position and why I believe it is free from the difficulties in his. 
It is true that my proposal may be recognized as appealing to sensations, but 
firstly sensations come into it only indirectly because what constitute a basis for my 
theory are only the qualitative properties of sensations —sensory qualities or qualia— 
as the previous sections will have given an opportunity to appreciate, and secondly, 
these intervene at one remove, as it were, since I account for the demonstrative 
character of the relation to objects in perception first by appealing to attention. 
Moreover, this theoretical background parts company with the classical theories of 
both sensations and qualia, which see the latter as (fully) intrinsic properties of 
experience. On the contrary, I subscribe to a variant of qualia-based theories which 
emphasizes both the external significance of qualia —holding by their very nature— 
and their cognitive accessibility (thus being reason conferring). And it is only if qualia 
are conceived as (fully) intrinsic properties of experience —intrinsic regarding what 
is objective— that they necessarily lack both properties (cf. section 2). Even views of 
qualia like Ned Block’s that try to make their putative intrinsicness compatible with 
an a posteriori purely empirical basis for their external significance, fail —as I 
                                                
26 Because it shares the idea that “a representational system has meaning because of the existence of 
causal correlations between external phenomena and the use of the system” with a naturalistic view 
(“Sense and Consciousness”, p. 206). 
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believe is shown in García-Carpintero's argument mentioned in section 2, which 
develops Wittgenstein and Dennett's views. The upshot of all this is that my 
proposal's background does not regard sensations, or rather their qualities, as merely 
the causal effects of objects and their properties, which, in Campbell's words, “would 
not provide [one] with any grasp of what [those properties], or the objects, 
intrinsically are”, i. e. would contribute nothing to making “the nature of the thing 
transparent to us” (“Sense and Consciousness” , p. 208). 
Campbell also mentions Locke as putting reflection on these matters on a path 
which led to another dead end: realizing that causal relations by themselves alone 
could not bring us any nearer to that “transparency”, he resorted to the notion of 
resemblance , postulating that sensory effects (or at least some of them) are 
intrinsically like their causes. But trying to do this as a sort of supplementary 
appendix to a thorough causal account of representation that is already quite complete 
by itself has, as Campbell says, “the problem ... that it makes no sense” (loc. cit. p. 
106). However, some idea of resemblance begins to make sense, I believe, when put 
in a rather different intellectual setting. It is the idea sought after in formulations of 
“imagistic content” (cf. § 1 of Chapter 6) —itself somehow touched upon in passing 
by Campbell himself;27 it is present in Jackson’s notion of “functional isomorphism” 
(§ 1 of the present chapter), or in the related notion of “second-order isomorphism” 
                                                
27 If I am not mistaken, Campbell uses the expression ‘imagistic content’ only twice, in the three 
papers mentioned above. One of its occurrences is in the title of the first numbered section of “Sense, 
Reference, and Selective Attention” (“Propositional vs. Imagistic Content”), and the other appears just 
in passing in the course of that same section, a text where Campbell moves —characteristically without 
giving any notice— from talking of propositional content to talking of the problem of confronting 
propositional representations with pictorial or imagistic representations. 
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(cf. § 2, Chapter 6) by Peacocke, and, in general, in the latter’s attempts to capture 
non-conceptual “analogue contents”. As it is present, I believe, in all attempts to 
articulate qualia by systematic descriptive strategies, from Nelson Goodman to the 
more recent techniques using multidimensional scaling (cf. Clark, Sensory Qualities, 
Chapter 4). One might understandably say that all these efforts have not yet 
cristallized into a well rounded philosophical theory of “resemblance” which is also 
satisfactorily integrated within some version of a causal-explanatory perspective, but 
it would hardly be plausible to say that all these attempts are not promising, not to 
speak of saying that they make no sense. All the work referred to has at the very least 
opened up Locke’s dead end. 
On the other hand, I think that there are motives for suspecting that Campbell’s 
views do not succeed in escaping completely from a rejectable sort of naturalism, 
contrary of course to his intentions. 
It is not difficult to relate Campbell’s position to Quinean naturalism. According 
to Campbell’s theory senses are determined —constituted— by “the principles that 
the perceptual system uses to select a collection of imagistic information as all 
relating to one object” (“Sense, Reference and Selective Attention”, p. 60, my italics). 
Thus, what constitute senses —putting it vaguely— are certain “elements” used by 
“the perceptual system”, that is the mechanisms of perception. And it is scientific 
psychology which studies such mechanisms, and also that determines what counts as 
“imagistic information”. In short, senses are wholly abandonned to science for 
determination. They are fully within its province, as it were, so the notion of sense is 
in the end a scientific notion. In this respect is there any difference from the Quinean 
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version of a naturalized epistemology? Strictly speaking I think there is no such 
difference and that this is ultimately the reason why we should say that Campbell’s 
theory of perceptual modes of presentation fails. And yet I also think that there is 
something very close to his theory in many respects that does not fall in the trap. 
The point just made about the affinity of Campbell’s view to Quinean holistic 
naturalism —be it rejectable or not— does not by itself establish Campbell's 
proximity to the naturalists' position on the specific issue of the use of a notion of 
sense that we normally grasp (see above). Indeed, there are some relevant details we 
should attend to before we can see where the inadequacy of Campbell’s theory lies on 
this decisive issue more clearly. In this respect I think it is instructive to begin by 
comparing Campbell’s theoretical stance with Tye’s theory of pictorial (mental) 
representation. Indeed, the theories are partly related by their respective subject-
matter because Campbell’s theory can be fairly described as a theory of the role that 
imagistic representations play in the constitution of a key aspect —the demonstrative 
aspect— of perception, and Tye’s theory as a theory of what is distinctive of imagistic 
representations in general.28 Moreover, besides being related by their subject matter, 
they are also related by their very nature, to the extent that both declare that 
clarification of their respective subject matter should be sought in empirical scientific 
psychology, either by taking up contributions by others (Campbell), or by making 
one’s own contribution to it (Tye). It might be thought that a critical stance on 
Campbell could simply refer to the criticism levelled at Tye’s project (cf. § 1 of 
                                                
28 Campbell himself indirectly relates both projects by mentioning Kosslyn’s attempts at clarifying the 
notion of pictorial or imagistic representation (cf. “Sense, Reference and Selective Attention, p. 56). 
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Chapter 6), but this would not be correct; Campbell’s emphasis is on information, and 
this changes matters significantly. As we will see, this does not free Campbell’s 
position from decisive criticism but makes it, in contrast to Tye’s, somehow 
“recyclable”. 
 Campbell’s central notion of attention is, indeed, that of “selection of information 
[from the imagistic array] for further processing” (“Sense, Reference and Selective 
Attention”, p. 57). With this Campbell is pointing to the information (of the relevant 
kind) that the perceptual (subpersonal) mechanisms use for “fixing on“ an object, that 
is, to the information involved in the (information-processing) procedures used in 
what we can reasonably describe as the task of “isolating” an object from the 
perceptual background. But spelling out what information an internal mechanism uses 
to solve a cognitive task and why the mechanism uses that information, is to theorize 
at what David Marr (misleadingly) called the “level of computational theory”, that is, 
what was later to be called Marr’s level 1. In contrast, Tye’s proposal belongs to the 
“level of representation and algorithm” as we saw in Chapter 5, section 2. Thus, 
Campbell’s proposal about perceptual modes of presentation and Tye’s proposal 
about pictorial representations, whatever other similarities they may have, differ 
completely about their explanatory levels as these are laid out in Marr’s widely 
discussed —and, I think, widely accepted in its main outlines— methodological 
reflections on the scientific study of cognition. 
This, I believe, has the immediate consequence that we cannot generalize without 
further ado our negative conclusion on the potential of Tye’s proposal for clarifying 
the sense in which imagination is “picture-like” to Campbell’s proposal for clarifying 
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the notion of perceptual modes of presentation and thus clarifying the relation 
between “imagistic content” to “propositional content” —another way in which 
Campbell himself sees his approach to sense (cf. “Sense, Reference and Selective 
Attention”, pp. 56-57).29 
So, where does the problem for Campbell’s approach lie? One could anticipate —
as I did at the beginning of the section and again in a general way some paragraphs 
ago— that it stands out as soon as we consider in detail the classical requirement of 
senses to be “cognitively accessible” to subjects; that they must be something the 
subject can grasp, as we say when expressing the requirement in the terms that a long 
tradition of discussion on senses has put it (the terms we saw Campbell himself use in 
his specific objection to the naturalist position) How then can we say that subjects can 
grasp demonstrative modes of presentation when these are characterized in the terms 
of subpersonal mechanisms and procedures postulated by scientific psychology? 
Campbell has recently formulated just this problem for his proposal in the following 
way: 
 
Of course, you might point out that some of the input and output procedures I am 
concerned with not only involve shifts between the conceptual and non-conceptual 
levels, but shifts between personal and sub-personal levels. And, you might ask, in 
what sense does the subject grasp the justification for sub-personal procedures of 
whose existence he may have no inkling? 
(“Sense and Consciousness”, p. 203) 
 
                                                
29 I think that when Campbell associated sense with “the principles that the perceptual system uses to 
select a collection of imagistic information ...” (as quoted above), he is making a non-explicit 
suggestion about the explanatory level of his proposal by using just the word I have italicised. 
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This specific way of putting the problem arises from Campbell’s explanation in 
the same paper of the (causal) role of perceptual attention to objects, and the 
(conceptual) relation that grasping perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation 
has to that role: 
 
Which object your are consciously attending to is what causes you to use one 
information-processing procedure rather than another to verify the judgement. And it is 
the character of your conscious attention that causes you to use one information-
processing procedure rather than another to find the implications of the judgement for 
action. Moreover, your conscious attention to the object does not merely cause your use 
of these information processing procedures. It is also what justifies your use of these 
information-procedures. It defines the point of these procedures, what the goal is of the 
computation. And that is grasp of the sense of the demonstrative. If your did not have 
consciousness of the object, you might run these information-processing procedures; 
but you would have no grasp of their point. 
(“Sense and Consciousness”, pp. 202-203) 
 
My main concern is with the two sentences I have italized in this text. Let us ask: 
is the subject justified  in using or at least entitled to use the procedures at issue? As 
we know, in Campbell’s approach the procedures are defined entirely in subpersonal 
terms. The information they process is information transmitted through a channel 
where the occurrence of certain events at one end increases the probability of other 
events happening at the other end, where these events belong to groups characterized 
in subpersonal terms; hence, the information at issue is really information about 
which the subject “has no inkling”. How, indeed, can the subject be justified in using 
or entitled to the use of such procedures? This is Campbell’s answer: 
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The answer is that what the subject grasps defines the point of these sub-personal 
procedures; they are not somehow carried out independently of the aims of the subject 
(...) the grasp a [person] has of the demonstrative he is using defines the point of the sub-
personal procedures which underpin his use of the demonstrative, even though the 
speaker could not say what those sub-personal procedures are. 
(Loc. cit.) 
 
I think there is indeed a kind of justification involved here. But exactly what kind? 
What we should expect when talking of senses is that the justification involved is a 
rational justification. I think that Campbell should fully agree to this. Since he is 
rejecting a naturalist position, he should, I think, reject an account of the justification 
at stake that makes this exclusively a matter of the reliability of the processes 
involved. This, to my mind, is the decisive point, since I think that Campbell lacks 
what he needs, because of the scientific (“naturalistic”) way in which he characterizes 
the notions of attention and of the demonstrative mode of presentation. Campbell 
explains why there is justification (of the sort it takes, it is assumed) with the help of 
an analogy —a linguistic analogy, as a matter of fact (cf. op. cit.,ibid.), and in a 
partially similar way I will try to sort out when we do not have and when we have not 
rational justification in the case at hand with the help of a different case. If I do not 
use Campbell’s own analogy to explain what I see as the fundamental difficulty that 
Campbell’s approach faces, it is not because I think that his analogy is somehow 
particularly well suited to his purposes, so that there would be some special difficulty 
in using it to criticise of his views. It so happens tha the case I will use for 
clarificatory purposes is simpler while also more directly related to our case than 
simply by analogy since it is the case that Campbell himself uses to explain in a 
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general way (that is, before he comes to discuss the special case of demonstratives) 
just what grasp of sense is. 
The case at issue is that of the sense of a connective or, in other words, the mode 
of presentation of the semantic value of a connective, as this is given by the truth 
function shown in its truth table. After giving some examples of extensionally 
equivalent connectives that differ in their senses, and with the help of some examples 
showing how they also differ in the inferences that are justified with one or the other 
connective, Campbell says: 
 
So the reason why we need the notion of a ‘mode of presentation’ of semantic value 
is to explain why it is correct to use particular set of procedures in verifying or drawing 
the implications of propositions. The subject who grasps a particular mode of 
presentation of semantic value thereby grasps the justification for using a particular set 
of procedures for verifying or finding the implications of propositions. 
If this model is right, it suggests that we should think of grasp of sense (...) as what 
causes, and justifies, your use of a particular pattern of use of the term —a particular 
set of procedures for justifying and finding the implications of propositions involving 
the term. 
(Loc. cit. p. 196) 
 
Let me spell out the sense in which I find that these comments to be right with the 
help of a couple of (very simple) examples. If one is asked to verify the proposition 
‘A or B’, when given as data the assumed facts that A is false and B true, one uses 
one's understanding —one's grasp of the sense— of the connective ‘or’ to reflect that 
it is enough that one of the two, A or B is true for ‘A or B’ to be true, and that this 
sufficient condition is satisfied in the case at hand, since B is assumed to be true, so 
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that the verification is thereby complete. Again, if one is asked whether ‘A or B’ is an 
implication of A, one can use the very same understanding of the connective to reflect 
that since it is enough that one of the two, A or B, is true for ‘A or B’ to be true and A 
may be assumed to be true in the case at hand, it is mandatory that ‘A or B’ is also 
true. These reflections could perfectly well be explicitly put in the form of the 
procedure: “to verify whether ‘A or B’ is true, verify whether one of the two, A or B, 
is true. First, find out whether A is true. If A is false or not known to be true, find out 
whether B is true ...”. 
The procedures at stake in these cases are undoubtly procedures “within reach” of 
the thinking person. And I think it is not very controversial —at least not in the 
present discussion context— to say that someone capable of using such procedures 
has rational justification for the conclusions he reaches when verifying or finding 
implications of propositions. Now, I do not think that only the person that is actually 
presently able to apply such procedures explicitly possesses rational justification for 
such conclusions. I think that the capacity the subject is exercising in the cases at 
stake is “the very same, understanding-based capacity he would be exercising in a 
real case in which he had the information that [say] A is true and is false and has to 
evaluate the alternation ‘A or B’” (Peacocke, “Implicity Conceptions, Understanding 
and Rationality”, p. 45). Only, of course, he would be exercising that capacity 
implicitly and show only implicitly his understanding of the sense of the disjunction. 
And I think that we should allow that a subject that exercises his capacities in this 
way is also rationally justified or entitled to the conclusions he reaches, since it is the 
very same “understanding-based” capacities which he is using that gave justification 
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in the explicit case (cf. Peacocke’s “Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and 
Rationality”, § 1). 
In these cases of exercise of capacities —be it explicit or implicit— where it is 
legitimate to regard the subject as rationally justified or entitled, the procedures he 
uses are either procedures he can formulate and follow explicitly, or at least 
procedures he uses only implicitly but could be brought to recognize if certain 
cognitive “complements” were realized in the subject: he would need to make the 
procedures explicit to himself in the first place, and this seems to require certain 
habits of reflection —not to mention factors like time or willingness— and the 
possesion of some conceptual resources (at least some conception of truth and false) 
to develop the potential behind his implicit possession of the notion of disjunction. 
Bearing all this in mind, I think one should fully agree with Campbell’s claims at 
the end of his text that I quoted, if the term ‘procedures’ is given a personal meaning, 
that is, when these procedures are regarded as procedures which are either explicitly 
or implicitly carried out —but in the latter case, only in the sense of ‘implicit’ that has 
been explained in connection with the examples above.30 In contrast with this, I do 
                                                
30 That is, in the sense of ‘unthematized’ —not fully “brought to light” and attributable “at the 
personal level”— not in the very different sense usual in the cognitive sciences since its introduction 
by Chomsky in connection with knowledge of grammar of the mother tongue, which applies to 
subjects only in virtue of their having some subpersonal mechanisms. Cf. the comments above in 
section 2, n. 18. As can be seen, I am sticking to the terminology with ‘tacit’ and ‘implicit’. On the one 
hand it seems like a good idea to use a new term (which, moreover, seems to have a certain 
philosophical “pedigree”), since the phenomena described are clearly different. On the other hand, one 
might think that the use of ‘implicit’ or ‘tacit’ is perfectly natural in connection with knowledge —
procedures, awareness, etc.— that can be attributed to a person but which is not explicit knowledge of 
that person —procedures he uses explicitly, awareness he can inmmediately express or articulate, 
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not think we have any reason at all to talk of rational justification or entitlement of a 
subject if what we mean by ‘procedures’ are subpersonal procedures of one of our 
cognitive systems, the perceptual system, say. And it is obviously this sense of the 
word that is given to it in Campbell’s answer to the question put to him about the 
subject’s grasping of the justification for the subpersonal procedures. Hence, we 
should conclude that his answer to his own query cannot be right. If rational 
justification is what is at stake, the subject —simply as a person— cannot have 
justification for such supersonal procedures. And viceversa, if there is justication for 
them, this justification is only for some subpersonal procedures or algorithms relying 
on some (subpersonal) information to be activated, rather than others. That is, the sort 
of justification provided for reliable mechanisms and known only to experts 
knowledgable about the workings of such mechanisms. Both kinds of justification 
may be perfectly in order; but they should be kept separate. 
No difficulties of the kind that face Campbell’s theory face the approach to 
demonstrative modes of presentation I have expounded in the previous section, since 
“cognitive access” in this approach has been modulated to a personal key: attention 
—selecting out— is regarded as a personal —as opposed to subpersonal— process. 
Hence, things we can say which express intuitions are in principle in order. Things 
such as when we are perceiving an object we are —at least in central cases— 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
etc.— and that, moreover, it is the Chomskian use, applicable to subpersonal processes, which is 
unnatural, even if it is widespread. On this basis, one might try to “recover” what is perceived to be the 
“natural” use. I remain undecided about which is the wiser terminological decision, but in this 
dissertation I use ‘implicit’ (or ‘tacit’) in an un-Chomskyan way, using the expressions ‘psychological 
reality’ or ‘psychologically real’ when the Chomskyan notion is at issue (see below). 
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conscious of it as attended to, that is, according to my approach, as “selected out” by 
“bundling up” the properties of it of which one is conscious, or, subjectively 
speaking, by binding the qualia whose instantiation is caused by those properties —
qualia of which we are also cognitively aware. 
Furthermore, there is now nothing conceptually amiss in saying that the point of 
binding all those properties or qualities is to keep track of an object (where this 
expression is given much of its ordinary meaning) and to attribute to a person at least 
implicit knowledge of that “point”. Equally, there is nothing wrong with saying, in 
the more specific case of vision, that the point of linking all those properties or 
qualities to a location at a given moment may be to make that object which has those 
properties or corresponding to those qualities “stand out”, or that the point of linking 
all those properties or qualities to a succession of locations —in the case of vision of 
a moving object— is that of keeping track of the object thus associated with such 
properties or qualities. 
Let me now, in the last section of this work, make some general remarks directed 
at making room for the kind of theoretical approach in which my proposal has found 
its setting. 
 
 
7.5. The philosopher's mind: neither deep, nor shallow 
 
In his commentary to Campbell's “Sense, Reference and Selective Attention”, 
Mike Martin criticizes Campbell’s views as follows: 
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One might contrast Campbell's account with one on which one appeals to our 
knowledge of essential features of physical objects. For one might claim, a physical 
object is one which is distinguished form others by its spatio-temporal history—no two 
physical objects of the same kind can occupy the same place at the same time.... So, if one 
is knowingly to pick out a physical object, then one will be rational only if one takes it 
that a different object must be in mind where one picks out something at a discrete 
location, unless one has specific reason to think otherwise.... 
Here the explanation stays solely at the level of what is manifest to us about 
experience. 
(“The Shallows of the Mind”, p. 90) 
 
Martin is contrasting an account which, like Campbell’s, appeals to scientific 
theories with one that appeals to our knowledge of what it is to be a physical object. 
There would be no point in appealing to science to establishing the point that our 
awareness of the fact that every object has a distinctive spatial location is involved in 
our “picking it out”, and so consequently objects are presented to us as essentially 
located. As  is made explicit in the last two lines of the text quoted, the suggestion 
appears to be that a kind of explanation that remains at the level of “what is manifest” 
to us about experience suffices for establishing this point about location, and that an 
account based on empirical psychology —or any other science— would therefore be 
out of place. However, I suggest accepting either of these tenets would be wrong. 
With regard to the first, it seems natural to hesitate in attributing to Martin what 
his words would naturally suggest, because it seems very dubious that the explanation 
that he gives about the role of location stays solely or remains at the level of “what is 
manifest to us about experience”. It is one thing to say that a claim of ours is founded 
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on what “is manifest” to us about experience, and quite another to claim that it is 
exhausted by what is thus manifest. And the first idea is, I think, much more plausible 
than the second. 
In this way one is led to rise the question about the scope we should give to the 
word ‘manifest’ in such methodological or metaphilosophical reflections. In other 
words, what is the nature of the knowledge we should be appealing to here? One 
possibility —which I surmise is close to Martin’s thought— would run roughly as 
follows: we, as theorists, decide what the relevant traits we will use for giving 
explanations are on the basis of something like asking people (including ourselves) 
about their common sense thoughts and experiences, and abiding by their intuitions 
concerning them. A theorist will ground what is philosophically relevant about 
perceptual experiences in the case at issue solely on the basis of what affects our 
conscious experiences in a manner that we can easily recover, or what is immediately  
accessible to us through introspection. Only facts established that way would count 
for confirmation or otherwise of any contending proposals. 
Now, as theorists interested in charecterizing “senses” or demonstrative modes of 
presentation of objects in perception we could also be suspicious about conferring 
such relevance on what is patently accessible to everyone. Is it not possible that 
relevant aspects of the phenomena under study are not “manifest” in the sense of 
uncontroversially immediately accessible to subjects? Could it not be that, in what 
appears to be just thus and so on the basis of a more or less casual act of introspection 
there is actually ample room for discussion, for rational reconstruction, or in short for 
cases in which theory overrides intuitions? I think that some sound motivation for this 
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kind of position can be found in the preceding sections. As a general position it does 
not coincide with the “contrasting view” that Martin advances in his commentary on 
Campbell’s views on sense. In the new view, what we know in an “implicit” manner 
about what constitutes our experiences could only be made explicit through a process 
of rational discussion of theorizations . 
As applied to our problem, it would seem that perceptual demonstrative modes of 
presentation should be regarded first as theoretical elements that we suggest and 
justify at an “intermediate” level of analysis (i.e. neither scientific, nor “manifest”). 
We are explicitly conscious of those modes of presentation, and of what they are, only 
through theoretically oriented analysis or reasoning. Nevertheless, they remain within 
the boundaries of what subjects of experience and action are able to recognize, if they 
are brought to recognize them in an adequate way, and because of this it is fair to say 
that modes of presentation are tacitly immediately accessible to subjects as “in use”, 
for “guiding” perceptions and actions. According to this position then, we have, on 
the one hand, an explicit theory of such modes of presentation and of the grasping of 
these which is a priori in character. 
Indeed, there are several things that it is natural to hold that subjects know tacitly, 
or are tacitly entitled to assume a priori, according to such a view. Things such as: 
they are aware of objects in perception as attended to; or that the properties or 
qualities they appreciate as bundled up in an object when attending to it correspond 
precisely to the object attended; or that they are aware of qualia as belonging to 
objects, which involves being aware of qualia as bound. In saying that they tacitly 
know or are entitled tacitly to assume these things a priori, I mean in the first place 
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that knowledge of these things which is particular and not general —not the 
knowledge of a generalization, but knowledge referred to particular occasions— and 
which is implicit does not require relying on perception beyond what belongs to 
“enjoying” those experiences, something that I have suggested we should explain in 
terms of implicit cognitive awareness of qualia.31 Furthermore, in saying that such 
items are known implicitly a priori, I mean that explicitly making the corresponding 
claims —on top of “enjoying” the particular experiences— requires only the 
possession of the concepts involved, that is the concepts of attention, binding, and so 
on. In other words, we would be following in the footsteps of the postulation of 
diverse tacit capacities on which we reflected at the end of section 2, after discussing 
the particular case of the cognitive awareness of qualia. Unfortunately, however, here 
I cannot rely on a well articulated and widely supported theory of the a priori. 
But, even if I cannot appeal to a well developed theory of a priori knowledge here 
(and even less to try to develop one myself) I suggest that there is nothing amiss in 
saying that the kind of a priori knowledge at issue —or rather, its explicit version— 
                                                
31 I think the notion here is an extension of the notion of relativized a priori which Peacocke has 
recently introduced (cf. “Explaining the A Priori: The Programme of Moderate Rationalism” p. 267, 
and which applies to e. g. the judgement that that shade (perceptually given) is red and not green. The 
subject is entitled to a judgement such as this, says Peacocke, to the extent to which his judgement 
“does not rely on the content of her perceptual experiences, beyond that content needed for having the 
relevant concepts in the first place” (loc. cit.). And this is precisely what happens in a normal situation 
in which he makes that judgement. Since having the content corresponding to ‘that shade’ is possible 
only by perceiving the shade at issue, this perception is “not counted” —as it were— when we 
pronounce on about the (relative) a priori character of the judgement. In a similar way, I suggest, the 
awareness of qualia, and even of qualia as belonging to an object normally require perceptual episodes 
which should “not be counted” in deciding about the (relative) a priority of the claims in the text. 
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is compatible with the claim that such knowledge is a posteriori impugnable. And 
this, looked on in a positive, amounts to saying that such knowledge is also 
empirically confirmable. I think that the model here is provided by Chomskian 
theories of grammar. It seems to me that when generative linguists argue for and 
against theoretical proposals to account for grammatical phenomena on the basis of 
intuitions about language they eventually arrive at generalizations and other 
theoretical claims that they are entitled to hold, and which, if true would constitute 
knowledge. And I think we should agree that this kind of knowledge, reached in the 
way briefly described, is a priori. On the other hand, the generalizations and claims 
postulated aim to account for an underlying reality which psycholinguists and 
neurologists try to study by experimental methods. And such inquiries are centrally 
relevant for confirming or refuting whether such generalizations and claims have 
“psychological reality”. 
Now, my suggestion is that what we need to apply such views to the case of our 
interest is a notion of a “psychologically real” perceptual demonstrative mode of 
presentation, much in the way in which I think a priori knowledge about grammar, 
reached by means of abductive reasoning from “what is manifest” to our grammatical 
intuitions, is empirically confirmable (or refutable) as soon as we have a general 
adequate notion of a “psychologically real” grammar. In the same way in which it is 
first possible to raise the claim that a grammar which has been articulated on the basis 
of fundamentally a priori reflections reflects really a mental-cognitive capacity with 
the help of this notion, the claim that a particular view of perceptual demonstrative 
modes of presentation, articulated on the basis of fundamentally a priori reflections 
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captures really a mental-cognitive ability, as soon as we had the explicit supplement 
of a notion of a “psychologically real” perceptual demonstrative mode of 
presentation.32 
Finally, I suggest that this way of looking at things can make sense of Campbell’s 
attempt to put the discussion of “senses” at the level of subpersonal processes and 
mechanisms. The thinking is that his contribution may be regarded as making 
suggestions for a “psychologically real” theory of perceptual demonstrative modes of 
presentation, in the same way in which we can make claims to the effect that a 
particular grammar has that property. In the same way that these claims require the 
notion of a “psychologically real” grammar, Campbell’s efforts would require the 
supplement of a parallel characterization of the notion of a “psychologically real” 
perceptual mode of presentation, which has not been given until now. 
From this viewpoint, in recalling how Campbell’s concrete proposals on the 
“senses” of visual and auditive perceptual modes of perception in “Sense, Reference 
and Selective Attention” relied on an empirical theory which postulates features, we 
can realize that those proposals may be seen as claims that something like the modes 
of presentation arrived at by an a priori route in the theory I have been defending can 
be regarded as psychologically real. For, if the suggested way of looking at 
Campbell’s proposals is right —that is, if he can indeed be regarded as advancing 
                                                
32 In “When Is a Grammar Psychologically Real”, Peacocke showed how it is possible in principle to 
capture the notion of a “psychologically real” grammar. The application of such a notion opens the 
way for an explanation of our knowledge of grammar at Marr's three levels: the level of what 
information is handled, the algorithm level, and the level of neurophysiological realization. What I am 
suggesting for the case of perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation is a parallel of this 
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proposals for a “psychologically real” theory of  perceptual “senses”— a sort of 
bridge is needed to reach those proposals. And it may be thought that my explanation 
of the elements on which attention works could provide an important part of this 
bridge, since (we can recall from Chapter 5) these seem to be fundamentally the same 
kinds of entities that an empirical theory could use, with the exception that they 
respond to different individuative needs. I believe it is when this bridge is in place 
that Campbell’s theory could first begin to be seen as the “counterpart” in cognitive 
science, at Marr’s level 1, of a philosophical hypothesis established by abductive 
procedures about our implicit knowledge and notions.33 
                                                
33 The fact that Campbell’s proposal and mine depend on concrete psychological theories in a quite different way is a reflection of their differing status. 
While Campbell’s proposal in “Sense, Reference and Selective Attention” seems to depend on the truth of something very much like Treisman’s theory 
of selective attention, since that proposal appeals directly to it, my own proposal would only be a posteriori refuted by an empirically well supported 
theory of attention that is entirely without #features# and any notion of “binding” #features#. It does not stand or fall with Treisman’s particular model 
of how these elements work. 
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Now, I think these reflections and possibilities provide reasons for regarding what 
I described above as Martin’s second tenet in “The Shallows of the Mind” as wrong, 
that is, the claim that there is no point in appealing to science for establishing claims 
such as the idea that our awareness of the fact that any object has a distinctive spatial 
location is involved in our “picking it out”. Martin is indeed right when he claims that 
“we cannot simply read Campbell’s account off from ... empirical hypothesis” (op. 
cit., p. 91), and I have tried to argue in detail in favour of a claim like this. But, on the 
other hand, I believe science has a major role to play in the formulation and testing of 
empirical theories of perceptual modes of presentation. I hope then to have 
contributed to showing why in spite of being incorrect as a philosophical theory of 
such modes of presentation, even if preliminary and in need of essential 
supplementation, Campbell’s work is a most valuable contribution to the development 
of an empirical theory of such modes of presentation after all. Fortunately, we are not 
“stuck here in the shallows of the mind” (ibid. p. 97). 
 
 
 
 
 
Allport, A. 1989. “Visual Attention”. In Posner, M. I. (ed.), Foundations of 
 Cognitive Science. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989. 
Almog, J., Perry, J., Wettstein, H. (eds.). 1989. Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Bach, K. 1992. “Paving the Road to Reference”. Philosophical Studies, 67, pp. 295-
300. 
Baddeley, A. & Weiskrantz, L. (eds.). 1993. Attention: Selection, Awareness and 
Control. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Baldwin, T. 1992. “The projective theory of sensory content”. In T. Crane (ed.) 
1992. 
Bartlett, F.C. 1932. Remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Block, N. (ed.) 1981. Imagery. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
— 1983. “Mental Pictures and Cognitive Science”. The Philosophical  Review, 
XCII, 4, pp. 499-541. 
— 1995. “On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness”. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 18, pp. 227-47. 
Brewer, B. 1992. “Unilateral Neglect and the Objectivity of Spatial 
Representation”. Mind and Language, 7:3, pp. 222-239. 
— 1999. Perception and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Brinck, I. 2000. “Demonstrative Reference and Joint Attention”. Manuscript. 
Broadbent, D.E.  1958. Perception and Communication. New York: Pergamon Press. 
 — 1971. Decision and Stress. London: Academic Press. 
Brown R. & Herrnstein, R. 1981 “Icons and Images”. In Block (ed.), Imagery. 
Burge, T. 1991. “Vision and Intentional Content”. In E. Lepore & R. Van Gulick 
(eds.), John Searle and his critics. 
 
 
 
 
 
Campbell, J. 1987-88. “Is Sense Transparent?”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 88, pp. 273-292. 
— 1994. Past, Space, and Self. Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
— 1997. “Sense, Reference and Selective Attention”. Proceedings of the 
 Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 71, pp. 55-74. 
— 2001. “Sense and Consciousness”. In J. Brarell and P. Sullivan (eds.), Festshrift 
for Michael Dummett, Grazer Philosophical Studies, Graz, pp. 195-211. 
Cassam, Q. 1996. “Self-Reference, Self-Knowledge and the Problem of 
Misconception”. European Journal of Philosophy 4:3, pp. 276-295. 
— 1997.  Self and World. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Chisholm R. 1957. Perceiving. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.  
— 1976. Person and Object . La Salle, Ill.: Open Court. 
Clark, A. 1993. Sensory Qualities, Oxford: Clarendon University Press. 
Crane, T. (ed.). 1992. The Contents of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
— 1992. “The nonconceptual content of experience”. In T. Crane (ed.) 1992. 
Crimmins, M. 1992. “Tacitness and Virtual Beliefs”. Mind and Language, 7, pp. 
240-263. 
Dennett, D. 1981. Brainstorms. Brighton: Harverster Press. 
— 1988. “Quining Qualia”. In T. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in 
Contemporary Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Also included in W. 
Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. 
— 1989. The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 
Donnellan, K. 1966. “Reference and Definite Descriptions”. Philosophical Reveiw, 
75, pp. 281-304. 
 
 
 
 
 
Dretske, F. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 
Duncan, J. 1984. “Selective Attention and the Organization of Visual 
Information”. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 113, pp. 501-517. 
— 1993. “Selection of Input and Goal in the Control of Behaviour”. In A. 
Baddeley and L. Weiskrantz (eds.), Attention: Selection, Awareness and Control. 
Dummett, M. 1993. The Origins of Analytical Philosophy. London: Duckworth. 
Eilan, N. 1997. “Objectivity and the Perspective of Consciousness”. European 
Journal of Philosophy, 5:3, pp. 235-250. 
— 1998. “Perceptual Intentionality, Attention and Consciousness”. In A. 
 O’Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. 
Elder, C. 1998. “What verus How in Naturally Selected Representations”. Mind, 
107, pp. 349-363. 
Evans, C. O. 1970. The Subject of Consciousness. London: George Allen & 
 Unwin Ltd. 
Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
— 1985. Collected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
— 1985. “Understanding Demonstratives”. In G. Evans, Collected Papers, pp. 291-
322 
Frege, G. 1980. Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, edited by Gottfried 
Gabriel, Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, Christian Thiel, and  Albert 
Veraart, abridged for the English edition by Brian McGuinness, and translated 
by Hans Kaal. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
— 1980. Posthumous Writings, edited by Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, and 
Friedrich Kaulbach, translated by Peter Long and Roger White. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
 
 
 
 
 
García-Carpintero, M. 1995. “El funcionalismo”. In F. Broncano (ed.), 
Enciclopedia Iberoamericana de Filosofía. Vol. 8: La mente humana. Madrid: Trotta-
CSIC, pp. 43-76. 
— 1996. “Superveniencia y determinación del contenido amplio”. Revista de 
Filosofía, IX-16, pp. 57-91. 
— 1997. “Putnam’s Dewey Lectures”. Theoria, 12, pp. 213-223. 
— 1998. “Indexicals as Token-Reflexives”. Mind, 107:427, pp. 529-63. 
— 1999a. “Searle on Perception”. Teorema, XVIII/1, pp. 19-41. 
— 1999b. “Por la ‘quineación’ de los qualia cartesianos”. Análisis Filosófico, 19:2, 
pp. 101-141. 
— 2000a. “Las razones para el dualismo”. In Chacón Fuertes, P. and Rodríguez 
González, M. (eds.), Pensando la mente. Perspectivas en filosofía y psicología, 
Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, pp. 27-119. 
— 2000b. “A Presuppositional Account of Reference-Fixing”. Journal of 
Philosophy, 97, pp. 109-147. 
Grice, H. P. 1961. “The Causal Theory of Perception”. Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 35, pp. 121-52. 
— 1969. “Vacuous Names”. In Davidson, D. and Hintikka, J. (eds.), Words and 
Objections, Boston: Reidel, pp. 118-45. 
Hamlyn, D.W. 1983. Perception, Learning and the Self: Essay in the Philosophy of 
Psychology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Hill, C. 1991. Sensations: A Defence of Type Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hopkins, R. 1998. Picture, Image and Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
Houck, M. R. & Hoffman, J. E. 1986. “Conjunction of color and form without 
attention: Evidence from an orientation-contingent color aftereffect”. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 12, pp. 186-99. 
Jackson, F. 1977. Perception. A Representative Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
James, W. 1952. The Principles of Psychology. Chicago: Encyclopædia 
 Britannica. 
Johnston, W. A. & Dark, V. J. 1986. “Selective Attention”. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 37, pp. 43-75. 
Kahneman, D. 1973. Attention and Effort. Englewoods Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
Kahneman, D. & Treisman, A. 1984. “Changing views of attention and 
automaticity”. In R. Parasuraman & D. R. Davies (eds.), Varieties of attention. 
New Work: Academic Press. 
Kaplan, D. 1989a. “Demonstratives”. In J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein 
 (eds.), pp. 481-563. 
— 1989b. “Afterthoughts”. In J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (1989), pp. 565-
614. 
Kosslyn, M., et al. 1979. “On the Demystification of Mental Imagery”. Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences, 2, pp 535-581. 
— 1980. Image and Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
LePore E. & van Gulick (eds.) 1991. John Searle and his critics. Oxford: 
 Blackwell. 
Lowe, E.J. 1992. “Experience and its objects”. In T. Crane (ed.) 1992. 
Marr, D. 1982.Vision, San Francisco: Freeman. 
Martin, M. 1992. “Sight and touch”. In T. Crane (ed.) 1992. 
 
 
 
 
 
— 1997. “The Shallows of the Mind”. In The Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
volume, LXXI, pp. 75-98. 
McDowell, J. 1990. “Peacocke and Evans on Demonstrative Content”. Mind, 99, 
pp. 255-266. 
— 1991.“Intentionality De Re”. In E. LePore & van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and 
His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 215-225. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962. The Phenomenology of Perception, London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
Mulligan, K. 1995. “Perception”. In B. Smith and D. W. Smith, The Cambridge 
Companion to Husserl, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 168-238. 
Nagel, T. 1974. “What Is It Like To Be a Bat?”. In Nagel, T., Mortal Questions, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 165-180. 
Nakayama, K. & Silverman, G. H. 1986. “Serial and Parallel Encoding of Visual 
Feature Conjunctions”. Investigative Opthalmology and Visual Science, 27 (Suppl. 
182). 
Neisser, U. 1976. Cognition and Reality. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company. 
Nida-Rümelin, M. 1996. “Pseudonormal Vision”. Philosophical Studies, 82, pp. 
145-157. 
O’Hear, A. (ed.) 1998. Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
O'Shaughnessy, B. 1992. “The diversity and unity of action and perception”. In 
T. Crane (ed.) 1992. 
Parasuraman, R. & Davies, D. R. (eds.) 1984. Varieties of Attention. London: 
Academic Press. 
Peacocke, C. 1981. “Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation”. 
 
 
 
 
 
Synthese, 49, pp. 187-217. 
— 1983. Sense and Content. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
— 1985. “Experience and Possibility: A Berkeleian View Defended”. In Foster 
and Robinson (eds.) Essays on Berkeley. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
— 1986. “Analogue Content”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 60, pp. 1-17. 
— 1986. “Explanation in Computational Psychology: Language, Perception and 
Level 1.5”. Mind and Language, 1, pp. 101-123. 
— 1989. “Perceptual Content”. In J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.), 
Themes from Kaplan . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
— 1989. “When is a Grammar Psychologically Real?”. In A. George (ed.), 
Reflections on Chomsky, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 111-130. 
— 1991. “Demonstrative Content: A Reply to John McDowell”. Mind, 100,  pp. 
123-133. 
— 1992. “Scenarios, concepts and perception”. In T. Crane (ed.) 1992. 
— 1998a. “Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationaliy”. In E. 
Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues, 8: Concepts. Atascadero, Calif.: 
Ridgeview, pp. 43-88. 
— 1998b. “Implicit Conceptions, the A Priori, and the Identity of Concepts. In E. 
Villanueva (ed.), id. id., pp. 121-148. 
— 1998c. “Conscious Attitudes, Attention and Self-Knowledge”. In C. Wright, B. 
Smith and C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
— 1999. Being Known. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pérez Otero, M. 2000. “Sobre la estructura de la explicación causal teleológica”. 
Mora, Ibarra et.al. (eds.) Actas del III Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, 
 
 
 
 
 
Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España. Donostia-San Sebastián: 
Universidad del País Vasco. 
Posner, M. 1978. Chronometric Exploration of Mind. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 
— 1994. “Attention: the Mechanisms of Consciousness”. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 91, pp. 7398-7403. 
Posner, M. & Petersen, S. 1990. “The Attention System of the Human Brain”. 
Annual Review of Neuroscience, 13, pp. 25-42. 
Pylyshyn, 1984. Computation and Cognition, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Reimer, M. 1991. “Demonstratives, Demonstrations and Demonstrata”. 
Philosophical Studies, 63, pp.187-202. 
— 1992. “Three Views of Demonstrative Reference”. Synthese 93, pp. 373-402. 
Roessler, J. 1999. “Perception, Introspection and Attention”. European Journal of  
Philosophy , 7:1, pp. 47-64. 
Rowlands, M. 1997. “Teleological Semantics”, Mind, 106. pp. 279-303. 
Searle, J. 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
— 1991. “Response: Reference and Intentionality”. In E. Lepore & R. Van Gulick 
(eds.), John Searle and his critics. 
Sellars, W. 1963. Science, Perception, and Reality . London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
— 1968. Science and Metaphysics . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp. 9-28. 
Shepard, R. & Chipman, S. 1970. “Second-Order Isomorphism of Internal 
Representations: Shapes of States”. Cognitive Psychology, 1, pp. 1-17. 
Shepard, R. & Metzler, J. 1971. “Mental Rotation of Three-Dimensional Objects”, 
Science, 171, pp. 701-703. 
Shoemaker, S. 1975. “Functionalism and Qualia”. Philosophical Studies, 27, pp. 
 
 
 
 
 
291-315. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1984. Collected in N. Block (ed.), Readings in 
Philosophy of Psychology, volume 1. London: Methuen, 1980. And also collected 
in D. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991. 
— 1982. “The Inverted Spectrum”. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1984. 
— 1984. Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
— 1991. “Qualia and Consciousness”. Mind, 100, pp. 507-524. Reprinted in 
Shoemaker 1996. 
— 1994. “Self Knowledge and ‘Inner Sense’”. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 54, pp. 249-314, Reprinted in Shoemaker 1996. 
— 1996. Ther First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Snowdon, P. 1980-1. “Perception, Vision and Causation”. Proceedings of the  
Aristotelian Society, 81, pp. 175-192. 
— 1992. “How to interpret ´direct perception´”. In T. Crane (ed.) 1992. 
Strawson, P.F. 1959. Individuals. London: Methuen. 
Treisman A. 1969. “Strategies and Models of Selective Attention”. Psychological 
Review, 76:3, pp. 282-299. 
— 1982. “Perceptual Grouping and Attention in Visual Search for Features and 
objects”. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 
8, pp. 194-214. 
— 1985. “Preattentive Processing in Vision”. Computer Vision, Graphics, and Image 
Processing, 31, pp. 156-177. 
— 1986. “Features and Objects in Visual Processing”. Scientific American, 255:5, 
 
 
 
 
 
pp. 106-115. 
— 1988. “Features and Objects: The Fourteenth Bartlett Memorial Lecture”. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 40A:2, pp. 201-237. 
— 1993. “The perception of features and objects”. In A. Baddeley & L. 
Weiskrantz (eds.) 1993. 
Treisman, A. & Gormican, S. 1988. “Feature Analysis in Early Vision: Evidence 
from Search Asymmetries”. Psychological Review, 95, pp. 15-48. 
Treisman, A. & Sato, S. 1990. “Conjunction search revisited”. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 16, pp. 459-78. 
Treisman, A. & Schmidt, H. 1982. “Illusory Conjunctions in the Perception of 
Objects”. Cognitive Psychology, 14, pp. 107-141. 
Tudela, Pío. 1992. “Atención”. Tratado de psicología general 3. Atención y percepción. 
Madrid: Alhambra, pp. 119-162. 
Tye, M. 1984. “The adverbial approach to visual experience”. Philosophical 
Review, 93, pp. 195-225. 
— 1989. The Metaphysics of Mind . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
— 1991. The Imagery Debate. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
— 1992. “Visual qualia and visual content”. In T. Crane (ed.) 1992. 
— 1995. Ten Problems Of Consciousness. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Valberg, J.J. 1992. “The puzzle of experience”. In T. Crane (ed.) 1992. 
Weiskrantz, L. 1986. Blindsight: A Case Sudy and Implications. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Wolfe, J. M., Cave, K. R. & Franzeld, S. L. 1989. “Guided search: an alternative 
to the feature integration model for visual search”. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 15, pp. 419-433. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Wright, C., Smith, B. & Macdonald, C. (eds.) 1998. Knowing Our Own Minds. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Wright, L. 1976. Teleological Explanations: An Etiological Analysis of Goals and 
Functions. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Wright, R. D. (ed.) 1998. Visual Attention. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
